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On the 11 May 2008, South Africa was awakened to a major xenophobic violence that 
was targeted at mainly black African nationals resident in the country. The violence 
later gained momentum spreading through the different provinces of the country in a 
space of weeks.  While this was not the first and last of these kinds of violence against 
African immigrants, this marked a watershed in terms of its magnitude. The net 
import of these kinds of attacks shows strained relations not only between South 
Africans and African immigrants but also between their states.   
 
This study therefore sought to analyse the deep-seated reasons behind afrophobia and 
the violence that accompanies it in South Africa. This was with a view to highlighting 
the development implications of this afrophobia for South Africa.  The overarching 
goal of the study which also underscores its significance is to proffer solutions on how 
to achieve intra-racial harmony and peaceful co-existence between different social 
groupings in South Africa to foster its development. 
 
Adopting a qualitative approach, this study illuminated the hydra-headed nature of 
xenophobia in South Africa and analyses the danger xenophobic violence poses to 
South Africa‘s national security and reputation. Its findings showed that not only is 
xenophobia not peculiar to South Africa, but that the country may not be as 
xenophobic as is popularly portrayed by images of the May 2008 violence. In view of 
this, it proffers practical recommendations that will provide lasting solutions to 
xenophobic violence in South Africa.  Some of these include instituting and practising 
peace education across various organisations and tertiary institutions in South Africa, 
abolishing all forms of apartheid structures and racial hierarchies of social benefits, 
inter/intra-racial integration and upholding the teaching and learning of various South 
African languages across South African institutions. Others include the provision of 
jobs and housing, strengthening of the judicial system and government agencies to act 
against xenophobic violence and hate speech, and instituting national integration 
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Historically in South Africa, inter-group conflicts and violence are not unusual.  From 
initial contact, many ethnic groups have often been involved in conflicts; in particular, 
black groups  have had inter-group conflicts dating  to the pre-colonial and apartheid 




 centuries in South 
Africa were marked by a series of inter-group conflicts such as warfare, cattle/slave 
raids and battles for fertile lands. For instance,  the Zulu kingdom fought with the 
Mpondo State forcing the Mpondos under the leadership of Faku to move to the west 
side of the Mzimvubu River, from where the Mpondo military strength became a 
force to be reckoned with in the region during the 1820s (Stapleton, 2010:13-15 and 
30). There were also decisive battles between the Mpondo and the Xesibe and the 
Mpondo and the Ngwane. Meanwhile, the Griqua horse men along with the Tlhaping 
also carried out disastrous attacks on the Mantatees, while the Ngwaketse rooted out 
the Hurutshe in the ‗war of Maobi‘ (Stapleton, 2010:15-20). 
Furthermore, there were deadly battles between the Zulus and the Boers and between 
the British and the Boers. These various geopolitical wars that were fought between 
different ethnic groups such as the Zulus, the English and the Boers, which eventually 
culminated in the emergence of the South African state in 1910, are part of the history 
of inter-group conflicts in South Africa (Laband, 2008a:168-174, laband, 2008b:87-
96, Jauch and Muchena, 2011:242). These latter conflicts which were underpinned by 
racial segregation between blacks and whites were formalised by and became 
intensified as a result of the apartheid system of government which came into effect in 
1948 (Richmond, 1994:208, Louw and Kendall, 1986:31, 12-15, Carton et al., 2008). 
According to du Toit (2001:72), the indigenous black people of South Africa were not 
only opposed to the apartheid system of government; but also increasingly engaged 
the white rulers through both peaceful and violent demonstrations. The harsh response 
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from the apartheid state served to further heighten their dehumanisation and led to 
more killings of many black people (Du Toit, 2001:72). Expectedly, many black 
South Africans were forced into exile to neighbouring Southern African countries 
such as Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia. 
Many others wound up in countries further afield such as Algeria, Nigeria and 
Tanzania. While in exile, black South African nationalists continued their campaign 
against the apartheid regime with the aid of their host nations (Human Rights Watch, 
1998:25, Tutu, 2008:1) . 
The relationship between black Africans and the nationalist black South Africans was 
very good during this period especially due to the rise of pan-africanist ideas which 
called for Africans to unite against oppression and colonialism. As a result many 
African countries and their peoples willingly offered assistance to black South 
Africans. For examples, many of them in exile across the continent were provided for 
and protected by both the government and the people of their host states sometimes to 
the latter groups‘ own detriment (Human Rights Watch, 1998:25-29). Even states 
outside the region such as Nigeria, which was geopolitically not a frontline
1
 state, was  
supportive in cash and kind to the anti-apartheid effort that by 1994, through had 
made financial donations of about US $61 billion towards championing the cause 
against apartheid (Ngwenya, 2010b, Okolo, 2008).Conversely, notable evidence of 
good relations between black South Africans and other black Africans based on the 
notion of ―we are all Africans‖ was evident in  the Swaziland independence struggle 
which was supported and encouraged by exiled South Africans in Swaziland 
(Sachikonye, 1995:67-68).  
Unfortunately, the relationship between black South Africans and black Africans has 
grossly deteriorated in recent times (1994-2008) with the worst case scenario being an 
outbreak of xenophobic violence in 2008 (The Citizen, 2008:3, Tutu, 2008:1). The 
relationship between the two different groups is now largely characterised not only by 
suspicion, fear and hatred but also violence expressed by some black South Africans 
                                                          
1
 The collapse of apartheid and the advent of democracy in South Africa were regionally supported by a group 
of southern African states known as the Frontline States. These were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and, from 1980, Zimbabwe.  
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against African immigrants and vice versa (in some cases) in what has been famously 
described as afrophobia/xenophobia (Mapumulo, 2008:5, Matsinhe, 2011:310).
2
 
Meanwhile it should be noted that since 1994 and beyond, black Africans have 
increasingly migrated legally and illegally in significant numbers to different parts of 
the world including South Africa. This is due largely to economic pull factors in 
South Africa as well as socio-political and economic push factors from their various 
countries (Muzumbukilwa, 2007:3, Nwonwu, 2010:149-152). For instance, Ngwenya 
contends that the attraction to South Africa ―may be attributed to South Africa‘s 
economic strength on the continent‖ (Ngwenya, 2010a:11). Unfortunately as it is a 
common problem with the case of new discoveries, the country endeared both the 
good and bad eggs from different parts of the world (Okolo, 2008).
3
  
However, what is often neglected in this analysis is the role of apartheid in creating 
the socio-economic conditions for post-apartheid African immigration to South 
Africa. Because the apartheid regime in South Africa felt threatened by the anti-
apartheid activities of a number of African states, it embarked on a destabilisation 
policy in 1979 to subvert the governments of some host nations of the exiled anti-
apartheid movements (Hanlon, 1986:27, Human Rights Watch, 1998:25-29). The 
apartheid government carried out several strategic military and economic actions to 
frustrate the government and economies of the frontline states, with Angola and 
Mozambique being the worst hit by South Africa‘s sponsored military campaigns 
(Hanlon, 1986:27-30, Human Rights Watch, 1998:25-31). In this way, the imperialist 
activities of apartheid South Africa contributed to negative political and economic 
conditions in the Southern African sub-region. These situations, contributed 
                                                          
2
 Afrophobia is the term used to describe the fear of fellow Africans and violence against fellow Africans. This 
term is deployed in the explanation of violence carried out against black African immigrants by some black 
South Africans in South Africa. 
3
 The fall of apartheid and the diverse nature of South African economy presented a very attractive picture of the 
nation to the world, fortunately and unfortunately this attraction lured both the good and the bad into the 
country. This is more in the sense that the country became very attractive for investors, professionals, traders as 
well as criminals. Criminals took advantage of the weaknesses in the new structures of democracy in the country 
to perpetrate crime with impunity. However it must be clearly noted that some of these criminals in the country 
are either South Africans or foreign nationals. 
Also see: Nkomo, M., Mkwanazi-Twala, Z. & Carrim, N. 1995. the long shadow of Apartheid ideology: The 
case of open schools in South Africa. In: Bowser, P. B. (ed.) Racism and anti-racism in world perspective. 
London: Sage Publications, Solomon, H. 2003. of myths and migration: Illegal immigration into South Africa, 
Pretoria, Unisa Press, Nyamnjoh, F. B. 2006. Insiders and outsiders: Citizenship and xenophobia in 
contemporary Southern Africa, Darker,London,New York, Codesria Zed Books, Mnisi, P. 2008. State is not 
doing enough to educate people on refugees. The Star May 15, p.11. 
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subsequently in many citizens of these states being forced to flee their countries for 
South Africa, which comparatively, is more stable and stronger politically and 
economically. A good number of black African immigrants from these countries 
living in post-apartheid South Africa are actually refugees from the civil wars of the 
1970s and 1980s in which apartheid South Africa is implicated (Hanlon, 1986). 
However, this is not to excuse the prevalence of corruption and bad governance in 
most of Africa which has also served to create or worsen socio-economic conditions 
in the continent.  
Unfortunately, in spite of the good relations between black South Africans and 
Africans during the apartheid era, racial segregation, discrimination, misconception of 
African foreigners and violence against them persists in South Africa in post-
apartheid South Africa. A number of inter-related arguments and factors have been 
advanced for this. For instance, Laing and Pather (2008:1) argue that many years into 
democracy in South Africa, whites enjoy the highest average incomes with as much as 
450 percent more than Africans and 400 percent more than ―coloureds‖. These 
prevailing social stratification structures appear not only to have placed the black 
people of South Africa in a disadvantaged position with a growing sense of frustration 
and anger, but also the need to identify suitable targets for their continued hardships. 
It is in this way that some of them have come to scapegoat another vulnerable group - 
the African foreigners - for their social and economic difficulties. 
1.2  Research Problem 
The period of 1994-2008 was an evolutionary period in the history of relations 
between South Africans and African immigrants. The democratic elections of 1994 
also marked the dawn of bitter relations between African immigrants and black South 
African citizens (Nyamnjoh, 2006). The height of this bitter relationship was the 
explosion of major xenophobic violence in 2008 which has negative implications for 
South Africa‘s regional leadership ambitions and global image as well as for its socio-
economic development (Hassim et al., 2008:1). The situation in South Africa is such 
that some black South Africans believe that African immigrants have come to 
compete with them for limited opportunities provided for them within the current 
social stratification (Lekota, 2008:4, Msomi, 2008:1, Sowetan, 2008b:1). As a means 
of ‗othering‘ and excluding the African immigrant, the black South African has 
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therefore deployed the negative ideology of ―aMakwerekwere‖ to describe and  relate 
with African immigrants (Matsinhe, 2011:302-303, Nyamnjoh, 2006:38-68). The state 
is not an innocent bystander as some politicians in South Africa go as far as making 
inflammatory statements that claim that African immigrants are responsible for the 
rising unemployment rate, current crime wave and even the spread of diseases all over 
South Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2006:48, Crush, 2008:33, 44-45). This has amounted to 
African foreigners becoming clear target for abuse by some South African citizens 
and government agencies (Sichone, 2001, Landau, 2004, La Grange, 2008b:1). The 
abuses and hate crimes still continue in South Africa in 2012 (Ncube, 2012, Nyasa 
Times, 2012, SAPA, 2011). However, it is strange that these xenophobic attacks are 
also meted out on poor black African immigrants who have lived for so long among 
poor black South Africans (Zondi, 2008:26-27, Ratsatsi, 2008:8). This shows that 
irrespective of the duration of residence of African immigrants in South Africa, the 
relationship between the two groups, that is, the migrants and black South Africans, 
has been characterized by conflicts and contestations of belonging. 
What are the deep-seated psycho-social, economic and political dynamics around 
selective xenophobia in South Africa? What are the development implications of 
selective xenophobia or afrophobia for South Africa? And how best can these issues 
be managed to foster better relations between the groups involved? It is the objective 
of this study to explore issues of conflict prevention, resolution and management in 
the relations between black South Africans and African immigrants in South Africa. 
In so doing, this study seeks not only to ascertain the reasons behind afrophobia and 
the violence that accompanies it in South Africa, but also to assess the implications of 
the conflict for South African development and regional ambitions.  
1.3 Significance of Study 
It is important to carry out a study of this nature because of the negative development 
implications a tense relationship between black South Africans and black African 
immigrants will continue to have for South Africa if this is not checked. This study 
reveals that this relationship has not improved since the last major outbreak of 
afrophobia in 2008. Therefore, an evaluative study aimed at understanding the 
relationship between both parties in a post-apartheid South Africa with a view to 
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proffer solutions for peaceful co-existence is significant especially in the light of its 
implications for regional solidarity and nation-building in South Africa. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study has the following as its specific objectives: 
 To analyse the deep-seated reasons behind afrophobia and the violence that 
accompanies it in South Africa 
 To highlight the development implications of this afrophobia for South Africa  
 To proffer solutions on how to achieve intra-racial harmony and peaceful co-
existence between different social groupings in South Africa. 
 1.5 Key Questions 
 What are the deep-seated reasons behind afrophobia and the violence that 
accompanies it in South Africa?   
 What are the development implications of afrophobia or xenophobia in South 
Africa? 
 What are the possible solutions to inter-group or intra-racial conflicts in South 
Africa and how can they be implemented? 
1.6 Hypothesis / Propositions 
 The dynamics of apartheid group relations between black and white South 
Africans is a cause of afrophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. 
1.7 Research Design 
The study adopted a combination of various overlapping research approaches and 
techniques to answer the broad research questions outlined. Accordingly, it combined 
historical and qualitative approaches. For example, the proposed study adopted a 
historical research approach with a qualitative approach bearing in mind the 
descriptive and exploratory nature of the study. Historical research method involves 
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the systematic collection and objective evaluation of data related to past events in 
order to test the hypothesis concerning causes, effects, patterns, or trends of these 
events that may help to explain present and anticipate future events. Also this research 
is exploratory as it seeks to attain novel insights and information on the proposed 
research area (Babbie and Mouton, 2006:80). The study also employed the qualitative 
research method due to the empirical and exploratory nature of the research. 
Qualitative research is most appropriate if the purpose of the study is to ‗describe a 
situation, phenomenon, problem or event; the information is gathered through the use 
of variables measured on nominal or ordinal scales (qualitative measurement scales), 
and if analysis is done to establish the variation in the situation, phenomenon or 
problem without quantifying it‘ (Kumar, 1999:10). It should be employed when the 
phenomena to be studied are ‗complex, are social in nature, and do not lend 
themselves to quantification' (Liebscher, 1998:46(4), 668-680). 
1.8 Methodology   
 Data is generated from mainly secondary sources. Data that are extracted from 
already existing literature is known as secondary data; conversely, the primary source 
of data is information collected directly by the researcher (Kumar, 1999:104). 
Secondary data is used to provide broad contextual and bibliographic information in 
order to illuminate the essence of this study. Relevant secondary data was sourced 
from a review of books, newspapers, magazines, government documents and 
legislation, research reports and statistics, academic journals and internet articles, 
press releases, archival materials, seminar papers and unpublished theses that speak to 
the theme of citizenship, immigration, xenophobia and peace in South Africa. 
 Data analysis: Due to the sensitive nature of this research and the enormous wealth of 
available secondary data resources, data was obtained from only secondary sources. 
This was analysed using content analysis in order to ascertain the influence of African 
immigration on the notion of citizenship in South Africa. In the words of Neuendorf 
(2002:10),  
Content analysis is a summarising, quantitative analysis of messages 
that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity, 
inter-subjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalisability, 
replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types 
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of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages 
are created or presented. 
This method of data analysis can be used in any kind of communication (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2006:383). Concisely, the study have carried out a collection and analyses of 
secondary data in order to produce a holistic but nuanced analysis of the implications 






















LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
  
2.1    Introduction 
Having thoroughly introduced this project in the previous chapter, bearing in mind 
that this project carried out an in-depth study into the causes and solutions to 
afrophobia in South Africa, it then becomes absolutely necessary to embark on a 
literature survey which will lead to a theoretical frame work suitable enough to carry 
on with the study. 
It is in this light therefore that this chapter undertook a very thorough review of 
available literature in order to investigate the true nature of Afrophobia in South 
Africa and the violence that accompanies it, drawing its strength from various studies 
that paved way for a suitable set of theoretical design.   
2.2 Literature Review    
2.2.1 Migration and Xenophobia in a Global Context  
Xenophobia is an issue not only peculiar to South Africa but also prevalent in 
different countries around the world. In Romania, for instance, xenophobia comes in 
the form of anti-Semitism, hatred for Hungarians and Russians who are citizens of 
their neighbouring countries (Saideman and Ayres, 2008:155-160). In the name of 
fear of domination, Romanians are said to exhibit xenophobic attitudes towards 
Russians more than Hungarians or any other immigrant resident in Romania. 
Meanwhile in Australia, there are xenophobic sentiments against immigrants; this is 
irrespective of the fact that Australia is a multicultural society. Foreigners are all 
reported to be perceived as criminals, asylum seekers or illegal immigrants. These 
sentiments are alleged to be directed more especially at those that arrived in the 
country on boats. To make matters worse, government and opposition parties are said 
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to be indulging in whipping up fears and loathing of refugees (Burnside, 2009).  
In France, anti-immigrant attitudes were spurred by the presence of Muslims and 
other races in a once predominantly white and largely catholic country. Xenophobia 
became so rife in France that immigration became highly politicised with the media 
and French citizens blaming unemployment and insecurity on immigrants (Roemer et 
al., 2007:237-247). As a result, the French government tightened up immigration laws 
as foreigners became labelled as criminals and a threat to the welfare of the average 
French citizen. In the 1980s, anti-immigrant political parties emerged in France and 
quickly became very successful -- perhaps, an indication that xenophobic attitudes 
had become widely accepted as patriotism in France (Roemer et al, 2007:237-247). In 
what seems to be the most infamous case of brutality against foreigners in France, the 
Mayor of Paris evicted forcefully some foreigners by bulldozing their hostel on the 
eve of Christmas in 1980, thereby rendering many African immigrants living in Paris 
homeless (Roemer et al, 2007:245-246). Campbell (2003:77) contends that in Britain, 
immigrants from white dominated continents are more welcomed by Britons. This is 
based on the fact that the British are afraid of allegedly getting their culture and 
national identity contaminated by people from other continents such as Africa, Asia 
and the Caribbean. Based on this, certain immigration restrictions were applied on 
people coming from these continents (Campbell, 2003:77). However, in the United 
States of America (USA), xenophobic violence is reported to be carried out in the 
form of anti-Hispanic hate crimes. Reports indicate that there are possibilities that 
alleged increase in hate crimes in the USA is as a result of Hispanic immigration and 
personal grudges directed at mostly Hispanics (Stacey et al., 2011:287-294). 
 
However, taking a look at xenophobia in the USA from a historical perspective 
reveals that xenophobia was rife in the USA in the 19
th
 century. But the situation grew 
worse from 1885 with white Americans reported to have rioted against Chinese 
residents. Later on in the 1890s, unemployed white farm workers were reported to 
have out of intolerance, launched xenophobic attacks on their Chinese counterparts to 
violently expel them from the fields. There were other cases of violence against 
Mexicans, Italians and Asians in the USA, but in 1891 a mob was reported to have 
lynched 11 Sicilians accused of murdering a police officer. Violence against 
Mexicans grew in magnitude and proportion in 1914 but despite this, English 
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speaking Canadians were welcomed in the US by Native Americans. Amongst those 
also welcomed in the USA during this period by locals were immigrants from 
England, Germany and the Scandinavia, while at the same time displaying hatred for 
Irish Catholics, French speaking Canadians and Jews (Fetzer, 2000:30). Incidentally 
this is similar to the situation in South Africa in the sense that the xenophobic 
violence reported in the USA is selective and not targeted at all foreigners resident in 
the United States of America. 
 
Apparently, there is a striking similarity between the type of xenophobic attitudes 
reported in the USA and the nature of xenophobic violence experienced in South 
Africa, as well as the oppressive policies of the defunct apartheid regime in South 
Africa. According to Mikulich (2009:4) there are fears that the influx of Mexican and 
Latino immigrants in the U.S will undermine ―white European—power over U.S. 
identity‖. Thus Mikulich (2009:4) writes:  
 
U.S. American xenophobia, based on the assumption that ‗our country‘ 
is defined by, and should maintain, its dominant white European 
heritage is rooted in the myth of the U.S. as a nation of European 
immigrants. This myth represses America‘s original sin of racism and 
obscures the fact that the country was in part built, advanced, and 
sustained on the backs of African people who were stripped from their 
cultures of birth and arrived involuntarily via the Atlantic slave trade. 
 
To further exercise control and protect their identity and interests, white Europeans in 
the U.S in a bid similar to the emergence of the aliens control act, Afrikaner 
nationalism and the Bantu Self-Governing Act of 1959 of the apartheid regime in 
South Africa, saw to it the enactment of the Naturalization Act of 1790 which 
restricted U.S Citizenship to only whites (Mikulich, 2009:4) . It must be recalled that 
the aliens control act of the defunct apartheid regime of South Africa was used to 
supress the naturalisation of black African migrants as permanent South African 
residents, while paving the way for white migrants to acquire permanent South 
African residence (Human Rights Watch, 1998:160-161). Incidentally, the Bantu-self 
Governing Act legalised self-governance for the segregated black South Africans in 
their homelands, while at the same time ensuring that they were denied South African 
citizenship. Meanwhile Afrikaner nationalism was reported to have been founded on 
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the belief that South Africa is ‗God-given to white people in general, and Afrikaners 
in particular, on spurious theological grounds‘ (Frye et al., 2011:246). 
 
In a move similar to the Group Areas Act of 1950 which was used to carry out forced 
migration/eviction of black South Africans (including coloureds and Indians) from 
white dominated areas (Frye et al., 2011:246, South African History Online, 1950, 
Johnson, 1951:286). And which is also similar to the forceful evictions of black 
African migrants resident in South Africa by gangs claiming to be representatives of 
national political parties in a mob action code named ―operation Buyelekaya‖(Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:135-136). The U.S. government several years after the end of the 
Mexican-American wars in 1848, came up with the ―Mexican Repatriation Act of 
1930‖ and subsequently launched ―operation Wetback‖ which both saw to it the 
forced removal from the USA, Mexicans and USA citizens of Mexican origin at the 
emergence of the great depression. Although unlike the case of South Africa, there 
seems to be a very poor record of xenophobic violence but history seems to be 
repeating itself in the USA as Mikulich alleges that there is a current political slogan 
in the country that goes: ‗save jobs for true Americans‘, an outcry similar to the 
screams of some black South Africans in South Africa that foreigners 
(amakwerekwere) are stealing jobs away from black South Africans (Mikulich, 
2009:4, Rondganger, 2008a:6, Nyamnjoh, 2006:38-41). These similarities are 
indicative of the fact that the contest of belonging between migrants and citizens is 
not only peculiar to Africa or South Africa in this context.   
 
Meanwhile in India, xenophobic sentiments are mostly carried out against 
Bangladeshi immigrants who are accused of being responsible for the ills of the 
society such as escalating the level of unemployment, involvement in terrorism and 
environmental degradation. Similar to the case in South Africa, the number of 
Bangladeshi immigrants in India continued to be exaggerated by some government 
officials who portray them as a national threat and a drain on the resources of the 
country. But one thing that is quite unique regarding xenophobia in India is that 
stereotypes against Bangladeshi migrants vary according to religious backgrounds. 
For example Bangladeshi Hindus are believed to be victims of Islamic fundamentalist 
while Bangladeshi Muslims are all believed to be criminals, hungry and illegal 
immigrants. These views seem to be polarised along-side the reality of Hindu 
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dominance of Indian politics in a country that is made up of both Hindus and 
Muslims. But the violence against Bangladeshi immigrants remains indicative of a 
hatred for all Bangladeshi migrants and other minorities resident in India. Meanwhile, 
xenophobia in India and South Africa are both founded on ‗the politics of exclusion‘ 
and associated with post-independence nation building (Crush and Ramachandran, 
2010:214-217, Danso and McDonald, 2001:125, Crush, 2008:44, Human Rights 
Watch, 1998:18-20 and 123-125). 
 
Unfortunately in Israel, the situation appears to be very similar to the case of post-
apartheid South Africa as some of those once oppressed turned out to become 
oppressors. Israeli‘s who were once victims of one of the world‘s greatest hate crimes 
ever recorded in human history, are now reported to have turned around to also 
perpetuate hatred (Pedahzur and Yishai, 1999:101-102, Matsinhe, 2011:302). 
Xenophobia in Israel seems to have mostly arisen out of fear that Israeli culture might 
be dominated by Ethiopian Jewish culture. Similar to the case of xenophobia in India, 
xenophobic attitudes in Israel revolves around religion which forms the basis for the 
‗politics of exclusion/inclusion‘. But then this is mostly as a result of existing tensions 
between Israel and her Arab neighbours, hence based on this, there exists a national 
hatred for Arabs/Arab-Israelis living in the country, while the hatred for Palestinians 
living in Israel results from the threat of terrorism. Incidentally, Israelis dislike for 
foreigners seems to be economically motivated since some foreigners in Israel are 
reported to be very educated and thus provide cheap labour in the country. But 
xenophobia in Israel unlike in many parts of the world is not solely economically 
motivated but rather it is majorly based on religious affiliations. However the case of 
hate in Israel remains unique in the sense that it is not only directed towards 
foreigners but also amongst fellow Israelis based on religious affiliations and cultural 
background (Pedahzur and Yishai, 1999:103-106, 114-115) .  
  
Conversely, Nigeria and Ghana had an overwhelming record over the years of 
tolerance for immigrants until they both ended up with records of xenophobia 
(Campbell, 2003:74). Suddenly in Ghana, the rate of xenophobic attitudes towards 
foreigners dramatically increased to the point that in 1969, the Ghanaian government 
expelled about 1.5 million immigrants, mostly Nigerians. In 1983, nearly a decade 
and half later, the Nigerian government repatriated about 1.5 million foreigners which 
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were mostly Ghanaians, from Nigeria (Campbell 2003:74). According to Soyombo 
(2008:94-95) these two countries were experiencing severe economic hardships at the 
time they each exhibited xenophobic attitudes to foreigners. This thus implies that 
their xenophobic attitude was stimulated by economic challenges frustrating them to 
the point of aggression towards foreigners. Similar to the situation in South Africa, 
citizens of both countries (Ghana in 1969 and Nigeria in 1983) took their turns in 
accusing each other of an increasing unemployment rate in their various countries by 
taking away their limited jobs (Soyombo, 2008:94-95, Tshabalala and Dibetle, 
2008:4, Human Rights Watch, 1998:125). The implication of this is; not only that 
national economic hardships which can cause frustration might be responsible for 
xenophobic attitudes, but it is also suggestive of the fact that xenophobic attitudes 
towards other nationals might provoke retaliations from the other. This can be made 
possible by globalisation as different nationals of different countries relocate or move 
around from country to country, either in search of greener pastures, or for the sake of 
businesses and transactions and in the process are exposed to violence (Nwankwo, 
2002:69-88, Nwankwo, 2003:33-67, Offiong, 2001:1-7, Boutros-Ghali, 1996:87-90, 
Harrison, 2005:11-13, Nyamnjoh, 2006:230-236, Nwonwu, 2010:149-152).     
 
Furthermore, some citizens of Botswana, also taking a cue from a situation 
(xenophobic ideas) to that in South Africa, refer to black African immigrants 
(excluding South Africans) living in Botswana as ―ma kwerekwere‖. Ma kwerekwere 
in Botswana (like in South Africa) implies people who speak strange languages and 
have come from economically devastated countries in search of better livelihood in 
Botswana (Campbell, 2003:101, Nyamnjoh, 2006:39). Some citizens of Botswana not 
only dislike African immigrants but also mostly dislike Indians for perceived 
dishonesty. Therefore, xenophobic sentiments in the country are not specifically 
directed to African immigrants but also Indian migrants. Xenophobic attitudes 
exhibited towards Indians living in Botswana by Batswana remain high despite their 
huge economic investments in Botswana (Campbell, 2003:101). A close comparison 
of these different cases of hateful attitudes found in different parts of the world, with 
the case of xenophobia in South Africa, reveals a certain degree of relationship 
between xenophobia and racism. A thorough analysis of xenophobic attitudes in 
Africa reveals a glaring similarity in attitudes which can be described as imitational 
capable of mutating into multiple retaliations. 
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2.2.2  Apartheid‟s Foundations to Xenophobic Violence in South Africa 
The reign of apartheid in South Africa which lasted for over three hundred years not 
only left the dignity of black South Africans and the African race in South Africa in 
ruins but it rather left behind some negative psycho-social and cultural imprints on 
some black South Africans which has continued to become the bane of peace and 
tranquillity in the country (Luthuli, 2008:9, Everatt, 2011:28, Du Toit, 2001:170). 
These foundations and shadows of the defunct apartheid regime continue to resurface 
in South Africa in many ways as the spiral effects of the ancient oppressive regime 
appears to be spinning and manifesting in different patterns (Hassim et al., 2008, 
Crush, 2008). 
2.2.2.1 Apartheid‟s Legal and Psychological Foundations to Xenophobic Violence in South 
Africa 
The history of apartheid and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa has in its 
content, a massive imprint of violence which remains indelible in the annals of South 
African history. Some black South African women acknowledge as follows: 
             R: Our kids and those who fought were never treated; now 
they should be taken for counselling to get rid of that 
horror, because we saw horrible things like a person 
burning right in front of your eyes or hacked in front of 
you, so we still have the trauma and we never had 
counselling to help us. 
              R: We used to hide our kids in the wardrobes; we took our 
sons and hid them because when the fighting broke out 
they would come and check if your child is a boy or girl, 
if it was a boy they would grab him by the leg and swing 
him head first to the wall… 
              R: In front of you… 
              R: Right in front of you; so we never had counselling to rid 
us from what we saw (Everatt, 2011:28)…. 
Meanwhile the reality about the xenophobic violence that took place in 2008 in South 
Africa is that some black African foreigners were burnt alive and some others were 
hacked to death, a pattern of violence similar to the confessions of these women 
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(Krog, 2008:1, La Grange, 2008a:4). This implies that some black South Africans 
might be acting out of psychological disorders inherited from their horrific life 
experiences in the hands of the defunct apartheid regime.   
According to Asagba (2011:153-166), during the apartheid regime, black South 
Africans were used to living a life of servitude and so the demise of apartheid brought 
about freedom and a brand new life to those who have lived several years in isolation 
from the rest of the world. However this freedom came with its shortcomings since 
despite their freedom, rights and opportunities, some black South Africans have a 
strong feeling of emptiness, frustration and lack of focus. Asagba (2011:162) 
supporting his claims with shapes and diagrams, illustrates how exactly people under 
this psychological state of mind usually end up very clueless on how to find meanings 
and objectives in life. According to Asagba (2011:153-166), this psychological state 
of mind ultimately results in the mind desperately seeking to fill up its vacuum with 
all forms of violence, including xenophobic violence.  This situation might have 
resulted in some black South Africans attempting to fill up their existing vacuum by 
any means necessary, including continuity with the acts of violence just as it was 
during the apartheid regime. This psychological situation that arises out of inability of 
the mind to handle freedom and find purpose or meaning to life is referred to as 
―Logotherapy‖ (Asagba 2011:154-167).  
Furthermore, Asagba (2011:154-167) contends that this situation might have arose out 
of the collapse of African family structures, traditions, morality and sudden exposure 
to the chaos of civilization. Thus the kind of freedom acquired is unstructured to the 
point that the individual receives no proper guidance or training to handle his newly 
found freedom and manage his new lifestyle. In South Africa, this situation might 
have as well been exasperated by high level of poverty and unemployment, thus 
compelling some black South Africans to get preoccupied with acts of violence (as it 
was during the apartheid regime). Evidently the South African police recovered some 
drugs and weapons during an anti-xenophobic violence raids in George Goch and 
Wolhuter hostels located in Jeppe and the Denver hostel in Cleveland (Alcock, 
2008:5, Asagba, 2011:156, Lekotjolo, 2008:1, Gower, 2009:3, Makhafola, 2008a:5). 
This psychological condition, according to Asagba (2011:153-166) is not only 
applicable to South Africa, but also prevalent in most African countries that went 
through certain phases of colonialism and independence from colonial masters. 
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However, it must be noted that in the face of threat to survival, people usually turn 
aggressive or violently attack to protect themselves since it is psychological that 
‗attack is the best form of defence‘. Accordingly, Bekker and Carlton (1996:21) argue 
that ‗…The instincts of aggression and destruction, just as well as the instincts of love 
and cooperation, are deeply seated in human nature. They are the result of a struggle 
for survival in a hostile environment through thousands of generations‘. Evidently the 
apartheid regime of South Africa was very oppressive and found an economic threat 
in the competitive black South Africans and thus went ahead to institute different laws 
to maintain white superiority and to restrain black South Africans from the 
mainstream of national economy (Banton, 1987:154-157, Dubow, 1995:249). 
Incidentally, this was the beginning of many oppressive apartheid laws to come.  
Consequently, these laws affected the very psychology of some black South Africans 
as some of them continue to act in accordance to these ancient apartheid laws even in 
contemporary South Africa. For example oppressive apartheid laws such as: The 1950 
Race Classification Act (Population Registration Act) was used to institute racial 
hierarchy of benefits in South Africa‘s socio-economic system. At the peak of this 
racial grading were the Boers and next on this social hierarchy were the rest of the 
white race who were followed by Indians and after Indians came the coloureds while 
at the bottom of this order were Africans (Nkomo et al., 1995:262-266).  
The Influx Control Act of the 1920s and 1930s which recommended that black South 
Africans should be denied entry into white dominated areas unless they are going to 
administer to the needs of whites, had its psychological implications. The 
circumstances surrounding some of these apartheid laws are such that there are fears 
of spread of diseases, drain on government resources and national budget, decline in 
values of properties and fears of economic competition (Vale, 2002:22-23). 
Contemporarily, similar concerns have been echoed by some black South Africans in 
their arguments regarding black African migrants in South Africa (Vale, 2002:22, 
Petros et al., 2006:74, Solomon, 2003:105-124). In addition to this law was the 1952 
amendment that saw to it the inclusion of ―section 10 legislation‖, which stipulates 
that black South Africans were not allowed to live in any urban area unless they were 
born there, lived in the area for fourteen years or had worked for the same employer 
living in the area for ten years (Vale, 2002:22). An amendment to this law led to the 
reduction from fourteen days to seventy two hours, the time allowed for a black South 
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African to find jobs in urban areas (Vale, 2002:22). The psychological impact of this 
Influx Control Act on some black South Africans is that it lured some black South 
Africans into believing that living in townships were the exclusive right of citizens 
causing immigration to townships to come under serious contest (Klaaren, 2011:138-
140).  
Therefore, Vale (2002:22) argues that the complexities within and surrounding these 
apartheid laws and the psychology behind it, seems to have been deployed by some 
policy makers in contemporary democratic South Africa. Incidentally, of which some 
of these modern political thought and national policies which might have been 
informed by these apartheid laws, were actually meant for specifically unleashing 
control over black African migrants/immigration in the country, and not specifically 
meant for illegal immigrants in general as white immigrants were treated differently 
just like it was during the apartheid days (Matsinhe, 2011:296). Arguably, it is based 
on these that Klaaren (2011:139) insists that ―the character of residence in 
contemporary South African understanding of citizenship is illustrated by struggles 
over residence in apartheid times‖. Incidentally, the Minister of Home Affairs in 
South Africa, Mangosutho Buthelezi in his budget introductory speech of 1997 was 
quoted as making the following inflammatory remarks: 
With an illegal population estimated at between 2.5 million and 5 
million, it is obvious that the socio-economic resources of the country, 
which are under severe strain as it is, are further being burdened by the 
presence of illegal aliens. The cost implication becomes even clearer 
when one makes a calculation suggesting that if every illegal costs our 
infrastructure, say 1000 rands [U.S. $ 200] per annum, then multiplied 
with whatever number you wish, it becomes obvious that the cost 
becomes billions of rands per year (Human Rights Watch, 1998:123-
124).            
Furthermore, the Job Reservation Act which was meant to protect and maintain higher 
paid white wage earners in South Africa was introduced before 1948 to make cheap 
labourers out of black South Africans, while protecting the superiority and jobs of 
white South Africans. Meanwhile the father of these laws was the Group Areas Act of 
1950 which was used to create a South Africa that was made up of people living 
together according to racial groups. This act ensured that South Africa was racially 
divided and people according to their racial classifications lived different lives in 
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isolation of each other; this act became the major foundation of the apartheid regime 
and the bane of inter/intra group relations in South Africa (Nkomo et al., 1995:262-
265, Frye et al., 2011:246). Since people were forced into living together according to 
their racial groups, with each racial group living separately, the law not only 
succeeded in promoting group/racial stereotypes, hatred, isolation, difference, distrust, 
ignorance and suspicion; but it also endangered good inter-group relations in South 
Africa. While the apartheid education laws (such as the Bantu Education Act of 1953 
and the Education and Training Act of 1979) not only encouraged illiteracy and 
ignorance among black South Africans they also laid solid foundations of inequalities 
and poverty in South Africa (Nkomo et al., 1995:265-275). Theological, scientific and 
legal methods were then deployed to justify and advance the idea of white superiority 
and black inferiority which ‗ideologically affected the consciousness of South 
Africans and cast them in racial molds‘ (Nkomo et al., 1995:266, Dubow, 1995:20-
281, Sonneborn, 2010:48-49).  
These apartheid laws which were then oppressively applied, even though they had 
been long abrogated, laid the psychological, socio-economic and political foundations 
for the various forms of discriminations, ‗narrow nationalism‘, violence, poverty, 
racial classifications, inequalities, stereotypes, suspicion, distrust and complexities 
surrounding citizenship and residence, witnessed in contemporary South Africa 
(Nkomo et al., 1995:263, Landau, 2011, Human Rights Watch, 1998). All these might 
have directly or indirectly fuelled the xenophobic violence as they may have 
continued to affect the thinking of some black South African politicians and citizens 
in contemporary South Africa (Nkomo et al., 1995:263, Vale, 2002:22-23). To be 
more precise about the influence of some apartheid laws on contemporary South 
Africa, the Aliens Control Act which was introduced in South Africa in 1991 with 
subsequent several amendments, allows government agencies to make arrests based 
on examination of vaccination marks, skin colours, understanding of local dialects 
and pronunciation of words (Everatt, 2011:13, Human Rights Watch, 1998:160-169, 
Nyamnjoh, 2006:39-56, Crush, 2008:37). Even the word ―aliens‖ is psychologically 
suggestive of an invasion of the country by a set of foreign bodies or objects 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006:38-39). Evidently, the psychological effect of this law in 
contemporary South Africa can be felt in stereotypical (newspaper) publications 
against black African immigrants with headlines such as: ―War against aliens: 
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Thousands forced to flee Alex‖, ―Francophone invasion‖ and ―Africa floods into Cape 
Town‖, to mention but a few (Danso and McDonald, 2001:129, Harber, 2008:162). 
While the 2002 Immigration Act enacted in place of the Aliens Control Act, 
empowers citizens to report to the authorities any foreign national suspected to be 
illegally residing in the country. Even with the previous amendment of 1995, the 
Aliens Control Act came with several complexities to the point that some government 
agencies interpreted and applied it differently. This situation not only provided the 
leeway for abuse of black African immigrants but also created a fertile ground for 
anarchy in some parts of South Africa. These complex laws were largely blamed for 
providing the favourable psychological background for the xenophobic violence in 
South Africa (Everatt, 2011:13, Human Rights Watch, 1998:160-169, Nyamnjoh, 
2006:39-56, Crush, 2008:37, Aidan, 2010:646). Vigneswaran (2011:158) clearly 
reveals a similar picture of this in a report on the complexities of apartheid laws as 
follows: 
Perhaps more importantly, responsibility for regulating the movement 
of South Africans was distributed among at least nine departments of 
state (Foreign Affairs, Internal [Home] Affairs, Cooperation and 
Development, Police, Defence, Justice, Community Development, 
Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Minerals and Energy, and Transport). 
The crucial point is that this function was not contained within a 
specific set of government agencies but was spread across the 
government bureaucracy. Police officials in particular became 
responsible for determining which aspects of apartheid laws controlling 
movement became a reality.  
The complexities of these laws can only lead to nothing but a certain degree of 
confusion, lawlessness and recklessness. Thus it can be argued that it is based on 
apartheid legal foundations and complexities surrounding these laws that some 
government officials were encouraged to make various random arrests and 
deportations of black African migrants in the 1990s, of which some black South 
Africans themselves became victims (Nyamnjoh, 2006:49-51). However as it became 
obvious to government agencies that some of these deportees were still returning to 
South Africa by other means, some members of these government agencies became 
more creative. Thus in what appears to be an attempt to discourage black African 
(legal/illegal) migration into the country, they in certain cases deployed various 
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tactical, physical and psychological means which involved torture, extortion, verbal 
attacks, sexual harassments, destruction of legal identities/refugee documents and 
arbitrary arrests based on skin pigmentation, body smells, inoculation marks and 
physical looks (Nyamnjoh, 2006:49-51, Gordon, 2010:57, Human Rights Watch, 
1998:49-122, La Grange, 2008b:1, Matsinhe, 2011:305-306). This unfortunate 
development in South Africa was interpreted by Gordon (2010:56) to mean that ―the 
regulation of migrants rests less with the law and law makers than with law 
enforcers‖. Some local residents encouraged by these dehumanising actions of some 
government officials attacked, looted and handed in black African migrants as alleged 
illegal immigrants to the South African police (Nyamnjoh, 2006:54, Kalamane, 
2008:3).  
Human Rights Watch (1998:161) and Neocosmos (2006:29-30) reveals that the origin 
of the apartheid draconian law, ―Aliens Control Act‖ can be traced from the 1950s 
and 1960s when the apartheid government of South Africa embarked on recruitment 
of white skilled workers. These white Europeans (mostly Germans and Britons) were 
subsequently offered permanent residence/citizenship, while their black counterparts 
(some of whom were semi-skilled labourers) were prohibited from acquiring 
permanent residence in South Africa. Under the apartheid regime, this law labels 
illegal immigrants in South Africa as ―prohibited persons‖ and this often applied to 
black African immigrants (Human Rights Watch, 1998:161-162). The implication of 
this is that permanent residence/citizenship in South Africa became the inheritance of 
the white race, while blacks became tagged as fugitives and aliens. A situation which 
might have informed the thinking amongst some black South Africans that white legal 
or illegal immigrants were investors and tourists who had the right to enter and stay in 
South Africa, while their black counterparts were dubbed ―Amakwerekwere‖ (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:161-162, Matsinhe, 2011:296). Some of these obnoxious laws 
(especially the Influx and Aliens Control Acts) might have also provided some black 
South Africans with the psychological nourishment to embark on the buyelekhaya 
movement (Monson and Arian, 2011:33). This thinking might have been more 
encouraged before now by the apartheid Influx Control Act which was used to 
regulate the movement of black South Africans into white dominated areas. Under 
this law black South Africans in their own country were denied citizenship while 
some of them received some sort of permanent residence in white dominated areas 
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(Vigneswaran, 2011:158). The complexities surrounding residence in South Africa 
are the by-product of both the influx and Aliens Control Acts. Although some of these 
laws have long been abolished, their psychological impacts on some black South 
Africans remained visible as the members of the rampaging mobs successfully link 
citizenship to place of residence. This was evident in the ethnic dimension to the 
xenophobic attacks which had as its victims or targets, South Africans from the tribes 
of Pedi, Shangaan, Venda and Xhosa. Some of these people from these tribes 
although from far away Limpopo (Venda, Shangaan), Sekhukhuneland which 
stretches to Mpumalanga and Limpopo province (Pedi), as well as the Eastern Cape 
(Xhosa) were resident in some cities and informal settlements of certain provinces in 
KwaZulu-Natal or Gauteng where they were targeted for attacks by mobs (Monson 
and Arian, 2011:32 and 50, Klaaren, 2011:138-140, Human Rights Watch, 1998:161-
162, Matsinhe, 2011:296, Saunders and Southey, 2001:132,187-188 and 195, 
Kalamane and SAPA, 2008b:3, Kalamane and SAPA, 2008a:3). If this then is true of 
some black South Africans, then it means that some black South Africans have chosen 
to apply their apartheid experience as a yard stick for measuring and conducting their 
relations with both black African migrants and some fellow black South Africans. 
Psychologically, the possible implication of their negative reactions towards black 
African immigrants is that it is not only grounded on apartheid experience but that it 
is also justified by their apartheid experience.          
Some black South Africans are of the opinion that the absence of capital punishment 
in the South African law encourages crime, xenophobic violence and murder. While 
some other black South Africans are of the opinion that the laws in South Africa are 
too soft on foreigners and so encourages regular ―influx‖ of illegal immigrants (in the 
form of black African migrants) who come to make black South Africans jobless 
(Everatt, 2011:24-27). Everatt (2011:24-25) captures the following revealing 
interviews with some black South Africans, as the first person clearly states: 
Basically, our constitution has a lot of loopholes. Everybody has a right 
to everything. (African female, 36-49, professional employment, 
Johannesburg suburbs) 
While the other insists as follows: 
28 
 
A foreigner who has just arrived in the country yesterday will tell you 
that he has rights. You can‘t tell him anything. So, it makes no 
difference whether I‘m South African. He is whatever he is. We all 
have the same rights. They are just sucking on our system. 
Similarly, Aidan (2010:654) argues that there is a growing sense of frustration among 
some black South Africans that there is no longer any difference between South 
African citizens and foreigners. According to Aidan (2010): 
The attacks, then, were ways of reaffirming the differences between 
citizens and outsiders, by removing foreigners from communities, 
reasserting state control over them, destroying and stealing their 
property and, ultimately, reducing them to bare killable life.   
Conversely, Everatt (2011:25-26) argues that the problem with some laws in South 
Africa is such that they provide South Africans with so many rights that some of them 
become easily prone to excessive laziness. This situation or state of laziness leads to 
the envy of some hardworking foreigners and their being easily misconstrued as 
robbing South Africans of their rights (Everatt, 2011). Besides the above statements 
implying that some black South Africans interpret their relations and perceptions of 
black African immigrants within the premises of the provisions of the law, the re-
occurrences of the word ―rights‖ in the above interviews suggests that some black 
South Africans are very sensitive to matters regarding their constitutional rights.  
Based on the already high rate of black illiteracy in the country, their sensitivity to 
legal rights could create the kind of psychological frame of mind that is highly 
dependable on constitutional rights for daily survival, a development which can also 
affect their interactions with black African migrants (Everatt, 2011:25-26, Danso and 
McDonald, 2001:118, Aitchison and Harley, 2006:96, Crush, 2008:33-35). This 
situation might further degenerate into subjective interpretations of rights, a 
development  which can prove to be inimical to black South African relations with 
black African foreigners (Klaaren, 2011:138-140). Summarily, Dodson (2010:6) 
argues that it is evident that there is a general confusion as to the rights of citizens and 
that of non-citizens in South Africa, a situation very capable of generating conflict.    
However, another respondent suggests the following amendment to the South African 
Constitution: ―If the death penalty is reintroduced, crime will be reduced. In 
Botswana, there is discipline because they keep to the rules (African male, 18-26, 
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student, inner city Johannesburg)‖ (Everatt, 2011:24).While another respondent 
sounded more pessimistic and racist, with his comments indicative of a high level of 
distrust for South African government: 
Old people say it was better to be governed by the boers because a 
boers can think for a black person (sic). During the apartheid era 
people used to be employed and were able to get jobs. There was food, 
too. Now it‘s difficult to get a job. It‘s very hard. All the white people 
have left with their investments. They‘ve gone to America (Everatt, 
2011).    
All these according to Everratt (2011:24-25) are indicative of the fact that some South 
Africans encourage a more authoritarian South Africa that will show no mercy on 
foreigners. The situation seems to be so bad that some black South Africans prefer to 
be left under the oppressive apartheid regime that would perhaps deal better with 
black African migrants. One thing about these ideas are that they might possibly be 
grounded on apartheid mentality, acquired through the experience of oppression and 
entrenched superiority, that were legalised by the apartheid regime‘s Influx and 
Aliens Control Acts (Human Rights Watch, 1998:160-161, Vale, 2002:22-23). These 
orientations possibly found within apartheid psychological parameters, could translate 
to meaning that some black South Africans want black African foreigners to feel the 
same pain they went through in the hands of the oppressive apartheid regime (Everatt, 
2011:24).                  
However, Zuma (cited in Shonisani, 2008:4), having criticised the afrophobic attacks 
on black African immigrants suggests that the laws in South Africa are ‗user friendly 
to criminals‘. It appears as if some black South Africans have actually been getting 
away with the crime of violence and looting of black African immigrants in South 
Africa. These criminal acts seem to have been regularly carried out in the country 
with so much impunity to the point that a black South African captures the picture in 
his comments as follows: 
I think it will happen again in the township because most guys are 
unemployed and they see this xenophobia as a chance of making 
money. It has now become a crime because these guys are robbing 
these foreigners of their belongings (Everatt, 2011:22). 
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 Meanwhile, Klaaren (2011:135) further reveals that contrary to the expectations that 
the law in South Africa will hold accountable all those responsible for the acts of rape, 
killings, lootings and several acts of violence that characterised the afrophobic 
violence of 2008 that left sixty people dead. Instead the law in 2009 only succeeded in 
securing conviction for six cases out of the entire sixty eight cases, thirty five cases 
were withdrawn and eleven accused were found not guilty. Four cases were placed for 
further investigations while the remaining six cases proceeded with continuous 
hearing as at 2009. According to Klaaren (2011) more than 60 people (including 
South Africans) lost their lives to the violence, but of the entire cases of murder, only 
a single person was found guilty of murder. This implies that many of those 
responsible for the barbaric acts of afrophobic violence and murder in 2008 are yet to 
be brought to justice, a situation which can prove to be a huge setback to the fight 
against afrophobic violence and crime in general in South Africa (Marindze, 2010:32-
31). 
 Monson and Arian (2011:36) conclusively argue that this situation might have been 
exasperated due to inability of the government to make legal provisions for hate crime 
legislation in South Africa. The fact that ‗xenophobic crimes are generally stripped of 
their political implications and are dealt with as ―ordinary‖ forms of crime‘ in South 
Africa further encourages the situation (Monson and Arian 2011:36). This perhaps 
provides the reason behind the continuous denial by government and some politicians 
of the reality of ―Afrophobic‖ violence in South Africa (Monson and Arian, 2011:36, 
Dlamini, 2008b:5, Hassim et al., 2008:4, Matsinhe 2011:310). Thus Nyamjoh 
(2006:40-41) concludes that continuous failure on the part of South African 
government to protect the rights of black African foreigners in the country provides a 
contradictory evidence of a rainbow nation that has imbibed the ‗culture of human 
rights‘. The implication of this is that black African immigrants might end up not 
trusting South African government, a situation which could in future breed serious 
animosity and hatred for black South Africans by black African migrants.   
2.2.2.2  Apartheid Foundations of a Culture of Violence as a Prelude to the Culture 
of Entitlement and Xenophobic Violence in South Africa 
 Although the new South Africa jettisoned the political ills of apartheid, it also 
inherited some social practices which continued to characterise relations within the 
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country. For example, racial classification and profiling in contemporary South Africa 
is a tradition handed down by the apartheid regime (Du Toit, 2001, Nkomo et al., 
1995:262-280). Richmond (1994:208) argues that on assumption of power in South 
Africa in 1948, the nationalist party created a system of government, which it named 
―apartheid‖. The apartheid system of government intensified and codified the already 
existing policies of segregation and discrimination which were in existence long 
before 1948 (Louw and Kendall, 1986:12-15). The then prime minister, Dr Daniel 
Francois Malan, insisted that it was necessary to keep the groups apart in other to 
sustain what he referred to as ―racial peace‖ (Richmond, 1994:208). 
Indeed, this was an ambiguous approach towards conflict management and 
maintenance of racial peace/harmony in South Africa given that it became the basis 
for the formalisation of all sorts of racial discrimination, violence, social inequalities 
and abuse. Not surprisingly, the policy not only did not bring about any form of 
peace, it actually exacerbated conflict in South Africa. It fostered a bitter feud 
between blacks and white that was fought on different social, economic and political 
terrains with major negative consequences for post-apartheid South Africa. This in 
itself saw the genesis of the culture of violence in apartheid South Africa which was 
initially employed to attain liberation and equality for all races, but in post-apartheid 
South Africa it was used as a tool against African immigrants who were perceived as 
the new threat in the country.   
For example, du Toit (2001:170) argues that South Africa has a culture of violence 
which was inherited from the apartheid regime. This culture of violence, which is now 
being deployed against African immigrants in South Africa, can be explained from 
different (but inter-related) psycho-social, economic and political stand-points. In 
what appears to be a political devise of grabbing and possibly stealing to get-rich-
quick, the culture of violence inherited from the defunct apartheid government took a 
new dimension in post-apartheid South Africa. Some black South African politicians 
―set the ball rolling‖ by making several failed promises of a better life for all black 
South Africans who have suffered so much poverty, operation and deprivations at the 
hand of the defunct apartheid regime (Mackenzie, 2008:13, Sekgala, 2009:20). Most 





, these same politicians indulged in corrupt practices while many 
black South Africans languish in poverty (Hassim et al., 2008:97-100, Neocosmos, 
2008:587). Therefore, encouraged by the covetous attitudes of their elite counterparts 
towards public resources, some poor black South Africans resort to attacking black 
African immigrants in their midst, killing many and looting their properties (Hassim 
et al., 2008:94-100).  
Similarly, Sekgala (2009:20) in his very words insisted that 
SERVICE delivery protest might be the only way to deal with the 
ANC. Whether we like it or not, the ANC government has indeed 
failed the people many times. People who are protesting today had high 
hopes in 1994. They were promised a better life year in, year out. 
Unfortunately, they could only observe other people live a better life 
while they were abandoned. Comrades drive 4x4s and help friends and 
family with benefits from the state. Soon these comrades move to posh 
suburbs. They are creating a great divide. These are people who were 
supported and nurtured by their poor communities, and are now 
abandoning them […]. And so because government officials have 
abandoned their communities, protests are the only solution. They are 
the only solution because those we send to government no longer form 
the core of our community, and they are no longer feeling the pain we 
feel.  
It is in this light that Orfanos (2009:20) perceives xenophobic violence as ―a struggle 
for survival‖, a perception which appears similar to the ―anti-apartheid struggle‖. 
                                                          
4
 Taking into account the dynamics and different meanings of  the word ―black‖ in South Africa, particularly as 
stipulated by law, to the designation refers to  South African citizens  who are either Africans, Coloureds, 
Indians and, more recently the Chinese. This project strictly specifies ―black South Africans‖ to mean Africans, 
unless where specified otherwise. However, it should be noted that black economic empowerment programmes 
(BEE) favour all South African nationals officially designated as ―black‖. But at some point, especially at the 
early stages, this programme was marred by elite enrichment and personal aggrandizement 
See Ponte, S., Roberts, S. & Van Sittert, L. 2007. ‗Black Economic Empowerment‘, Business and the State in 
South Africa. Development and Change, 38, 933-955, BBC News. 2008. S African Chinese „Become Black‟, 
BBC News [Online]. BBC. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7461099.stm [Accessed 2/4/2012], Mbola, B. 
2008. Chinese South Africans qualify for BEE [Online]. BuaNews. Available: 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/empowerment/beechinese-180608.htm [Accessed 2/4/2012], SAPA. 
2008c. SA‘s Chinese qualify for bee deals, court rules‘. The Star, June 19, p.5, HO, U. 2008. Chinese locals are 
black. Business Report, June 19, p.1, Shapiro, I. & Tebeau, K. 2011. After apartheid reinventing South Africa, 
Charlottesville, London, University of Virginia Press, Dibetle, M. 2008. ‗Are the Chinese black?: This week 
black business groups joined forces in rejecting Chinese South Africans‘ access to BEE, seeing it as an affront 
to the black struggle. Monako Dibetle interviewed Chinese South Africans about their experience of apartheid 
and tested opinion in Soweto: ‗Ching chong‘ like the k-word: Chinese South Africans lived an oppressed 
twilight existence under apartheid, never really accepted by any group. Mail and Guardian, July 4, p.14.    
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Alleging that African migrants are invading the country and taking away jobs from 
poor black South Africans, Orfanos contends that black South Africans have now 
been abandoned to languish in penury as beggars in their own country (Orfanos, 
2009:20). Hence it follows that since government has allegedly abandoned poor black 
South Africans to the point that black African foreigners have become more 
progressive than they are (black South Africans), government is thus perceived as no 
longer trustworthy. Thus it becomes logical to some poor black South Africans that 
the best way to effectively get government to deliver on their promises to the 
suffering masses is to alternatively attack black African migrants. Impliedly violence 
against black African foreigners has become a medium to communicate grievances 
against the ANC lead government. Possibly an indication that it is totally wrong to 
think South Africans dislike African migrants, but rather that the afrophobic violence 
indirectly targets the ANC led government. 
Incidentally studies have indicated that beyond distrust for their government, many 
South Africans also do not trust foreigners (SAPA, 2012b:2, Sekgala, 2009:20). This 
level of distrusts, frustrations, and feelings of deprivation amongst some black South 
Africans might be responsible for the reported planned siege on the department of 
home affairs, which was later foiled by intelligence reports. This development was 
said to have prompted South African government to beef up security around its 
officials and the structures of the department in order to forestall any mob attack (de 
Klerk, 2009, Human Rights Watch, 1998:125, Wray, 2008b:1, Orfanos, 2009:20, 
Wray, 2008a:1, Sekgala, 2009:20, Salgado et al., 2008:2, Mkhwanazi, 2008:10, 
Vromans et al., 2011:90, Bourne et al., 2002:157). 
However, taking into cognizance the fact that violent protests against government 
have for ages been an integral part of South African culture which obviously is an 
apartheid legacy, but before now the pattern of violence has been very consistent; 
usually commencing on a peaceful note and ending up in violence and bloodshed 
(Sonneborn, 2010:56-87, Du Toit, 2001:72 and 170). During the apartheid days it was 
a struggle targeted towards the apartheid government, a struggle meant for the 
emancipation of black South Africans (including Indians, coloureds and black African 
foreigners) from the shackles of the oppressive apartheid government (Sonneborn, 
2010:11-92, Nkomo et al., 1995:261-274).  
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Surprisingly, in post-apartheid South Africa, a similar pattern of protest seems to have 
been deployed. Although currently the focus remains the government, but the target 
this time around has changed. The target of violence has actually shifted from being 
normally directed at the government and its agencies as it was back in the days of 
apartheid, and now directed mostly at black African migrants, who incidentally are 
fellow Africans like black South Africans (Neocosmos, 2008). Unfortunately, one 
thing that has continued to remain constant ever since the beginning of violence in the 
days of apartheid in South Africa to date is that generally, black Africans living in 
South Africa (including South Africans) have largely continued to be victims (Ncana 
and Mkhize, 2008b:4, Johnston, 2008b:31, Landau, 2011:1, Monson and Arian, 
2011:32 and 50, Kalamane, 2008:3, Kalamane and SAPA, 2008b:1 and 3, Kalamane 
and SAPA, 2008a:1 and 3, Ncana and la Grange, 2008:4, Joubert, 2008b:3, Ndlovu, 
2008b:5). This is so because some black African foreigners in South Africa personally 
participated in the same anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa while some were 
victims of the destabilization policies of the defunct apartheid regime (Fuphe, 
2008c:6, Leshilo, 2008:10, Human Rights Watch, 1998:24-28, Du Toit, 2001:75-76). 
Based on this Neocosmos (2006:12) therefore concludes: 
In fact if we did not know better this could easily be a description of 
changes in South Africa between 1984 and 1990, and especially since 
1994 and the establishment of post-colonial liberal democracy when, 
within the public sphere, the celebration of Africanism and an ‗African 
Renaissance‘ has alternated with xenophobic statements and practices 
towards other Africans. 
It is in this light therefore that Matsinhe (2011:302) alleges that ‗the ex-oppressed has 
taken on the character of the ex-oppressor‘.  
Meanwhile Crush (2008:33) disagrees with the popular notion that black African 
immigrants are stealing jobs from black South Africans as his study reveals that 
85percent of South Africans have never lost a job to a foreign national. While more 
than half of those interviewed in his study revealed that they did not know anyone in 
their communities or elsewhere with a personal experience of losing a job to an 
immigrant (Crush, 2008). Conversely Solomon (2003:103) cited an example of an 
event that occurred in Hillbrow (Johannesburg) in which the owner of a certain Café 
Zurich fired twenty South African waiters replacing them with twenty Congolese 
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workers who barely survived on tips without wages. Therefore such reports support 
the popular notion that black African migrants actually take jobs from South Africans 
by providing cheap labour to the detriment of poor black South Africans. However, 
the Gauteng Housing MEC (member of executive Council, by the name of Nomvula 
Mokonyane) in refuting this argument insists that black African migrants ‗…use their 
hands, their heads, to provide a service and do jobs that are not wanted by South 
Africans‘ (Badat, 2008c:3). Similarly, Danso and McDonald (2001:124-125) contend 
that migrants in South Africa create jobs as well as compete for jobs with South 
Africans. Incidentaly, this argument supports Muzumbukilwa‘s (2007:87) point of 
view that 85% of black African migrants he interviewed were self-employed while a 
meagre 15% were working in the private sectors like security companies, while some 
others were preoccupied with car guarding. Thus Muzulbulkilwa (2007) concludes 
that the general perception of black African migrants as stealing away jobs from South 
Africans appears to be false and lacks substance. In support of this notion, a research 
conducted by Everatt (2011:21-22) in Soweto quoted some black South Africans as 
responding to his interviews in the following manner: 
They are self-employed and are hard workers. When we saw what they 
were doing we soon realized that we can also do the same and make 
money in the process. Most of them own hair salons and plait people‘s 
hair for a fee; now we want to do the same thing, which is why we 
don‘t want them here anymore […].  
Beyond the fact that the above statement reveals a strong sense of entitlement and 
envy, it has a mimicry undertone that might lead to conflict (Everratt 2011:21-22). 
This is also a pointer to the fact that some black South Africans appear to be imitating 
their elites, some of whom were reported to have been in the habit of acquiring ill-
gotten wealth by any means necessary (Pillay 2008:97-98). Besides, the above 
comment also clearly supports the above claims that black African migrants make an 
honest income and are mostly self-employed in South Africa (Muzumbukilwa‘s 
2007:87, Badat, 2008c:3).  
Meanwhile in accordance to the notion that some black African foreigners work in the 
private sectors, Human Rights Watch (1998:2) claims that: 
The South African economy, especially its farming, mining, security, 
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and construction sectors, relies heavily on the cheap and easily 
exploitable labour of undocumented migrants, mostly from 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland. Undocumented 
labourers on farms work for a pittance, on average about 5 rands [U.S. 
$1 at an exchange rate of five rands for one U.S. dollar] per day. 
Incidentally, in what appears to be a situation similar to what was experienced during 
the days of the oppressive apartheid regime, some white farmers in South Africa were 
reported to be employing some illegal black African migrants some of whom they 
violently abused, dismissed unjustly or handed over to the police for deportation 
without pay. This malicious act is said to usually occur whenever these migrants are 
about to get their (stipends) wages by the end of the month. Their employers advises 
them ―to take a day off‖ after which they are replaced with another set of labourers 
who also end up suffering similar faith (Human Rights Watch, 1998:36-41, Nkomo et 
al., 1995:261-280). Beyond this, there are many other cases of abuses meted out to 
black African migrants by farmers, but a most shocking case is the case of a particular 
farmer in Northern Province who was alleged to have conducted a test on his gun by 
shooting at the leg of his farm worker with impunity (Human Rights Watch 1998:36-
41).  
According to Human Rights Watch (1998:41) reports, attempts by the police to 
prosecute farmers for abuse of their workers normally end up in futility. This is so 
since it was alleged that sometimes the police is so unwilling to bring them to justice 
for fear these white farmers might turn against the ANC government, since the issue 
was alleged to usually turn out to be politicised (Human Rights Watch, 1998:41). 
Evidently a close comparison of the attitudes of some of these white farmers with that 
of black South Africans points to the fact that black African foreigners have become a 
melting point for different races in South Africa to maliciously protest their 
grievances against the ANC lead government.  
Similarly, Neocosmos (2006:105) further reveals that a black African foreigner 
legally resident in South Africa was arrested by the police along with his friends on 
the mere suspicion that they were criminals. But when he got a lawyer to secure his 
release as required by the law since he was illegally detained for an unknown crime, 
the Indian judge presiding over his case allegedly denied him bail on the irrational 
basis that he needed to be discouraged from residing in the country. The black African 
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foreigner therefore remained in detention only to be released five months after without 
any criminal charges, while his friends suffered the same fate but for extra five 
months (Neocosmos, 2006:105).  
Unfortunately this is an indication that xenophobic attitudes are not only found among 
black South Africans but also amongst people of other races living in South Africa 
irrespective of their social status. Incidentally, all these are in line with the outcome of 
SAMP (South African Migration Project) research (Danso and McDonald, 2001:116, 
Crush, 2008:20). Accordingly, SAMP research proved that xenophobic attitudes in 
South Africa cuts across races and income as some South Africans irrespective of 
their races, higher status and comfortable income are found to be also xenophobic 
(Crush, 2008:20, Danso and McDonald, 2001:116). Danso and McDonald (2001:115-
116) therefore contend that the outcome of this research is indicative of the fact that 
xenophobic attitudes are not only prevalent in South Africa but that it is widespread 
and intense. Therefore, it means that some negative reports speculated in the country 
about the maliciousness of black African migrants were purposely constructed to suit 
the personal ideas of some South Africans or were based on mere rumours, suspicions 
and perhaps personal grudges. As Crush (2008:28) puts it: ―In South Africa, negative 
opinions on immigration go hand-in-hand with hostile attitudes towards foreign 
nationals. If some black South Africans view foreign nationals as a threat, they will 
generally attribute negative motives ―to the invader‖. 
Incidentally, reports such as the attitude of some white farmers towards black African 
foreigners rather creates wrong impressions that poor black African migrants are out 
to compete for jobs with poor black South Africans (Human Rights Watch, 1998:36-
41). Thus having for many years been armed with these grudges against black African 
migrants, coupled with the frustrations of government‘s poor service delivery, 
motivated by poverty and unemployment, some black South Africans reacted at the 
slightest given opportunity (Zondi, 2008:27-29, Seale et al., 2008:3, Ncana and 
Mkhize, 2008a:1 and 4, Ndlovu, 2008b:5, Gower, 2009:3, Sekgala, 2009:20, Orfanos, 
2009:20). This might have been the case, as many black African migrants were 
actually hard working and successfully survived on businesses and creativity and thus 




Perhaps based on these crystallized grudges, suspicion, envy and shear hatred, 
security and service delivery meetings in Alexandria became politicised against black 
African migrants and crime in Alexandria and Diepsloot became totally blamed on the 
presence of black African foreigners. They all soon became completely labelled as 
criminals and illegal migrants and a decision was allegedly taken in a meeting(s) in 
Diepsloot/Alexandria to loot and purge the area of black African foreigners 
(Maruping, 2008:42-47, Monson and Arian, 2011:33-35, Ndlovu, 2008b:5). Similarly 
Ndlovu (2008:5) reports that ―…The original intention of the meeting had been taxi-
related. But, other issues had cropped up and a criminal element had hijacked the 
initiative for their own ends, looting, pillaging and rampaging through the townships‖. 
The sense of jubilation that prevailed after the exit of black African migrants in some 
neighbourhoods, the scorn and laughter exhibited by some local residents at the sight 
of a burning Mozambiquan set alight by some black South Africans, are all indicative 
of an intense long withheld grudges, hatred and inner conviction/satisfaction that is 
reflective of an expression of ―now we can claim that (jobs) which was stolen from 
us‖(Bearak and Dugger, 2008:15, Krog, 2008:1, Tromp, 2008:1). It‘s in light of this 
that Nyamnjoh (2006:14) argues that irrespective of the fact that most South Africans 
have not come in contact with black African immigrants they have already developed 
serious hatred for them.  
―The very inadequacy of direct contact makes it possible for the reality 
and humanity of African immigrants to be imagined and re-imagined to 
suit the negative images conjured up by their reluctant South African 
hosts. Black Africans are the most likely to be considered ‗illegal‘ 
immigrants or aliens, even before they have crossed the borders‖ 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006:14).           
Beyond this, Johnston (2008b:31) argues that South Africa also possesses a culture of 
impunity. Prior to the major xenophobic violence of 2008, black African migrants 
have repeatedly been victims of all sorts of xenophobic attacks and abuses since 1994 
For instance in the private sector, there are reports indicating that farmers exploit and 
abuse black African migrants working on their farms and only pay them stipends. 
Some of these labourers physically abused and exploited by farmers were children 
and police rarely carried out investigations regarding these abuses. Rather some police 
officers were reported to have connived with farmers in exploiting these immigrants 
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by deporting them without pay since some were illegally resident in South Africa 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998:2). Between December 1994 and January 1995 violence 
erupted in Alexandria and a Human Rights Watch report indicates that some gang 
members made violent attempts at evicting black African migrants from their 
neighbourhood, blaming them for the ills of the society. The action which involved 
some armed men seizing black African migrants and handing them over to the police 
for deportation irrespective of their residential status in the country, was code named 
―Buyelekhaya‖ (go back home) (Human Rights Watch, 1998:135). These actions 
were carried out with so much impunity that the SAPS, in what appears to be an 
action very supportive of the course (Buyelekhaya), either deported or released some 
black African foreigners after confirming the legality/illegality of their stay in the 
country (Human Rights Watch, 1998:135-136). It was reported that some of these 
black African migrants, on getting to their homes after their release, found their 
property either missing or thrown out on the streets while some others were 
completely locked out of their homes by gangs (Human Rights Watch, 1998:135-
136).  
2.2.2.3 Socio-Economic Foundations of Xenophobic Violence in Contemporary South Africa 
Following the promises of an equal distribution of wealth and a promise of an 
―Eldorado‖ made by some black South African politicians to their fellow black 
African citizens at the demise of the oppressive apartheid regime (Ncana and Mkhize, 
2008b:1, Landau, 2011:3,1-12, Michela, 2008:23). Some poor black South Africans 
became frustrated by the fact that these promises have turned out to become a mirage. 
Therefore encouraged and frustrated by the fact that they have become spectators to 
the affluent lifestyle of some black South African elites, who might have become 
oblivious of their plight and appalling dehumanising living conditions (Pillay, 
2008:97-100, Landau, 2011:12, Michela, 2008:23, Sinwell, 2011:143-147). Some of 
them suddenly become violent and ended up scapegoating African immigrants for 
being responsible for their economic woes (Lekota, 2008:4, Bearak and Dugger, 
2008:15). Scapegoating took place in the form of killing some black African migrants 
and looting their property; in what appears to be a bid to abide by or brace up to the 
challenges posed by the get-rich-quick syndrome prevalent amongst some elite black 
South Africans, in contemporary South Africa (Pillay, 2008:97-100, Michela, 
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2008:23). Aggravating the situation was the fact that post-apartheid South Africa 
contrary to their expectations presented them with: High levels of crime, HIV / AIDS, 
inequality and abject poverty (Petros et al., 2006:67-77, Michela, 2008:23).  
Perhaps more frustrating and unfair was the reality that some black African 
immigrants resident in the country were better skilled and possessed better 
qualifications to compete more favourably with the challenges posed by the South 
African labour market and economy, than poor black South Africans. With better 
qualifications and skills they excelled in businesses, became self-employed and 
possibly competed better for jobs than poor black South Africans who have for many 
years been disadvantaged by the defunct oppressive apartheid regime in their own 
country (Bearak and Dugger, 2008:15, Nkomo et al., 1995:263-265). The obnoxious 
fact was that besides having to allegedly contend with black African immigrants who 
are professionals, black South Africans with poor qualifications also have to allegedly 
compete with some black African migrants that possess little or no qualifications for 
low-skill requiring jobs (Everatt, 2011:22, Solomon, 2003:102-103). Possibly most 
aggravating was the perception that some black African foreigners provided 
employers with cheaper labour thus out-competing some black South Africans 
(Solomon, 2003:102-103). Conversely, irrespective of the fact that some of these 
black African migrants allegedly compete with some black South Africans for jobs, 
they also have created jobs for some unemployed black South Africans (Danso and 
McDonald, 2001:124-125).      
However, during the oppressive apartheid regime, black African migrants were 
welcomed to South Africa to provide cheap labour at the mines (Steenkamp, 
2009:442, Mogale, 2008:15). They also properly integrated and lived peacefully with 
poor black South Africans and some of them even engaged in inter-marriages as they 
were then perceived as comrades in the fight against a common enemy— the 
apartheid regime. During this period, apartheid was perceived not only as a commonly 
shared enemy between black South Africans and black African migrants, but it was 
also commonly acknowledged to be the biggest impediment to the socio-economic 
well-being of all black Africans resident in South Africa (Steenkamp, 2009:442). But 
astonishingly, this was not the case after apartheid  since the dawn of democracy in 
South Africa gave birth to a new order that saw the emergence of a new enemy and on 
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the other hand, a brand new partner worthy of respect, emulation and suspicion 
(Matsinhe, 2011:295-296, 299-302, Steenkamp, 2009:442, Everatt, 2011:25, Laing 
and Pather, 2008:1 and 4). The by-product of this was a novel form of relationship 
between some black South Africans and black African migrants. This new order not 
only affected the relationship between some of these two former comrades but it also 
produced both a change in the enemy target and a single authentic beneficiary to the 
spoils of the struggle (Steenkamp, 2009:443). This new order set in motion by the 
demise of apartheid led some black South Africans into assuming that since their 
independence from apartheid in 1994, they were yet to enjoy the fruits of liberation 
and democracy while at the same time, black African foreigners were found to be 
taking away their jobs. All these imply that black African migrants are viewed by 
some black South Africans as an impediment to their well-being. Aggravating the 
situation are the inflammatory statements recklessly made by some South African 
politicians of black African origin. These politicians with so much reckless abandon 
portray black African migrants as responsible for the ills of society and the major 
impediment to the future of black South Africans (Crush, 2008:44-45, Tshabalala and 
Dibetle, 2008:4, Neocosmos, 2008:99-100, Human Rights Watch, 1998:20, Sekgala, 
2009:20, Orfanos, 2009:20).  
Unfortunately, these assumptions were clearly demonstrated in Alexandra where the 
explosive 2008 xenophobic violence was said to have originated. Theory became 
practical as a major battle line was drawn between some poor black South Africans 
and poor black African migrants who have lived, inter-married and dinned peacefully 
together for several years (Steenkamp, 2009, Badat, 2008d:1). The good relationship 
existing between the two groups deteriorated so much to the point that at the demise 
of apartheid, some black South Africans targeted and even killed some fellow South 
Africans for being sympathetic to or getting married to black African migrants 
(Landau, 2011, Ndlovu, 2008b:5, Makhafola, 2008b:5). Steenkamp (2009:443) and 
Sinwell (2011: 132-133) thus contend that following the launching of a ―R3 billion 
infrastructural development project‖ in Alexandra, some black South Africans 
perhaps in a bid to determine ―who gets what and how?‖ suddenly rose up against 
their neighbours (black African foreigners and some fellow citizens), in an attempt to 
possibly have them excluded as beneficiaries (Steenkamp, 2009).  
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In contemporary South Africa, in the psychological optical view of the minds of some 
black South Africans; black African immigrants have not only become transformed 
into a brand new impediment to both their socio-economic well-being, but have 
become a hindrance to their economic relations with their brand new partners – white 
South Africans and white immigrants, who incidentally have become revered as the 
bringers of money and jobs (Matsinhe, 2011:296). This situation was made 
combustible by the fact that some black South Africans view as authentic, any 
information emanating from both the national media and police, some of whom 
unfortunately have grossly painted a national bad image of the black African migrant 
(Steenkamp, 2009:443).    
Incidentally, reports indicated that a very high percentage of  both white and black 
South Africans are intolerant to black African immigrants and some black South 
Africans not only tolerate white South Africans but also treat white legal/illegal 
immigrants differently from black African legal/illegal migrants (Everatt, 2011:15, 
Steenkamp, 2009). White immigrants were perceived by some black South Africans 
as investors and tourists, while black African immigrants both professional and skilled 
labourers were recognised by some black South Africans as both miscreants and 
personae non gratae (Matsinhe, 2011:296). Perhaps a situation which explains why 
Vale argues that post-apartheid South Africa like apartheid South Africa ―operated 
two migration gates—one on labour migration, which has been open, and another for 
other forms of migration, which has remained officially closed‖ (Vale, 2002:21). It 
appears that the resentment for black African immigrants was as a result of the fact 
that the number of both professional and skilled black African immigrants has 
dramatically increased in post-apartheid South Africa, as this was not the case during 
the anti-apartheid struggle. Such a development is perceived by some black South 
Africans as a threat to their economic well-being (Muzumbukilwa, 2007:69-70, 
Steenkamp, 2009:442). However this development can be ascribed to both the 
attractive economy of South Africa and the political instability experienced in many 
African countries. Evidently, some black African immigrants who were fleeing from 
political unrest in their home countries found a safe haven in the stable and favourable 
economic and political terrains of South Africa (Steenkamp, 2009). 
Unfortunately, with the media and some black South African politicians having 
solidly classified black African immigrants as miscreants, outsiders, the cause of 
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economic woes and looming health hazards experienced by poor black South 
Africans; the emergence of major afrophobic violence against African immigrants in 
South Africa in 2008 becomes perfectly timed (Steenkamp, 2009:441-443, Petros et 
al., 2006:74-75). This is in the sense that the period in question (1994-2008) was very 
rife with frustration and aggression resulting from the plague of HIV/AIDS, poverty, 
the high cost of living, politically motivated violence, crime and inequality 
(Steenkamp, 2009:442-444, Mboyisa, 2008b:4). With black African immigrants 
already nationally labelled with the blame for these socio-economic woes, at a time 
when poor black South Africans were yearning for better service delivery from their 
elusive politicians (Michela, 2008:22-23). They presented themselves to some black 
South Africans, both as diversions and as ―body bags‖ to vent their anger and 
frustrations, thus making scapegoats out of black African foreigners became the order 
of the day.  Against this background it also becomes logical to some black South 
Africans that their nation‘s economy should be rid of these parasites, therefore 
violence against African immigrants became perceived among some black South 
Africans as a national cause (Molefe et al., 2008b:4).    
Molefe et al. (2008) reveals a horrific picture of the situation as some kind of 
cleansing and patriotic violence that can be pictured as ‗an act reminiscent of 
Passover‘. As the violence rages on, some frightened black South Africans were 
compelled by necessity to dub their surnames on their shacks to save their homes 
from being mistaken for that of black African migrants by the rampaging mob 
(Molefe et al., 2008b:4). According to Molelefe et al (2008:4), the surnames read: 
―Madondo, Ndlovu, Masinga, Cele….‖ Some residents in Alexander were reported to 
have openly supported the violence claiming it was necessary in solving the problem 
of South Africa since government have refused to carry out the supposedly noble 
assignment of getting rid of alleged illegal black African migrants (Molefe et al., 
2008b:4). A black South African resident was quoted as saying: ‗We are not trying to 
kill anyone but rather solving the problems of our own country. The government is 
not doing anything about this, so I support what the mob is doing‘ (Molefe et al., 
2008b:4). This not only meant that some black South Africans have embarked on 
getting rid of  some black African foreigners from their country because of severe 
economic pressure, but it also meant that they could no longer trust South African 
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government. A situation of this nature can prove to be very precarious for national 
development.    
Similarly, Sapa (2008:5) argues that black migrants from Africa were seen by some 
black South Africans as economic competitors and the sole reason behind their 
economic woes. Some black South Africans insist that they provide cheap labours to 
employers who found South African workers expensive and unattractive, thereby 
keeping black South Africans unemployed (Everatt, 2008-2009:4). But some black 
South Africans acknowledge that some of these assertions were false as some of their 
fellow citizens were just envious. Envious of the fact that some of these black African 
migrants were found to possess better skills and qualifications to be either self-
employed or acquire jobs South Africans wouldn‘t like to have. Many of these black 
African foreigners were said to be very creative and hardworking, to the point of 
exposing some black South Africans to the world of self-employment and businesses.  
Unfortunately some black South Africans are now desirous of the departure of black 
African foreigners from South Africa to their respective countries so that they might 
take over (SAPA, 2008d, Everatt, 2008-2009:4, Everatt, 2011:26, Human Rights 
Watch, 1998:128-129, Makhafola, 2008b:5). This is evident in the way and manner in 
which shops owned by African immigrants were attacked with their cars, spaza shops, 
shacks, destroyed sometimes after meetings involving some taxi drivers. Interestingly, 
most of these usually took place at the slightest provocation as the wares of immigrant 
black African hawkers and shop owners were regularly looted while some of them 
were either violently attacked or killed in the process (Human Rights Watch, 
1998:129-131, Joubert, 2008b:3, Rossouw, 2008:11, Johnston, 2008b:31, Evans et al., 
2009:1 and 4, Ndlovu, 2008b:5, Bloem, 2008:9). Beyond envy, this is suggestive of 
the fact that it is possible that some big business conglomerates in South Africa, 
owned by certain elites have a lot to gain from the violence. This situation brings to 
the fore the possibility of a third party involvement in fuelling the conflict, more so 
since there has been an outcry of unfair business competition emanating from 
different quarters across the country (Religious Leaders Training on Conflict 
Resolution, 2013, Rossouw and Kharsany, 2008:6, Amisi et al., 2011:74-75) .  
Meanwhile Sinwell (2011:135) claims that since around 2005 there have been 
persistent efforts by some companies and government officials to evict some people 
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from their shacks in Malboro, Alexandra. The occupants of these shacks have been 
renting these sharks for over 10 years and were reportedly involved in illegal tapping 
and use of electricity for their respective homes in and around some abandoned 
factories. Most appalling was that the environment was reportedly becoming 
extremely unhygienic for habitation, making it vulnerable to an outbreak of diseases 
(Sinwell, 2011:135). Interestingly, following an out-brake of violence, later reports 
indicated that arrests were made by the police of certain individual(s) in Soweto who 
confessed to have received money from some faceless sponsors to either instigate or 
sustain the xenophobic violence for some selfish but yet to be ascertained  reasons 
(Mashaba, 2008b:4, Sowetan, 2008c:5, Everatt, 2011:26).  
Incidentally, these developments are in line with government‘s claims of a possibility 
of a ―third force‖ and could mean that some industrialists/capitalists around the 
country may have directly/indirectly sponsored the conflict by funding the eviction of 
people from their abandoned factories and environs. This of course is also in line with 
the modus operandi of South Africa‘s ester while apartheid colonial masters who 
forcefully evacuated black South Africans from white dominated areas around the 
country.  Meanwhile, irrespective of the fact that government failed to bring forward 
proof of financiers of the violence, reports clearly indicated that the arrests were 
publically confirmed by the then police spokesman Captain Mpande Khoza and some 
other government officials (Frye et al., 2011:246, South African History Online, 1950, 
Johnson, 1951:286, SAPA, 2008a:3, Sowetan, 2008c:5, Mashaba, 2008b:4, Naki, 
2008a:9). 
Similarly, before and during the 2008 major ―afrophobic‖ violence, there were reports 
of some acts of economic sabotage against black African immigrants. Reports 
indicated that some South African members of hawkers unions openly supported the 
violence against immigrant black African hawkers, traders and shop-owners (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998-131, Rondganger, 2008b:13, Tshetlo, 2008:4). Following several 
protests by some local hawkers unions and violence against black African migrant 
hawkers, government agencies started issuing hawking licences. In what seems to be 
an attempt to exclude black African immigrants from participating in hawking 
businesses, many of them were skilfully denied hawking licences by some local 
governments (Human Rights Watch, 1998:133). This situation is quite similar to the 
economic modus operandi of the erstwhile apartheid regime which became envious of 
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the fact that black South Africans were more successful farmers than they were. Thus 
out of envy and rage, the apartheid government came up with laws (such as the 
Natives Land Act of 1913) that would systematically strip them of their lands, hence 
rendering black South Africans landless in order to entrench white economic 
superiority and have them excluded from the mainstream of the national economy 
(Banton, 1987:156, Nkomo et al., 1995:262-266, Fahmawi, 1987:132). This latest 
form of relationship between some black South Africans and black African foreigners 
could mean that some black South Africans are still suffering from the hangover of 
their experiences with the defunct oppressive apartheid regime or are encouraged by 
some white industrialists to attack fellow Africans.  
In the words of Chossudovsky (1997:397), ‗…transfer of nominal political power by 
the apartheid regime in 1994 rather than restraining the white dominated economic 
system, has in fact created the preconditions for its advancement both within South 
Africa and the region‘. The total result of these is that the economic status quo of 
apartheid South Africa still survives in post-apartheid South Africa, a situation which 
can prove to be economically very frustrating for poor black South Africans. Hence 
the oppressed (being some poor black South Africans) in emulation of his oppressor 
(some white South Africans) has chosen to become the brand new oppressor (Bearak 
and Dugger, 2008:15, Matsinhe, 2011:296-302, Kalamane, 2008:3). A situation which 
Matsinhe (2011:302) describes as follows: ―Once the ideals of the oppressor became 
the aspirations of the oppressed, the oppressed has become a cultural clone of the 
oppressor‖. However, Gqola (2008:210-222) views the xenophobic attacks of black 
African immigrants differently from a perspective she regards as ―negrophobia‖. 
Gqola (2008:210-222) believes that the negrophobic violence of 2008 was targeted 
mainly at poor black men from other African countries and not wealthy black 
Africans or poor people of other races.  Gqola (2008:218-219) thus argues that some 
black South Africans view poor black African immigrants as stealing their jobs and 
women:    
Black South African women and jobs are the entitlement of black 
South African men. Historically as well as in the contemporary 
moment, dominant black masculinities index access to finance as 
linked to sexual attractiveness and virility. Therefore the loss of both a 




The ideological baggage of such assertions comes from assumptions 
about women‘s availability for sale. If ‗foreign‘ Africans have all the 
‗money‘, then South African men cannot compete […]. 
Meanwhile, Matsinhe (2011:296) insists that the word ‗foreigners‘ commonly used 
among some black South Africans are meant to refer only to black African 
immigrants, and immigrants of other races resident in South Africa are free from such 
label. Therefore whenever there is an emotionally charged accusation of foreigners in 
South Africa stealing jobs and women, emanating from some black South Africans, 
the focus lies on black African immigrants (Gqola, 2008:218-219). One of the greatest 
problems with intra-group relations in South Africa lies with the fact that there are 
high levels of distrust among black South Africans, between black South Africans and 
black African migrants and vice versa. And to make matters worse, many black South 
Africans do not even trust South African government, especially with the tackling of 
the issue of illegal immigrants and unemployment in the country  (Dube, 2008:3, 
Molefe et al., 2008b:1 and 4, Ncana and la Grange, 2008:4, Steenkamp, 2009:445-
446). Black African immigrants also, do not trust South African government due to 
the state‘s discriminatory attitudes towards them (Steenkamp, 2009:445). Steenkamp 
(2009:446) therefore concludes that bridging this gap of mistrust in the country 
remains difficult in the midst of competition over scarce resources. Hence this high 
level of distrust continued to breed antagonism, suspicion and all manner of 
dicrimination in the relationship between these groups (Steenkamp, 2009:445, 
Tejumaiye and Oso, 2008:127). A situation like this might prove to be inimical for 
socio-economic development in South Africa as these groups continued live in utter 
suspicion and distrust. 
However, it must be clearly noted that the personal attitude of some black South 
Africans towards black African immigrants is in contrast to the actions of the mobs. 
The fact is that some black South Africans still have good relationships with and are 
even getting married to some black African migrants despite the challenges posed by 
these negative perceptions and attitudes towards black African foreigners resident in 
South Africa (Okolo, 2008, Neocosmos, 2008:588, Badat, 2008d:1). Some black 
South Africans are so ashamed of  the xenophobic violence carried out against black 
African migrants by their fellow countrymen, to the point that some of them 
publically condemned the act describing it as inhumane (Tau, 2008:3, Msomi and 
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Meintjies, 2008:1and 4, Msomi et al., 2008c:1 and 4, Msomi, 2008:1, Mogale, 
2008:15, Crush, 2008:9). While some others were reported to have assisted 
government agencies in quelling down the violence, some black South Africans took 
the campaign to another level by joining the fight against ―afrophobic‖ violence to the 
point of physically clashing with some rampaging mob in an attempt to protect black 
African migrants from attacks (Shonisani, 2008:4, Msomi et al., 2008b: 1 and 4). This 
situation was also well proven by the enormous relief materials and assistance 
displaced black African foreigners received from sympathetic South Africans, the 
South African government and non-governmental organisations (Tau, 2008:3, Crush, 
2008:9). But unfortunately, these humanitarian services offered to these displaced 
black African migrants provoked anger and envy among some black South Africans. 
A black South African female between the ages of 40-49 argued as follows: 
I am not against foreigners…really, I have nothing against foreigners. 
Our government is too accommodating when it comes to foreigners. 
When we watch TV in our neighbours‘ houses we are amazed to see 
government providing free food for foreigners when we are also 
hungry but are not catered for. Government provides foreigners with 
free maize meal but fails to do the same for us so that we can be able to 
feed our children. Our children go to bed on empty stomachs on some 
days. 
Government gives foreigners preferential treatment; it is too 
accommodating towards foreigners (sic). Last week my children and I 
went to bed hungry for three days; government would not offer us any 
help even if we approach them for help. Government does not provide 
us with free maize meal (Everatt, 2011:21, Everatt, 2008-2009:3).  
Clearly this is not only indicative of the fact that some poor black South Africans 
have very poor knowledge of what it means to be a refugee but also it is indicative of 
a high level of poverty among black South Africans. Besides, this points to the fact 
that some black South Africans might be very dependent on government for their 
daily survival. Meanwhile regarding government provisions of RDP (Reconstruction 
Development programme) houses to black South Africans and humanitarian 
assistance to black African immigrants, a black South African female between the 
ages of 30-39, dwelling in Alexandria, has the following to say:  
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I say this thing [xenophobia] will never end. They take those people 
even to church as if they feel pity for them-in the meantime we are 
suffering. We live in one-roomed houses; in the meantime they are 
living comfortably. These people working for the government are the 
ones selling these houses and these outsiders have money. They sell 
these houses for something like R2000 to these foreigners. That is why 
these people are occupying houses that are supposed to belong to South 
Africans […] (Everatt, 2008-2009:3). 
While another black South African male between the ages of 20-29, 
views the entire situation as follows: 
The problem starts with the communities competing with foreigners. 
The foreigners start achieving more and the communities realize these 
foreigners are getting so much more yet they don‘t belong here (sic)! 
(African male, 20-29, Vosloorus, unemployed)  (Everatt, 2011:22). 
Therefore in view of these, Wimmer (1997:21) argues that the intensity of the 
conflict witnessed between black Africans from outside South Africa and black 
South Africans was wrongfully classified as xenophobia. Wimmer (1997: 21) insists 
that the situation was borne out of ‗equality and difference, of legitimate and 
illegitimate competition‘. Obviously, some South Africans were chased away from 
their RDP houses while two South African women working for a security company 
were beaten up on returning from work and refusing to participate in the violence 
(Seale et al., 2008:3, Ncana and Mkhize, 2008a:4). This development points to the 
fact that among the attacking mobs were unemployed and homeless black South 
Africans as the mob screamed at and accused foreigners of taking away their jobs 
and RDP houses (Oloyede, 2008:108-109, Aidan, 2010:649, Tshabalala and Dibetle, 
2008:4). In view of this, Ncana and Mkhize (2008:4) report that some black South 
Africans are taking advantage of the situation to settle some old scores, While some 
other reports indicate that some councillors were either killed or had their houses 
burnt down (Mboyisa, 2008b:4, Stewart et al., 2008a:4). 
Incidentally, at the end of the major afrophobic violence of May 2008 South Africa 
more than any other African country recorded the highest number of casualties 
(Oloyede, 2008:108). Thus leading Wimmer (1997:21) to conclude with a careful 
observation that it does appears as if ‗ethnic and xenophobic conflicts are waged 
over collective goods‘. A development which Wimmer (1997) claims, makes it 
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difficult for negative attitudes towards foreigners to be high among people who have 
been jobless for a very long time, some of whom have actually worked with 
foreigners for years. Thus Everatt (2011:23), having considered certain consistencies 
in the reactions he received from some black South Africans during interviews 
regarding xenophobia in the country, identifies these collective goods at stake to 
mean houses and jobs. The underlying implication of the statement: ‗The foreigners 
start achieving more and the communities realize these foreigners are getting so 
much more yet they don‘t belong here (sic)!‘ is that black African immigrants 
actually make a decent living as against different stereotypes in the society that 
criminalises black African migrants (Mancotywa, 2008:12). Similarly but most 
revealing is the account of a black South African woman from Kliptown informal 
dwellings which reveals a clearer picture of the situation as she was quoted as 
making the following statements about the attitude of some black South Africans to 
jobs and their treatment of foreigners: 
In general South Africans are lazy whereas foreigners are willing to do 
any job in order to be able to provide for their families. The minute 
they make money and are able to do things for themselves the locals 
become jealous and begrudge them their success. I am a waitress and I 
work with foreigners who work 24 hours as cleaners, a job which many 
South Africans don‘t want to do, but as soon as they see that there is 
money to be made as a cleaner they become jealous and beat the 
foreigners (Everatt, 2011:26).   
   
 However, research has proven that several years after apartheid in South Africa, 
besides skin colour, education determines how much one earns as a worker in South 
Africa. A matric certificate holder earns twice more than secondary school students 
while university graduates earn five times more than the salary of a matric certificate 
holder. Meanwhile, a postgraduate degree holder earns approximately eight times 
more than a matric holder. Based on this structure, a matric holder earns R4 million in 
a year; a postgraduate earns almost R24 million while an illiterate (if he manages to 
find a job) will only earn R1.15 million in a lifetime (Laing and Pather, 2008:1 and 4). 
The unfortunate result is that illiterate South Africans are very much at economic 
disadvantage. Thus it can be argued that with adult black South Africans more than 
any other race in South Africa, recording the highest rate of illiteracy with more than 
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80% of its population found to be ―functionally illiterate‖. It then becomes possible 
that approximately the same figure has become economically disadvantaged or live in 
adverse poverty and frustrations due to illiteracy and South Africa‘s socio-economic 
structure (Aitchison and Harley, 2006:96, Danso and McDonald, 2001:118, Laing and 
Pather, 2008:1 and 4). When it is reported that South Africa records about a 40% 
unemployment rate, it becomes obvious that a greater chunk of this percentage of 
unemployment goes to black South Africans due to their high rate of illiteracy 
(Michela, 2008:23, Danso and McDonald, 2001:124). Similarly Gower (2009:3) 
reports that a study conducted in 2007 reveals that 2.8 million out of 6.7 million South 
African youths between the age brackets of 18-24 years were either unemployed or 
illiterate. 44percent of this population were reported to be black South Africans, while 
41percent were actually coloureds (Gower, 2009). This situation happens to be a 
shadow of apartheid policies of unequal access to education, a situation which can be 
very frustrating for some poor black South Africans (Danso and McDonald, 2001:115-
137, Sonneborn, 2010:48-49, Nkomo et al., 1995:269-274, Laing and Pather, 2008:1 
and 4). These frustrations therefore makes it possible for black South Africans to have 
the tendency of becoming more xenophobic and violent than any other race in the 
country (Muzumbukilwa, 2007:87, Gower, 2009:3). 
 Unfortunately, this high level of illiteracy and poverty among black South Africans 
can further complicate their relations between black African foreigners who are 
reported to be mostly more educated, better skilled and exposed than some black 
South Africans (Muzumbukilwa, 2007:76-87). This level of illiteracy might as well be 
responsible for some black South Africans being ignorant of the fact that although 
some black immigrants allegedly compete with them for jobs, they are mostly self-
employed and create jobs for some black South Africans as well (Muzumbukilwa, 
2007:76 and 87, Danso and McDonald, 2001:124-125).  
Certainly, education has a lot to do with xenophobia in South Africa as xenophobic 
attitudes were found to be very high amongst South Africans with no formal 
education, of which more than 80% adult illiteracy was recorded amongst black South 
Africans (Crush, 2008:33-35, Danso and McDonald, 2001:118, Aitchison and Harley, 
2006:96). This alarming rate of illiteracy found amongst black South Africans might 
as well mean that some of them who target fellow South Africans based on skin colour 
52 
 
or ethnic variance, could be ignorant of the fact that they are fellow South Africans 
(Landau, 2011:1, Monson and Arian, 2011:32 and 50, Ncana and la Grange, 2008, 
Ncana and Mkhize, 2008a:4, Kalamane and SAPA, 2008a:3). Since some of them are 
not educated they might have out of ignorance given South African citizenship a 
thorough subjective definition, and as such might be acting out of ignorance. 
Accordingly, since many black South Africans are not properly enlightened, many of 
them might as well be ignorant of the role of black African nations and nationals in the 
anti-apartheid movement in South Africa (SAPA-AFP, 2008a:3, Cox, 2008:3). This 
situation leaves some black South Africans prone to manipulations and exploitations 
from people with selfish /malicious intentions. Such malice can be done by sowing 
―the seed of discord‖ between both parties (black South Africans and black African 
migrants) in order to trigger confusion and conflict. Incidentally reports indicate that 
some poor ignorant black South Africans acknowledged collecting money from 
unknown individuals to kill black African migrants and trigger xenophobic violence in 
their community (Sowetan, 2008c:5, Mashaba, 2008b:4). 
2.2.3 Dimensions to the „Politics of Xenophobia in South Africa‟ 
Fortunately, the end of apartheid paved way for democracy in South Africa as well as 
increase in migration of black Africans into South Africa (Sonneborn, 2010, Solomon, 
2003). Different patterns of politics emerged to deal with the situation; score cheap 
political points, inflame the violence or even paint a negative picture of the 
government in power. But the most interesting scenario is the case of media politics 
and politics of ‗insiders and outsiders‘ otherwise known as ―Amakwerekwere‖ 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006, Matsinhe, 2011, Danso and McDonald, 2001).    
2.2.3.1 State Actions and Inactions and the „Politics of Exclusion in South Africa‟ 
It must be recalled that  incidents of xenophobic violence have replicated  in different 
forms and magnitude for years in South Africa, the worst of it all being a major 
outbreak  of ―afrophobic‖ violence in the country which sparked up on the 11
th
 of 
May 2008 (Reuters, 2008b:4, Solomon, 2003:98, Crush, 2008:44-54). Furthermore, 
irrespective of the fact that ―afrophobic‖ violence continues in South Africa, reports 
indicate that the government has legally done very little to either protect the lives of 
black  African migrants or prevent reoccurrences (Nyamnjoh, 2006:40-41, Klaaren, 
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2011:135). Incidentally after the major ―afrophobic‖ violence of May 2008, the then 
President Thabo Mbeki was quoted by the press, some writers and researchers to have 
in a most sophisticated manner, publically denied or exposed his ignorance regarding 
the obvious reality of xenophobia in South Africa (Dodson, 2010:7). According to 
Mbeki: 
When I heard some accuse my people of xenophobia, of hatred of 
foreigners, I wonder what the accusers knew about my people, which I 
did not know…The dark days of May which have brought us here 
today were visited on our country by people who acted with criminal 
intent. What happened during these days was not inspired by a perverse 
nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities 
violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiment of mass and 
mindless hatred of foreigners—xenophobia … and this I must also 
say—none in our society has any right to encourage or incite 
xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it 
in the garb of xenophobia (Worby et al., 2008:4). 
Conversely, Worby et al. (2008:6) reveal that some writers agree with this notion 
insisting that the violence of 2008 cannot be completely defined as xenophobia.  For 
example, Matsinhe (2011:310) submits to a similar notion by insisting that taking into 
account a thorough analysis of the history of South Africa, violence against black 
African immigrants as experienced in South Africa can best be described as 
―Afrophobia‖. This development may not continue to augur well for the nation as the 
above statement from the president might prove to be a setback to the fight against 
―afrophobic‖ violence in the country. Unfortunately, Dodson (2010:7) contends that 
Nelson Mandela the first democratically elected president of South Africa, who 
happens to be President Thabo Mbeki‘s predecessor, was earlier quoted in 1994 to 
have made the following speech: ‗The fact that illegal immigrants are involved in 
violent criminal activity must not tempt us into the dangerous attitude which regards 
all foreigners with hostility‘. Besides encouraging the sustenance of a culture of 
impunity and acts of violence against black African migrants in the country, these 
statements sends a negative signal to investors within and outside South Africa. For 
instance, Ferreira and Mtshali (2008:16) both revealed that after the major afrophobic 
violence of 2008 many foreign business owners shut down their businesses and left 
the country out of fear.    
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Meanwhile some of the perpetrators of these crimes against black African foreigners 
may have continued to walk freely in the country as some government agencies and 
law enforcement agencies who instead of providing black African foreigners with 
support and protection as they are legally bound to do, rather chose to participate in 
shameful acts of extortion, harassments and abuse of black African migrants 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006:51, Neocosmos, 2008:589, Human Rights Watch, 1998:2-82). For 
instance a self-employed black African migrant who works as an electrical engineer 
was reported to have received a smoky car from a policeman who brought the car to 
him for repairs while on mufti. On the completion of repairs on his car, the policeman 
appeared in full uniform and took both his car and the Mozambican engineer to the 
station. Irrespective of the fact that the policeman never paid the young man for his 
services, he was rather said to have been forced to pay a bribe of R500 to the 
policeman to secure his release since he was reportedly an illegal migrant (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:42-43).  
Meanwhile Neocosmos (2006:104) contends that even black African migrants 
residing legally in South Africa often end up losing their documents to some 
government agencies as they shredded their papers with impunity the moment they 
got hold of them. This is an indication that the problem is by no means the legality of 
their stay in the country but rather an indication of hatred of their very presence in the 
country. Incidentally, at the Lindela detention facility, there are several reports of 
abuses and torture of black African migrants. Reports indicated that officials collected 
money from those wrongfully detained in the facility as a bribe to secure their release 
and the same applies to those that are to face deportation. According to these reports, 
detainees facing deportation are compelled to bribe officials to secure their 
deportation; otherwise their deportation becomes unduly delayed as they languish in 
detention (Human Rights Watch, 1998:68-83, Neocosmos, 2006:108).               
Unfortunately, a report of a possible lacuna in the law indicates the absence of 
specific hate crime legislation (Monson and Arian, 2011:36), a situation which might 
have exacerbated the violence as mobs went on rampage stealing, killing and maiming 
black African immigrants and some fellow South Africans with so much impunity 
(Johnston, 2008b:31, Landau, 2011:1, Monson and Arian, 2011:32 and 50, Ncana and 
la Grange, 2008:4, Joubert, 2008b:3, Ndlovu, 2008b:5, Kapp, 2008:1987, Kalamane 
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and SAPA, 2008a:3, Ncana and Mkhize, 2008b:1 and 4). Irrespective of the fact that 
arrests were made by the police of alleged criminals, rapists and murderers, the 
judiciary was said to have not been able to secure conviction for most of the arrests 
(Klaaren, 2011:135). For instance Evans et al (2009: 1 and 4) argues that a hundred 
and twenty eight (128) people out of the one thousand four hundred (1,400) suspects 
arrested for allegedly participating in xenophobic attacks were only convicted by the 
courts. While The Times newspaper (2009:18) contends that less than thirty percent of 
those that took part in the xenophobic violence have been made to face justice. 
Meanwhile less than three percent of these people have only been convicted so far, 
with the type of penalties The Times newspaper reports as encouraging to the violence 
(The Times, 2009:18). This implies that from 2008 to 2011 the South African 
government have done very little to legally forestall re-occurrences of xenophobic 
violence in South Africa. Therefore the country continues to experience acts of 
violence against black African migrants (Everatt, 2011:10, Ncube, 2012, Nyasa 
Times, 2012, SAPA, 2011). 
Incidentally, since the political entity of a state is defined by its boundaries and 
control of migration across its boundaries, it is possible that South African 
government might have perceived the influx of African migrants in the country as a 
threat to the existence of the state (Crush, 2008). Thus comparing the situation with 
that of animals in the jungle, Solomon (2003:16-36) contends that ‗territoriality 
predates the rise of the modern state‘ which is compelled to protect her territory at all 
cost. Hence the practise of exclusion and inclusion clearly defines the state of nation-
building. The idea of creation of a particular community while at the same time 
excluding some others from the same community makes up an integral part of the 
emergence of a nation-state. Hence amongst others a state is characterised as 
specifically defined territorial boundaries with clear distinction between foreigners 
and nationals (Neocosmos, 2006:15-16 and 90, Solomon, 2003:16-36). This 
perception is reflected in the harrowing experiences of some black African migrants in 
South Africa such as: media negative/stereotypical reportage, reckless and 
inflammatory statements made against them by some black South African politicians, 
the regular abuses they go through at the hand of state agencies, their classification as 
―amakwerekwere‖ by some black South Africans and their experiences of 
―afrophobic‖ violence/killings (Neocosmos, 2008:586-594, Nyamnjoh, 2006:28-68). 
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Based on these, Neocosmos (2006:90) therefore insists that the problem lies with the 
question of how the state manages its processes of exclusion and inclusion, how 
democratic it has become and to what extent these processes have actually been 
democratically piloted.   
 
Similarly, Neocosmos (2008:588) argued that the attitude of the state remains 
different from that of the citizens as some black South Africans are sympathetic to the 
plight of black African migrants. For instance after the nation experienced an orgy of 
―afrophobic‖ violence in 2008, many sympathetic South Africans irrespective of their 
race or colour showed up amidst national outburst of emotions with donations of 
massive relief materials to assist the displaced African migrants (Smillie, 2008:1, 
Rasool, 2008:13, Botes, 2008:8, Badat, 2008a:2, Naki, 2008b:5, Serrao, 2008b:1, 
Serrao, 2008a:1, Crush, 2008:9, Neocosmos, 2006:103, Mashaba, 2008a:4). While the 
same Mangosotho Buthelezi, the former minister of the department of home affairs 
who was reported to have received so much publicity from the media for reckless and 
inflammatory utterances against black African migrants was later found to be 
shedding tears for the victims of ―afrophobic‖ violence (Neocosmos, 2008:588, 
Human Rights Watch, 1998:123-124, Mngxitama, 2008:190). It is in view of this that 
Mngxitama (2008:189-205) contends that not all South Africans are 
barbarians/xenophobes as alleged, some are totally not in support of the violence 
against black African migrants or the states discriminatory policies against them.  
 
Therefore it follows that all these are indicative of the fact that the reactions of black 
South Africans towards black African migrants can be analysed from the following 
perspectives, namely: political/state level of analysis and the individual levels of 
analysis. At the political/state level citizens react according to how the state and her 
agencies perceive and treats black African migrants. At the individual level some 
citizens are personally very sympathetic to African immigrants, while some out of 
fear simply dance to the whims of the state‘s ‗politics of exclusion‘, the type of 
politics Michael Neocosmos describes as ‗the politics of fear, violence and war 
against those perceived to be different‘ (Neocosmos, 2008:587, Neocosmos, 2006:12-
17 and 103, Udeh et al., 2013).  
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2.2.3.2 The Injection of Media Politics to the Flame of Xenophobic Violence 
At the political level, the actions and inactions of government officials and the media 
have served to whip up and sustain anti-African immigrant sentiments among black 
South Africans. For instance, some government agencies abuse black foreigners
5
, 
while some politicians continue to make reckless and inflammatory statements that 
scapegoat black African immigrants as the cause of development problems in South 
Africa, the media is found culpable with its negative publicity for African immigrants 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998:4-20, Makatile, 2008:9). Ironically, it becomes obvious 
that although the state condemns xenophobia out-rightly, it also provides the fertile 
grounds and basis on which xenophobia thrives. Meanwhile, the facts regarding 
African immigrants being the cause of underdevelopment problems in South Africa 
speak differently.  
In dismissing the notion that foreigners account for the increase in crime wave in 
South Africa, a study conducted by Matsche (2001) reveals that foreigners account for 
less than one percent of arrests while about 98 percent of arrests in 1998 for various 
criminal activities were South Africans. This is owing to the fact that besides some 
black Africans being illegal immigrants, they have received so much negative 
publicity that they would prefer not to attract the attention of the police (Matsche, 
2001:590, Neocosmos, 2008:590, Nyamnjoh, 2006:46). Therefore, Nyamnjoh 
(2006:68) argues that negative publicity; stereotyping and scapegoating of black 
African immigrants were in the interest of the black and white bourgeoisie/elites since 
those tactics serve a ‗useful diversionary purpose in the face of the rising expectations 
of ordinary black and white citizens‘.   
 
Furthermore, Nyamnjoh (2006:63-64) reveals that the South African media is largely 
owned by white South Africans. While Chossudovsky (1997:397) insists that South 
African economy is also dominated by white South Africans. Therefore it then 
follows that since these two sectors of the economy are dominated by white South 
Africans, media reportage might be very biased to the point of promoting ancient 
apartheid racist and discriminatory politics (Nyamnjoh, 2006:63-64). Obviously the 
                                                          
5
 Some members of the SAPS encourage South Africans to assist them to round up and root out illegal black 
African immigrants .See Neocosmos, M. 2008. The politics of fear and the fear of politics: Reflections on 
xenophobic violence in South Africa. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 43, 586-594, Matsinhe, D. M. 2011. 
Africa‘s fear of itself: the ideology of makwerekwere in South Africa.Third World Quarterly, 23, 295-313. 
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defunct apartheid regime‘s system of governance was made up of anti-African 
policies and based on racial classifications and profiling (Nkomo et al., 1995:261-280, 
Human Rights Watch, 1998:160-161). Thus, it becomes obvious that since the media 
is largely owned by white South Africans, media sensational and stereotypical reports 
are devised to possibly run down or caricature the young democratic government of 
South Africa. This can be achieved by promoting apartheid‘s similar politics of 
exclusion and violence (Danso and McDonald, 2001:118-131, Nyamnjoh, 2006:63-
68, Harber, 2008:161-169, Sonneborn, 2010:56-87, Du Toit, 2001:78-83, Udeh et al., 
2013). In this regard Nyamnjoh (2006:64) clearly argues 
 
That the media in post-apartheid South Africa are still dominated by 
white interests in ownership, control and content is a good case in point 
that talking or scripting change is different from living change. If the 
media in general, and the print media in particular, still mainly serve 
elite white interests and the economy is largely still under elite white 
control, it means that how the media cover immigration and migrants is 
likely to be indicative of the dominant elite white views on these 
issues. And if, in the face of negative coverage, black South Africans 
were to reinforce their hostility towards Makwerekwere, they would be 
acting in tune with dominant elite white interests, even as they may 
claim to be defending their own interests as emerging citizens….  
 
 Furthermore, since contrary to apartheid policies and politics, South Africa‘s new 
democratic government seeks to improve the economic well-being of poor black 
South Africans who have for many years lived a life of servitude under the defunct 
white dominated oppressive apartheid regime (Nkomo et al., 1995:261-280, Ponte et 
al., 2007:933, BBC News, 2008, SAPA, 2008c:5). This novel black economic 
empowerment policy, engineered by the new democratic dispensation appears not to 
be serving the interest of some white South Africans (Dibetle, 2008:14). Hence the 
media provides some of them with an alternative political divisive method of setting 
up African communities against each other thereby making a jest of South Africa‘s 
newly found democracy, to the detriment of the ANC-lead government (Harber, 
2008:165-171). The possible implication of these is that South African media might 
have become a modern mechanism of ancient apartheid politics meant to promote and 




During apartheid, some of the major concerns surrounding the complexities of 
immigration in South Africa were fears of spread of diseases, drain on government 
resources and decline in values of properties, economic competition and devaluation 
of wages (Petros et al., 2006:67-77, Nkomo et al., 1995:261-282). These same 
concerns and anti-African ideas were echoed all over the media in contemporary 
South Africa, before the major out-brake of the xenophobic violence in 2008 (Danso 
and McDonald, 2001:115-137). 
Incidentally, since most widely read newspapers in South Africa are controlled or 
owned by white South Africans and are said to also have among their regular readers, 
South African elites, policy makers and politicians (Danso and McDonald, 2001:118). 
It perhaps explains why some black South African politicians deploy some of the 
newspaper stereotypical publications as political propaganda (Human Rights Watch, 
1998:19-20 and 123-125). A situation like this might as well be responsible for some 
black South Africans having negative perceptions regarding black African migrants.  
Some black South Africans bear these negative perceptions even though many of them 
are yet to meet or come into regular contact with black African foreigners, as to 
ascertain the degree of their maliciousness and lawlessness. Rather, their actions and 
belief about African migrants are based on ―second hand (mis) information‖ from 
sources like the media, friends and schools (Danso and McDonald, 2001:116, Crush, 
2008:31). This also implies that many black South Africans have never travelled to 
other African countries as to be exposed to other Africans/African culture. Thus this 
level of ignorance can only mean that many black South Africans are not exposed to 
the outside world but are only dependent on South African orientation. Therefore, this 
explains why some black South Africans are said to have anti-African orientation, 
possibly stemming from the fact that South Africa is the only African country where 
white supremacy had for years been properly entrenched in the system (Matsinhe, 
2011:297-300).   
 Unfortunately some media in South Africa continues to aggravate the situation by 
promoting certain stereotypes against black African immigrants which suggests the 
nationalisation of crime among black African foreign nationals. Zimbabwean and 
Mozambican women were labelled as prostitutes, Mozambicans were also associated 
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with car hijacking while Nigerians and Moroccans were negatively publicized by the 
media as drug peddlers. Congolese as being involved in passport fraud, while Zairians 
were identified with diamond smuggling and Lesotho nationals became associated 
with smuggling of gold dust and copper wire (Danso and McDonald, 2001:126-127). 
All are indicative of the fact that most media in South Africa have not only succeeded 
in ―Africanising‖ crime but have also successfully ―internalised racism‖ in South 
Africa (Danso and McDonald, 2001:126). Perhaps it is based on these (media) 
negative publicity and stereotypes that government agencies and some black South 
Africans embarked on regular abuse of black African migrants (Human Rights Watch, 
1998:49-136, Nyamnjoh, 2006:46-56). Hence it can be argued that most media in 
South Africa might have been used to sponsor a hidden agenda of the defunct 
apartheid regime. This could be the case since contemporary South African media 
mirrored similar images of concerns and complexities surrounding immigration and 
residence in apartheid South Africa (Vale, 2002:22-23, Petros et al., 2006:74, 
Solomon, 2003:105-124).  
During the apartheid regime, there was no room for black ownership of press and in 
contemporary South Africa, few newspapers are owned by black South Africans. 
Incidentally, out of the four major newspapers in South Africa, only one newspaper—
TML (Times Media limited) has recorded significant black ownership (Danso and 
McDonald, 2001:118).  However, this does not imply that black owned newspapers 
are not involved in stereotypical publications against black African immigrants in 
South Africa, as they were found equally guilty of similar offence. However, since the 
majority of them depended mostly on European sponsorship they might easily be 
persuaded into blowing ancient apartheid tunes (Danso and McDonald, 2001:115-
137). Owing to this attitude of some journalists in South Africa, the case of 
xenophobia in the country becomes worrisome as the situation was aggravated by the 
fact that South Africans easily view information from the media regarding black 
African immigrants as authentic  (Steenkamp, 2009:443). 
 Meanwhile just before the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the 
possibility of the country being faced with a massive migration problem from black 
African countries was brought to the fore of public debate. Public debate on the matter 
began to heat up following de Klerk‘s speech of 2
nd
 February 1990 that geared the 
country towards democracy. There were calls on the government of South Africa to 
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commence planning for a possibility of an influx of black African immigrants, but 
South African government never heeded to these calls (Vale, 2002:14). Intellectuals 
and some members of the academia offered explanations and notified government on 
how best to handle immigration in the country, but rather South African government 
choose not to heed to these demands (Vale, 2002). Incidentally, an address to the 
Biennial Conference of the former Development Society of South Africa that followed 
F.W. de Klerk‘s speech clearly revealed these concerns: 
All the evidence suggests that the ending of apartheid will deepen, not 
weaken, South Africa‘s attractiveness to the people of the region. This 
means that when southern Africa‘s own Berlin Wall—apartheid –
finally comes down, a tide of humanity will cross over into this 
country. To avoid the resulting long-term social dislocation, planning 
for these migrants needs to commence as soon as possible (Vale, 
2002:14).  
Therefore it appears as if media‘s negative publications against black African 
immigrants were desperate attempts to draw the attention of the government or 
salvage the alleged situation by other means. This might have been carried out by 
those that possess enough powers to wield enormous influence on the media, as severe 
negative publications against black African migrants suggests this possibility (Danso 
and McDonald, 2001:115-137). Hence crime in South Africa became successfully 
linked to black African migrants, words like, ―illegals‖, ―illegal alien‖, ―illegal 
foreigners‖,  became common media slogan used to depict all black African migrants 
irrespective of their legal status in the country. While phrases such as ―illegals in SA 
add to decay of cities‖, ―Africa floods into cape town‖ (sic), ―Francophone invasion‖, 
―6 million migrants headed our way‖, ―Africa‘s flood of misery‖, made newspaper 
headlines and were used to depict  Alien invasion, danger, crisis, foreign bodies and 
undesirables before South African readers, thus ―criminalising‖ and ―Africanising‖ 
migration in South Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2006:63-68, Danso and McDonald, 2001:115-
137). To make matters worse, during the afrophobic violence of 2008 some 
newspapers such as Daily Sun were accused of inflaming the situation with headlines 
such as: ―its war on Aliens-20 bust for attacks‖, ―War against aliens: Thousands 
forced to flee Alex‖. These served to encourage the violence as a national course or a 
sort of patriotic war to defend the nation against invading aliens (Harber, 2008:161-
163). Meanwhile the regular re-occurrence of the word ―aliens‖ is indicative of an 
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apartheid mentality as it stems from the apartheid phrase ―Aliens control Act‖ (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:160-165). Unfortunately, the founder of the Daily Sun newspaper 
Deon du Plessis may have indirectly admitted to this as it was reported he was 
defending the actions of Daily Sun by acknowledging that the publication of the 
newspaper was for the interest of poor black South Africans whose welfare had been 
abandoned by their government.  
According to the report, du Plessis claims his newspaper serves the interest of those 
poor black South Africans who do not comprehend the global view of sharing with 
foreigners as brothers and sisters since they can barely survive themselves (Harber, 
2008). Another dimension to this debacle might be that some media houses might 
have cashed in on the conflict to make money and record larger sales. This might be 
applicable to the Daily Sun‘s reported style of stereotypical publications because, 
following the condemnation of actions of the media and the rampaging mobs, du 
Plessis was quoted as defending the actions of the Daily Sun by insisting that: ―It may 
not be a very worldly view, but it served the paper‘s audience‖…(Harber, 2008:168).   
The implication of this statement is that the media might have been used to continue to 
set up black South Africans against their fellow black Africans. Arguably, the above 
statement is perhaps a reflection of an apartheid mockery of contemporary South 
African democracy. The anti-African nature of the media can be equated to the nature 
of the defunct apartheid regime, which serves to point out a possibility of a ―third 
force‖.  
Although most English newspapers were involved in these negative publicity, not all 
journalist were involved in these stereotypical publications as some media reports 
were objective and also reported on the advantage of immigrants to the country 
(Danso and McDonald, 2001:117 and 127). However, the press cannot be held entirely 
responsible for instigating xenophobic violence while some black politicians in South 
Africa like Mangosuthu Buthelezi were reported to have been found culpable of 
making outrageous statements capable of inciting afrophobic violence. Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, the then minister for Home Affairs, was regularly quoted in the media for 
making inflammatory statements. Under this circumstance, media reports can be said 
to be reflective of public opinion or perceptions, while at the same time it is the duty 
of the media to engage in objective reports as it has the ability to influence/construct 
public perceptions of societal matters (Danso and McDonald, 2001:131-132, Webb, 
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2008:10). Hence according to Smith (2008-2009:26-27) the following interview 
captures a different view of the possible roles of the media in the major violence of 
2008, irrespective of the fact that there is no concrete evidence as to the direct link 
between the media and the ―afrophobic‖ violence of 2008: 
There is, however, evidence that the media played a significant role in 
triggering violence in areas such as Tembisa, Masiphumelele and Du 
Noon. Respondents in these areas believe that the violence was 
triggered by what people saw and read in the media about attacks in 
other townships, such as Alexandra. Images and media reports of 
attacks; of people successfully looting foreign-owned shops and of the 
helpless police and authorities, were certainly encouraging to the ill-
intentioned. Criminals and opportunists then organised themselves and 
mobilised other community members to emulate what was happening 
elsewhere (Smith, 2008-2009:26). 
However the following interesting argument/account captures the very dynamics of 
the role of the media in South Africa: 
Insensitive reporting of immigration issues might have contributed to 
the violence…the prompt reporting this time may have saved lives. It 
allowed migrants to take appropriate steps to ensure their security amid 
genuine concerns and brought the plight of targeted communities to the 
attention of the South African government, civil society and the 
international community (Smith, 2008-2009:27). 
The possible implication of these two different accounts is that beyond being capable 
of saving human lives and preventing violence, the media has the ability and capacity 
to encourage and discourage afrophobic violence in South Africa. These arguments all 
point to the fact that the media can also be used to shape and reshape the South 
African society if need be.   
2.2.3.3 Black African Migrants as Melting Points for Political Gambits and Continuity with 
Post-Apartheid Violence  
Reports indicate that before the major xenophobic violence of 2008 some politicians 
(like the minister of Home Affairs, Mangosutho Buthelezi) had engaged in making 
some careless, and unsubstantiated statements such as claiming that African migrants 
were not only responsible for the ills of the society but also blamed them for the 
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dilapidating structures in the country meant for poor black South Africans. African 
immigrants were blamed for rise in the cost of government maintenance of public 
structures, increase in crime wave, poor implementation of the reconstruction and 
development programme (RDP), high unemployment rates and even the scourge of 
HIV and AIDS (Human Rights Watch, 1998,123-124, Petros et al., 2006:67-77). 
Although politicians like Matthews Mposa (the then Mpumalanga premier) and 
analysts like Archbishop Desmond Tutu warned that these attitude towards African 
immigrants might spark up xenophobic violence. Plus a report from the Southern 
African Bishops‘ Conference revealing that major xenophobic violence looms around 
if politicians do not desist from their attitude of blaming African migrants for their 
own failures (Human Rights Watch, 1998:126-127, Kunda, 2009:120-123). Negative 
attitudes and publicity against black African migrants still continued unabated 
amongst different politicians. IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) representatives were 
quoted as vowing to take ―physical action‖ towards solving the alleged problem of  
illegal black African immigrants in the country, if the ANC lead government was 
unwilling to take bold steps (Human Rights Watch, 1998:124-125, Solomon, 
2003:94).  
Therefore, following the explosion of xenophobic violence in 2008 the IFP was 
strongly accused of masterminding the act. Although the IFP consistently denies this 
allegation, the act was allegedly confirmed by the then Kwazulu-Natal Provincial 
Safety, Security and Community Liaison MEC (member of executive council) Bheki 
Cele. According to him, the violent attack and looting of a pub in Umbilo owned by a 
Nigerian, (which subsequently sparked up ―afrophobic‖ violence in some other parts 
of the country) was carried out by IFP members returning from a meeting (Ncana et 
al., 2008:4). Meanwhile Naki (2008:9) claims that information reaching a 
parliamentary multiparty task team reveals that the ―afrophobic‖ violence of 2008 had 
a political background, while the Alexandra police station commissioner (Director 
Theko Pharasi) perceived the afrophobic violence was planned as it took place after a 
meeting of local hostel dwellers (Dalton Men‘s Hostel and Madala Hostel) (Memela, 
2008:8, Naki, 2008a:9, Stewart et al., 2008a:1 and 4). Despite all these, it remains 
unclear if IFP was behind the violence which triggered off chains of afrophobic 
violence across the country as the IFP provincial chairman, in the name of Mntomuhle 
Khawula claimed that the hostel in question (Dalton Men‘s Hostel or Madala hostel) 
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which appears to have hosted the political meetings was a multi-party hostel and that 
it was unreasonable to claim that IFP members were responsible for the violence. 
Meanwhile it must be clearly noted that some IFP representatives (Madala Abraham 
Mzizi and Nhlanhla Msimang) were present at some of the political meetings that 
took place at the hostel before the attacks (Naki, 2008a:9). This suggests a political 
dimension to the meetings but Mhlana et al (2008:10) contend that a particular report 
clearly indicates the involvement of members of several political parties in the 
violence.    
Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2008:135-136) reveals that there has been violence 
against black African migrants even before the 2008 major xenophobic violence. The 
attacks which took place between 1994 and 1995 were said to have been orchestrated 
by some gang members who claimed to be members of the ANC (African National 
Congress Party), the South African Communist Party and the South African National 
Civic Organisations. Some other groups like Concerned Residence Group of 
Alexandra and the Alexandra Property Owners Association were reported to have also 
participated  in  the violent campaign which was code named  ―Buyelekhaya‖ , which 
translates to ―go back home‖ in English (Human Rights Watch, 1998, Steenkamp, 
2009:441, Monson and Arian, 2011:33, Solomon, 2003:98). Black South Africans 
who participated in this action were reported to have robbed and forcefully evicted 
black African immigrants from their homes with impunity and handed over some of 
them whom were alleged to be illegal immigrants to the police for deportation. But 
surprisingly these organizations later denied their members ever participated in the 
violence and even condemned the act, while the IFP Youth Brigade supported the 
removal of all migrants insisting they were guilty of criminal activities. Meanwhile 
the Alexandra Property Owners Association denied ever participating in the violence 
claiming they were doing a good job by handing over to the police, some illegal 
immigrants for deportation (Human Rights Watch, 1998, Mashaba, 2008b:4).  
Therefore a situation whereby the South African president (President Thabo Mbeki) 
and the ANC president (President Jacob Zuma) remained silent during the 2008 
afrophobic attacks, only for both to speak out against it when it was already two 
weeks into the violence, remains worrisome. The same reason behind the state‘s 
quietness over media stereotypes against black African immigrants while at the same 
time rising up furiously against racist publications in newspapers might be used to 
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explain the situation. More especially when the affairs of the state is piloted under the 
leadership of some black South Africans (Danso and McDonald, 2001:118-119, 
Mngxitama, 2008:195). Thus it is possible that black African foreigners have been 
caught up in the crossfire of South Africa‘s raging (political) battle of racial 
supremacy stoked by the nation‘s racial hierarchy of social benefits (Nkomo et al., 
1995:263-264). But with particular reference to the history of Buyelekaya and the case 
of poor response of South African government to the xenophobic violence of 2008, it 
becomes possible that South African government might have actually perceived the 
movement of black African migrants, who are either refugee, legal/illegal migrants in 
the country as a threat to the state. But with a former director-general of the 
department of Home Affairs (Billy Masetlha) quoted as suggesting that ―It is quicker 
to charge [immigration offenders] for their false documentation and then to deport 
them than to pursue the long route in respect of the other crimes that are committed‖, 
it then becomes obvious that the state indeed feels threatened by the presence of black 
African immigrants, more so in the sense that black African migrants have been 
completely criminalised irrespective of their legal status in the country (Danso and 
McDonald, 2001:126-127, Human Rights Watch, 1998:2-5 and 54-55, Aidan, 
2010:647). If this then is true of the situation, in order to avert criticism from human 
rights activists and the international community, government might be left with the 
option of getting rid of the perceived threat by simply allowing the situation to take its 
natural course. Under this circumstance, violence will be allowed to spread as 
government is busied with simple acts of laying claims to ignorance, criminality and a 
third force. Whereby this is true of the situation, the implication is that history (of 
Buyelekhaya 1994-1995) was actually repeating itself in 2008. However it is also 
possible that some of these elites might have been forced into dealing with some very 
powerful political interests groups or forces within the country before embarking on 
challenging the situation (Human Rights Watch, 1998:135-136, Mashaba, 2008b:4, 
Meintjies and Msomi, 2008:1, Reuters, 2008a:6, Msomi et al., 2008a:1, Steenkamp, 
2009:440, Dodson, 2010:7 and 11). 
Evidently, President Jacob Zuma (the ANC president) in his public address and 
request for calm from his countrymen was met with furious verbal attacks in which 
some South Africans insisted that black African immigrants must go or he (President 
Jacob Zuma) and the rest of the ANC leadership should depart with them (Fuphe, 
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2008c:6). This request came from some South Africans following the ANC 
president‘s revelation that the ANC freedom fighters (of which he was one) that fled 
into exile during the oppressive apartheid regime in South Africa were safeguarded 
and protected while in exile in other African countries. He further revealed that the 
same people whom some black South Africans were molesting in their 
neighbourhoods were nationals of these same countries that were so supportive of the 
anti-apartheid struggle (Fuphe, 2008c:6, Leshilo, 2008:10).  
However the ANC and IFP power sharing deal of 1994 that saw to the placement of 
the IFP leader (Mangosuthu Buthelezi) as the Minister for Home Affairs might have 
also done more harm than good on the relationship between black African migrants 
and black South Africans (Danso and McDonald, 2001:132). This might be so 
because his appointment might have caused a clash between the ‗politics of inclusion‘ 
(represented by the ANC) and the ‗politics of entitlement‘ (represented by the IFP). 
Thus the Minister of Home Affairs was quoted by the media as making some of the 
most inflammatory and outrageous statements capable of inciting xenophobic 
violence across the nation (Nyamnjoh, 2006:3-13, Human Rights Watch, 1998:19-20 
and 124, Danso and McDonald, 2001:132).        
Meanwhile, it should be clearly noted that as at this period in the history of South 
Africa, it was very possible that a post-apartheid South Africa was absolutely 
unprepared to handle such social calamity. This is in the sense that for a nation that 
just emerged from several years of an oppressive apartheid regime, its democratic 
structures were still very young and immature to accommodate a situation of this 
nature. Apparently, these acts of violence that were witnessed under the democratic 
government of South Africa appears to be a hangover of the culture of violence 
experienced and inherited by some black South Africans from the oppressive 
apartheid regime (Du Toit, 2001:81-84, Mnisi, 2008:11). This might be true of some 
black South Africans as some South African mothers confessed their children 
experienced so much horror and witnessed so much violence and gruesome murders 
during apartheid that it seems to have affected their psyche. Impiedly, even as adults 
they are yet to receive medical attention to this effect hence some of them continue 
with acts of violence (Everatt, 2011:28).   
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However, du Toit (2001:78-81) insists that during the apartheid struggle, the 
leadership of some forces lost control of the activities of some of their members who 
carried on with the culture of violence into a post-apartheid South Africa. This notion 
might be applicable to the origin of the afrophobic violence in South Africa as one of 
the IFP representatives (by the name of Nhlanhla Msimang) who was present during 
one of the meetings insisted that the meeting he attended was meant to address the 
problem of poor service delivery in the hostel and discuss on a proposed protest 
against the issue of government poor service delivery to the hostel (Naki, 2008a:9, 
Stewart et al., 2008b:1). The IFP leadership therefore claimed unawares of an alleged 
plot to instigate xenophobic violence during or after their meetings (Stewart et al., 
2008a , Memela, 2008:8). Similarly, Firoz Cachalia (the Gauteng Safety and Security 
MEC) was reported to have argued as follows:  
We knew that there were certain meetings held, statements made, 
decisions apparently arrived at. But that that would lead to the kind of 
situation that has developed wasn‘t fully anticipated, nor the speed at 
which it has spread…particularly the rapid escalation we‘ve seen over 
the weekend was not fully anticipated. Otherwise we would have taken 
the necessary pre-emptive action (Stewart et al., 2008b:1). 
But interestingly, Nhlanhla Msimang (one of the IFP representatives who was present 
at one of the meetings) after putting up a defence for his party to refute the allegations 
of the IFPs involvement in the ―afrophobic‖ violence, was then quoted as saying: 
―people were demanding for housing and jobs and the police had to intervene‖ (Naki, 
2008a:9).  Thus a thorough analysis and combination of these statements might reveal 
a dangerous psychological mind set of some black African politicians in South Africa 
who wrongfully blamed the African immigrant for being totally responsible for the 
ills of society (Vale, 2002:12-1).  
Indeed a look at these statements reveals that there are certain questions begging for 
answers. For instance: Does the demand for service delivery justify violence? What is 
the relationship between service delivery to the hostel and the violence/lootings 
outside the hostel? What were the decisions arrived at during the meetings? What was 
it expected to lead to or develop into? To what extent is the authenticity of the 
information that the meeting was only meant to deal with the problem of service 
delivery to the inmates of these hostels?  
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All these unanswered questions creates a questionable background of the authenticity 
of the information that meetings were actually meant to only address the issue of 
service delivery in these hostels (Naki, 2008a:9, Stewart et al., 2008b:1). More so it 
brings to fore, the possibility that some politicians in South Africa might be 
sponsoring afrophobic violence or fanning the flames of xenophobic sentiments for 
personal reasons. Meanwhile, a contrary report alleged that in one of the meetings, 
some locals dwelling in Diepsloot unanimously agreed to loot the properties of 
African immigrants as a punishment for their alleged malice and criminality. This 
probably explains why violence erupted after meeting(s) (Monson and Arian, 
2011:35). However, this does not rule out the fact that some community leaders 
desperately wanted peace to reign in their respective communities (Sinwell, 
2011:134-139).  
According to Crush (ed.) (2008:33) the accusation that African immigrants were 
responsible for the high unemployment rate in South Africa was obnoxious as most 
have never had a personal experience of losing a job to an African immigrant. Crush 
(ed.) (2008:31) further reveals that between 1997 and 1999 the majority of black 
South Africans have not made personal and regular contact with African immigrants 
as to actually ascertain the claims of their maliciousness and criminality. Thus Crush 
(ed.) (2008) concludes that ―Perceptions of, and attitudes towards foreigners were as a 
result of second-hand (mis)information.‖  
In a similar fashion, Matshe (2001) strongly disagrees with the notion that African 
immigrants were responsible for the escalating level of criminal activities in South 
Africa. According to Matshe (2001) South Africans commit about 98% of the crime 
in South Africa while foreigners were responsible for about 1% of criminal activities 
in the country. While some other researchers and writers agree with this notion, they 
present statistics that are not very different from each other and portrays black African 
immigrants as being only responsible for either 14%, 2%, or 4.4% of crimes in South 
Africa (The Citizen, 2008:3, Neocosmos, 2008:590, Solomon, 2003:105). Despite the 
inconsistency surrounding these figures they are far from suggesting that black 
African immigrants are entirely responsible for the alarming rate of crime in South 
Africa.  Nyamnjoh  (2006:68-69) and Johnston (2008a:4) therefore contend that 
xenophobic violence and stereotyping of black African immigrants acted as an 
important diversion and a distraction for the corrupt black and white politicians in 
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South Africa amidst persistent pressure and demands from poor South Africans who 
were languishing in poverty and deprivation. 
However, it must be recalled that during the anti-apartheid struggle it was alleged that 
the IFP had ties with the apartheid government, a sort of relationship the ANC finds 
very suspicious. As a result of this, it is widely believed that the ANC‘s 
misunderstandings with the IFP had the sponsorship of the NP (National Party) —
apartheid lead government. The IFP was later reported to have moved into the 
township of Boipatong (an ANC strong hold) on 17 June 1992 where they massacred 
46 people, mostly women and children. Outraged by this action, the ANC probably 
interpreted this to mean an attempt by the apartheid government to weaken their 
political strength through the IFP. Based on this Nelson Mandela withdrew from 
negotiations with the apartheid government and the ANC called a 48 hour national 
strike that crippled the nation‘s economy for two days and violence subsequently 
ensued amongst different groups (Sonneborn, 2010:87, Du Toit, 2001:78-80). Beyond 
this it must be clearly recalled that the IFP and ANC had historically been involved in 
serious political fisticuffs and warfare in Alexandra in the 1990s, from were the major 
2008 xenophobic attacks were reported to have erupted. Meanwhile the two political 
parties still maintain their presence in Alexandra, a situation which might have further 
complicated situations (Sinwell, 2011:138).  
The major cause of the ANC-IFP clash of the 1990s was reported to revolve around 
matters of status, but beyond this, ANC members accuse IFP members of being old 
fashioned, uncivilised and tribalistic in their approach to (political) matters. This also 
implies that the IFP was perceived by the ANC as still practising some sort of jungle 
justice hence they were nicknamed ―othelewini‖ which implies that they have been 
equated to King Shaka‘s ‗punitive regiment‘, responsible for throwing people off a 
cliff. This is irrespective of the fact that ANC members are also implicated in acts of 
violence (Du Toit, 2001:78-80, Sonneborn, 2010:85-86 and 16-17). Thus, it can be 
argued that the ANC perceives history to be repeating itself in the form of 
―afrophobic‖ violence, thus the ANC led government gravelly suspects the IFP and 
ancient apartheid forces when it alleges a possibility of a ―third force‖ (Memela, 
2008:8, Naki, 2008a:9, Stewart et al., 2008a:1 and 4, Mhlana et al., 2008:10). This 
age long political fisticuffs between the IFP and the ANC might be responsible for the 
different out-brake of ―afrophobic‖ violence experienced in post-apartheid South 
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Africa more so in the sense that reports indicates that the IFP and ANC had once 
engaged each other in a fatal conflict in Alexandra (Sinwell, 2011:138).                
Therefore du Toit (2001:78-121) insists that South Africa possesses a culture of 
violence which stems from the defunct apartheid regime. In accordance to this notion, 
du Toit (2001) reveals that some political parties such as the ANC and the NP with 
some members of former apartheid paramilitary units such as ―Umkhonto we Sizwe‖ 
(MK) and South African Defence Force (SADF) were implicated in several arrests 
made by the police. These arrests follows accusations and counter accusations that 
ensued among some black South African politicians in connection with violence 
experienced in post-apartheid South Africa. Du Toit (2001) then further argues that, 
considering their good skills in violence, the use of weapons and arms, and also taking 
into account the fact that they can easily gain access to these arms even after the 
demise of apartheid. Some of the members of these defunct paramilitary units will 
always be tempted to carry on with their old profession in post-apartheid South 
Africa, since contemporary South Africa presents some of them with poverty and 
unemployment as motivations.  
Evidently, in 1994, 1995 and 1998 there were reports of members of gangs moving 
from home to home evicting black African migrants and also targeting South 
Africans. Members of these gangs looted, killed and raped African immigrants. 
Among those killed and looted by the gangs were also South African citizens 
(Monson and Arian, 2011:32-33 and 138, Human Rights Watch, 1998, Steenkamp, 
2009:441). Based on these, Du Toit therefore concludes that it is obvious that these 
ex-combatants who are members of these paramilitary units are yet to be ‗drawn into 
the discipline of the state and society in the post-settlement era‘ (Du Toit, 2001:120-
121). The total implication of all these is that the old tradition of political violence of 
apartheid South Africa continued to flourish in contemporary South Africa.    
Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that a few months before the major outbreak of 
xenophobic violence in South Africa, there was an outbreak of political protests and 
violence which involved killing of councillors and subsequent burning down of their 
houses (Mboyisa, 2008b:4, Stewart et al., 2008a:4). Considering the fact that the then 
South African president (President Thabo Mbeki) was from the Xhosa ethnic tribe and 
the newly elected ANC president (Jacob Zuma) that replaced him as the president of 
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the political party was from the Zulu ethnic tribe (Steenkamp, 2009:443-444, 
Sonneborn, 2010:106, Saunders and Southey, 2001:198-199), While the IFP which 
was widely accused of instigating the violence had in its membership, a majority of 
the Zulu ethnic tribe, it becomes possible that the xenophobic violence resulted out of 
a clash of identity, struggle for political status or ethnic rancour (Ncana et al., 2008:4, 
Naki, 2008a:9, Mboyisa, 2008a:3, Solomon, 2003:94-95). The xenophobic violence 
might be another means of carrying out an ethnic political agenda as the then 
unpopular President Thabo Mbeki (who is from a Xhosa ethnic group) was later 
forced to resign in September 2008 after being recalled by his political party the 
ANC. His resignation came after an alleged prolonged rancour between him and his 
former vice president (Jacob Zuma) who later emerged the popular ANC president 
before President Thabo Mbekhi was recalled by the ANC (Sonneborn, 2010:105, 
Gevisser, 2008:16-17, Saunders and Southey, 2001:195, Phaahla and Darley, 
2008:22).  
These complications perhaps explains why there have been brewing ethnic tensions 
among some black South African ethnic groups, as the afrophobic violence of 2008 
metamorphosed into some ethnic clashes (Kalamane and SAPA, 2008b:1 and 3, 
Kalamane and SAPA, 2008a:3, Ncana and la Grange, 2008:4). Some miscreants were 
reported to have seized the opportunity created by the violence to ―settle old scores‖ 
(Fuphe, 2008a:4, Sowetan, 2008c:5, Ncana and Mkhize, 2008a:4). As some black 
South Africans were either intentionally or erroneously robbed, killed and raped, as 
the rampaging mob was overheard screaming: ―kill the shangaan‖ (Sowetan, 2008c:5, 
Dlamini, 2008a:8, Ncana and la Grange, 2008:4).  
Evidently, some black South Africans were forced out of their houses while a few 
were reported killed or brutalised for refusing to participate in the xenophobic 
violence, or for being sympathetic to the plight of some black African immigrants 
(Molefe et al., 2008b and 4, Ndlovu, 2008b:5, Seale et al., 2008:3, Ncana and Mkhize, 
2008a:4). Going by this chain of events, it is possible that the xenophobic violence of 
2008 was part of the politically motivated violence that is witnessed in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Therefore, it can be argued that some political miscreants might have 
cashed in on the frustrations and weaknesses of some poor black South Africans to 
instigate violence across the nation so as to satisfy their selfish desires, or score cheap 
political points. This they might have done either to the detriment of the ruling 
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political party (the ANC) or to the disadvantage of the President Thabo Mbeki—lead 
democratic government.   
Unfortunately, the reported political rift between Thabo Mbeki and his former vice 
president Jacob Zuma had some ripple effects on the xenophobic violence as there 
were reports of politically motivated violence and protests experienced amidst, before 
and after the major ―afrophobic‖ violence (The Star, 2008a, Steenkamp, 2009:443-
444, Nkosi, 2008:13, Evans et al., 2009:4, Mboyisa, 2008b, Memela, 2008:8, Ncana 
et al., 2008:4, Naki, 2008a:9, Sonneborn, 2010:105, Gevisser, 2008:16-17, Saunders 
and Southey, 2001:195, Phaahla and Darley, 2008:22).  Among other reasons, some 
South Africans were reported to have possibly perceived President Thabo Mbeki as 
disconnected from the plight of poor black South Africans, but lenient and 
sympathetic to the plight of poor black African migrants to the detriment of black 
South Africans. Meanwhile the ANC President Jacob Zuma appears to have been 
assumed in certain quarters to be connected to a certain informal Zulu 
identity/nationalist movement. Jacob Zuma seems to have also been perceived by 
some black South Africans as a shrewd politician and a revolutionist, very 
unsympathetic to a general African course in South Africa. Thus some black South 
Africans were reported to have publically displayed some sort of explicit trust in him 
as capable of taking immediate action against African migrants who have come to 
take away the birth right of poor black South Africans (Landau, 2011:12, Mngxitama, 
2008:190, Steenkamp, 2009:443-444, Rossouw, 2008:11, Seale, 2008:3).  
Evidently, the ripple effects of this so called power play (between Thabo Mbeki and 
Jacob Zuma) on the ―afrophobic‖ violence was such that some black South Africans 
confronted some black African foreigners and demanded they trade in their ―Thabo 
Mbeki papers‖ (resident permits) insinuating that Jacob Zuma was about to become 
the president of the country (Landau, 2011:12, Steenkamp, 2009:443-444, Rossouw, 
2008:11, Saunders and Southey, 2001:195). Some others were reported as singing 
―umshini wami‖ (‗bring me my machine gun‘) perhaps in total solidarity to this cause, 
a song popularly associated with the famous ANC president (Jacob Zuma) during the 
struggle against apartheid (Seale, 2008:3, Landau, 2011:12, Mngxitama, 2008:190, 
Steenkamp, 2009:443-444, Rossouw, 2008:11). This is irrespective of the fact that 
president Zuma condemns outrightly their barbaric acts as embarrassing to South 
Africa and a huge setback to the idea of African brotherhood. Despite his 
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admonishing them against participating in acts of violence, some black South 
Africans openly challenged him and thus remained adamant and the blood-letting 
continued (Mngxitama, 2008:190, Rondganger, 2008c:3, Fuphe, 2008c:6, Leshilo, 
2008:10). In view of this, Steenkamp (2009:443-444) states as follows: 
In December 2007 the ANC replaced the, by then hugely unpopular, 
state president Thabo Mbeki with Jacob Zuma as president of the party. 
This led to a transitional period where the country was effectively 
landed with a lame duck president and torn between two centres of 
power—the ANC and the government. For the first time since the end 
of Apartheid, discontent with government delivery (and Mbeki) could 
be voiced without compromising one‘s loyalty to the ANC (represented 
by Zuma). The xenophobic violence of May 2008 was almost certainly 
influenced by this context, as confirmed by the observation that some 
of the violent mobs were singing ‗Umshini Wami‘ (meaning ‗bring me 
my machine gun‘), a song from the liberation struggle associated with 
support for Zuma.  
Therefore, situations like these could mean that black African migrants have become 
a focal point for violently registering all forms of political grievances against the 
South African government. As Vale (2002:8) reveals, it is on record that in September 
1998 a crowd returning from a rally in Pretoria under the auspices of an organisation 
known as ―Unemployed Masses of South Africa‖, in the name of representing 32 000 
jobless people suddenly turned xenophobic. Three African migrants lost their lives in 
the incident, a Mozambican was thrown out of the moving train and the remaining 
two Senegalese were electrocuted while trying to escape being lynched by the mob in 
the train (Vale, 2002).  
However there exists a possibility of a third force as speculated by South African 
government, as there are indications that the attacks were either motivated, sponsored 
or particularly instigated by a group of selfish individuals. This is in view of the 
reports of arrests made by the South African Police Service (SAPS) of certain people 
who confessed receiving money from a set of faceless individuals to instigate violence 
against African immigrants (Mashaba, 2008b:4, Sowetan, 2008c:5, Everatt, 2011:26). 
While subsequent arrests of four community leaders for allegedly inciting violence in 
their community not only further proves this point, it is also indicative of a political 
dimension to the xenophobic violence (Msomi et al., 2008a).  
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But Landau (ed.) (2011:12) believes that some politicians took advantage of the plight 
of poor black South Africans who were going through economic pressure and 
deprivation amidst a rising cost of living, to mobilize them to embark on mass action 
against black African foreigners who have been solely blamed for these ills. The 
failure of government to deliver on its promises of a national rebirth, increase in cost 
of living, the failure of Zimbabwean elections and subsequent alleged influx of 
Zimbabweans, illegal immigrants and refugees into South Africa created a favourable 
atmosphere of national crisis for some political and economic leaders to successfully 
mobilise the poor (Landau, 2011:12-13). However, in what appears to be an attempt 
to underscore the possibility of a third party involvement in the violence, Landau (ed.) 
(2011:1) reveals that the then Minister of Intelligence (Ronnie Kasrils) admitted to the 
falsehood in blaming the violence on a ―third force‖. 
Furthermore, Matsinhe (2011:306-308) argues that the 2008 major outbreak of 
xenophobic violence in South Africa was not a surprise to researchers in South Africa 
who have been following the consistent trend of xenophobic attitudes and violence 
carried out by some South Africans against black African foreigners in South Africa. 
According to Matsinhe (2011) the 2008 violence was not the first time black African 
immigrants have been targeted but was as a result of continuous replication of an 
intense hatred for foreigners of African descent. In his very words Matsinhe (2011) 
asserts that ‗The significant difference between May 2008 and the previous outbreaks 
of violence was magnitude‘.  
Matsinhe (2011) further argues that each time this violence occurred (between the 
periods of 1994 to 2008) the government of South Africa was always slow in 
responding to the violence. And this is further reflected in the usual poor response 
from government security agencies like the police and army. Matsinhe (2011) 
therefore contends that ‗nationally, the retreat of the state was demonstrated by the 
president‘s 16-day inaction as the mobs terrorised the country‘. The possible 
implication of this is that there might be some very powerful elites in South Africa 
who are strong supporters of ―afrophobic‖ violence. Whereby this is true of the 
―afrophobic‖ violence of 2008, the government in power will for political reasons and 
for the sake of national interest, do anything possible to avoid incurring upon itself the 
wrath of its citizens, for doing so could automatically spell doom not only for the 
government in power but also for the nation at large. Thus this leaves African 
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immigrants in a very vulnerable position as sacrificial lambs that can be used to quell 
the thirst and manage the interest of a powerful few.   
2.2.3.4 Anarchy and the Complexities of Nationality / Identity as the Harbinger of Xenophobic 
Violence in South Africa  
Complications regarding matters of nationalities and identities remain a global 
phenomenon (Pelican, 2009:52-53). It thus follows that to capture the very 
complexities surrounding nationality and identity in South Africa it‘s important to 
also understand the views of the United Nations (UN) on indegeneity. Hence it must 
first be recalled that the UN 2007 declaration on the rights of indigenous people after 
23 years of consultations and negotiations with various nation-states turned out to 
become a landmark proclamation for various dominated minorities around the world 
seeking to lay claim to indegeneity. These rights as adopted by the UN General 
Assembly includes: ‗Rights to self-determination, to lands, territories, and natural 
resources and to free, prior, and informed consent‘ (Pelican, 2009:52). However, 
complications arising from the definition of indigenous people led the UN Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues into refusing to adopt any formal definition of indigenous 
people. Instead the forum contends that indigeneity shall only be defined according to 
―self-identification‖. Impliedly, only those that lay claim to indigeneity shall be 
recognised as indigenes (Gausset et al., 2011:137). 
           Against this background, Gausset et al (2011:139) attempts a definition of the term 
indigenous as befitting for those people already faced with marginalisation while the 
term autochthonous applies to the dominant group in a particular area who are in 
constant fear of marginalisation or dominance. Impliedly, autochthonous is 
synonymous to those groups that constantly view themselves as ―first comes‖ or ―first 
arrivals‖ (Gausset et al., 2011, Pelican, 2009). In view of these, some black South 
Africans already under dominance by the South African white race and armed with 
claims of indegeneity, laid siege on black African migrants, carting and looting away 
their properties (Laing and Pather, 2008:1 and 4, Rondganger, 2008b:13, Ndlovu, 
2008a:7, Ndlovu, 2008b:5).  
Similarly, history has it that the British on defeating the Boers and occupying their 
territory brought in Chinese slaves, Indians and Africans to work in the mines in South 
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Africa (Muzumbukilwa, 2007:3), while some white South Africans also brought in 
white skilled workers who were offered citizenship on arrival, hindering black African 
migrant workers from acquiring permanent residence. At the same time, they made 
sure black South Africans where possible, did not acquire permanent residence in their 
own country (Human Rights Watch, 1998:160-163, Vigneswaran, 2011:158). After 
the demise of apartheid, people with different ancestral origins, nationalities and racial 
backgrounds linked to some of those immigrant labourers from different racial 
backgrounds are today black South African citizens, based on the provisions of the 
law (Nyamnjoh, 2006:40, Vale, 2002:18). Also based on the provisions of South 
African laws, the Chinese have most recently been able to claim and acquire the 
identity of black South Africans (Ponte et al., 2007:933, BBC News, 2008:1, Mbola, 
2008:1). Compounding the entire situation is an already existing background of 
apartheid discriminatory and complex laws that are interpreted differently in different 
quarters, a condition which appears to be leading the nation towards anarchy (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:161, Dubow, 1995:256-279, Vigneswaran, 2011:158). Hence it 
must be recalled that it was based on the battle for freedom (from the oppressive 
Europeans), and acquisition of their rightful national identity and residency that black 
South Africans who have been legally denied of their identity and nationality in their 
home country, engaged in fatal conflicts with the defunct apartheid government 
(Klaaren, 2011:139, Du Toit, 2001:71-85).  
Meanwhile as this was happening, some black South Africans were forced to quickly 
flee to neighbouring countries, while some others fled for safety with the aid of 
Nigerian government on acquiring Nigerian international passports (Okolo, 2008, 
Neocosmos, 2006:30, Human Rights Watch, 1998, Tutu, 2008). Compounding the 
problem of indegeneity in South Africa is the fact that some South Africans on exile 
after several years returned back to their country as foreigners of which some of them 
may have acquired citizenship in their countries of refuge (Neocosmos, 2006:30). 
Hence it became difficult to distinguish for instance between ‗a citizen of Lesotho and 
a citizen of the Transkei, a citizen of Mozambique and citizen of Swaziland and a 
citizen of Venda‘. Therefore with the enactment of various immigration laws like the 
Aliens Act of 1984, the case of indegeneity in South Africa was dealt a final blow as 
around six million South Africans were estimated to have become denationalised 
(Neocosmos, 2006:29-31). The greatest advantage to this is that since the apartheid 
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government treated citizens of these countries including black South Africans in the 
same oppressive manner, it provided a common front for the people of the region to 
march as united Africans against the apartheid government (Neocosmos, 2006:30-31).                      
Similarly, Neocosmos (2008:591) argues that every racial group in South Africa 
migrated into the country and the only indigenous people of South Africa are the San 
people. While Landau (ed.) (2011:14-15) concludes that almost every group in South 
Africa has at some point in time in historical perspective been geographically 
displaced. Apparently in accordance with this notion, Vale (2002:9) declares that 
South Africa is ‗a product of continuous migration‘, a statement which supports the 
view of some anthropologists that the concept of ‗indigenous peoples‘ is far from 
being applicable to Africa. More so since the UN and ILO (International Labour 
Organisation) definition of indigenous people hinges on very weak criteria such as: 
‗cultural distinctiveness, political marginalization and self-identification‘ (Pelican, 
2009:53). Incidentally, even the UN concedes to the weakness of this definition 
(Gausset et al., 2011:137). Situations like this compounded by the emerging impact of 
‗political subjectivity‘, globalisation and multiculturalism in South Africa, further 
complicates the issue of citizenship or the definition of ‗outsider and hosts‘ (Landau, 
2011:11-15).  
Despite all these, the ambiguous imagination of identity/nationality as a basis for 
―othering‖ people has remained a common case especially among a good number of   
South Africans. According to a recent survey on acquisition of South African 
citizenship by foreigners, conducted among 2400 adult South Africans from rural and 
urban areas in 2011, it was gathered that 62percent supported the notion that a woman 
married to a South African man should be granted citizenship while only 48percent 
supported the idea of offering citizenship to a male foreigner married to a South 
African woman (SAPA, 2012b:2). Perhaps an indication that some South Africans do 
not want their women to be married to foreigners who on acquiring citizenship might 
later move out of the country with their women. Besides these figures also proving 
that many South Africans might be scared of their population being dominated by 
―foreigners‖, it is also a pointer to the fact that many South Africans are more tolerant 
to female migrants than their male counterparts. Another dimension to this new data, 
is that it might also be indicative of the fact that some South Africans support the idea 
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of continuous narrow weaving of South African citizenship around the interests, 
entitlements and rights of only nationals (Nyamnjoh, 2006:40-41).  
Beyond these, this research might have as well succeeded in revealing that many black 
South Africans would love to have a South African government that would control the 
private lives of black African migrants, just like it was during the apartheid era 
(Hyslop, 1995:59). If this then is true of some black South Africans, the implication is 
that the complexities surrounding identity/nationality created during the apartheid 
regime has a psychological impact on some black South Africans (Human Rights 
Watch, 1998:161-162, Matsinhe, 2011:296, Vale, 2002:22-23).  
Apparently, it can then be argued that the whole idea surrounding identity relies on the 
―paradoxical combination of sameness and difference‖ (Lawler, 2008:2). Thus 
Michael Jackson (Cited in Lawler 2008:2) argues that the problem with identity is that 
people are becoming more aware that ‗one‘s humanity is simultaneously shared and 
singular‘. In Germany for instance, ‗Anti-Semitism grew to deadly levels as the Jews 
grew indistinguishably German‘ and Germans started accusing Jews of being 
responsible for the ills of their society (Matsinhe, 2011:309).  
This ambiguity surrounding identity might be used to explain the complications of 
nationality, residence and identity in South Africa. Given that some black African 
migrants in South Africa from SADC (Southern African Development Countries) 
easily blend with locals owing to the fact that some SADC countries share similar 
cultures and languages with black South Africans. Thus they become perceived by 
some black South Africans as a threat to their identity, interests and superiority, a 
situation which might best be described as ―autochthony‖. More aggravating is the 
situation that some of them have actually acquired citizenship which makes them 
potential economic competitors, hence raising the fear of dominance amongst some 
black South Africans. For instance SADC countries like Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe share similar cultures and languages with 
South African, and so does the Ndebele, Swazi, Shangaan, Sotho and Tswana 
(Matsinhe, 2011:309-310, Gausset et al., 2011:139). The presence of these people who 
have strong resemblance with black South Africans and who are also South African 
citizens might have triggered fear of the presence of an invincible sneaky enemy from 
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within. This fear might make some black South Africans feel their identity or 
superiority is threatened and they might react out of panic (Matsinhe, 2011:309).  
Hence, it is in this regard that Crush and Ramachandran (2010:218) believed that the 
continuous weaving of social benefits in South Africa around the South African 
Identity book inflated the entire situation making it highly inflammable and 
combustible. This panic among some black South Africans of a perceived threat to 
their identity was clearly displayed by some rampaging mobs in Johannesburg in 2008 
during the xenophobic violence. The mob was reported to have confronted suspected 
black African foreigners to verify their identity by requesting they go through an 
immediate language test. Their victims were compelled to pronounce archaic Zulu 
words like: ―ucikicane‖ (meaning finger) and ―indololwane‖ (elbow). When a victim 
failed the test he/she was declared a foreigner, a status which automatically attracts a 
penalty of merciless general beatings and theft from the fierce looking mob (Ndlovu, 
2008a:7).    
Incidentally, some of these complications that surround the issue of identity might as 
well be the benchmark for the creation of various apartheid discriminatory and 
inhumane laws, and the subsequent classification of various racial groups in the 
country into different racial hierarchy for the sake of social benefits in order to sustain 
inequalities, racial superiority and difference (Nkomo et al., 1995:263-264). 
Unfortunately, this has turned out to become the bane of social stability in South 
Africa as this form of social hierarchy of benefits may have left the black community 
in South Africa in confusion. Some black South Africans not only turned against 
African migrants but also violently attacked and even killed fellow citizens based on 
either skin pigmentation or ethnic variance (Landau, 2011:1, Monson and Arian, 
2011:32 and 50, Ncana and la Grange, 2008:4, Kalamane and SAPA, 2008a:3, Ncana 
and Mkhize, 2008a:4).  
Similarly, some others were attacked or targeted by fellow South Africans for either 
having a foreign (black African) parental background or being married to a non-South 
African (La Grange, 2008a:4, Eliseev, 2008:15, Makhafola, 2008b:5). A situation 
quite similar to the German Nazi method of verifying identities based on ancestral 
origin/descent during the reign of Adolf Hitler and his anti-Semistic policies in which 
millions of Jewish lives were lost (Gausset et al., 2011:137). The centre of focus have 
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continued to be based on social benefits as the confusions of ―who gets what and 
how?‖, who should be classified as an ―insider‖ or an ―outsider‖, who is a foreigner 
and who is an indigene? rages on thereby leading to subjective interpretations of 
identity, nationality/citizenship by some black South Africans; a situation which 
further degenerated into intra-racism among some black South Africans (Nyamnjoh, 
2006, Landau, 2011, Makhafola, 2008b:5)  
Furthermore, with the already existing social/racial hierarchy of benefits in South 
Africa that already places black South Africans at the bottom line of socio-economic 
benefits in the country (Nkomo et al., 1995:263-264), it becomes possible that the 
BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) programme which also accommodates Indians, 
Coloureds, and Chinese as blacks South Africans and the commissioning of R3 billion 
infrastructural project in Alexandria, might have also fuelled and made combustible, 
the clash of identities among some black (African) communities in South Africa 
(Steenkamp, 2009:443, Ponte et al., 2007:933, BBC News, 2008:1, Mbola, 2008:1, 
Rabinowitz, 2008:13, Dibetle, 2008:14, Ho, 2008:1, Sinwell, 2011:132-133). Perhaps 
perceiving a threat to both their identities and interests, further complicated by the 
presence of black African migrants and their subjective definitions of a black South 
African citizen; some black South Africans might have been compelled to go on the 
rampage in search of sacrificial scapegoats to be used to set the records straight. This 
is evident in the ethnic dimensions to the ―afrophobic‖ attacks, the violence against 
black South Africans with darker skin colours, the violence against fellow South 
Africans whom their maternal or paternal lineage can be traced back to black African 
migrants as well as South Africans citizens married to African immigrants (La Grange, 
2008a:4, Makhafola, 2008b:5).  
Besides the possibilities of tribalism and politically oriented violence, it is also 
possible that the complications surrounding identity/nationality in South Africa might 
be the reason behind the assassination of some political office holders amidst the 
heated afrophobic tensions (Mboyisa, 2008b:4). That some black South Africans were 
heard singing ―Umshini wami” during the xenophobic violence of 2008, (a song that is 
only peculiar to the South African nationalist movement), is an indication that the 
mobs have successfully linked their actions to patriotism and revolution. Impliedly the 
act of expelling and attacking black African immigrants in South Africa has totally 
been perceived by some black South Africans to mean a national cause of economic 
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liberation (Steenkamp, 2009:443-444). Thus it becomes logical to some black South 
Africans that any South African with any form of emotional affiliation or sympathy 
for black African immigrants becomes an impediment or an ―enemy of the state‖ that 
should be wiped out based on the justifiable grounds of nationalism (Molefe et al., 
2008b:1 and 4, Meintjies and Msomi, 2008:1, Seale et al., 2008:3). Mobs moved from 
home to home in search of black African immigrants as terrified South African 
citizens begin to write down their surnames on their shacks to avoid being mistaken 
for black African migrants, a situation which appears to be a mimic of the Biblical 
Passover (Molefe et al., 2008a:1, Monson and Arian, 2011:31). Therefore the 
implication is that some black South Africans must have successfully associated 
citizenship with surnames and residence (Klaaren, 2011:138-140). 
 Unfortunately, this situation of ―jungle justice‖ and ‗narrow nationalism‘ was 
worsened by poor policing and a breakdown of law and order in some of the affected 
areas. There are reports that in Alexandra there had been public executions of 
suspected criminals by either stoning or ―necklacing‖. This form of popular justice 
was often carried out by a vigilante group known and referred to as ―comrades‖ 
(Monson and Arian, 2011:33). There were also reports that there were various security 
meetings held in Alexandria involving Alexandria Community Policing Forum (CPF) 
regarding a security threat posed by the presence of illegal immigrants  (Monson and 
Arian, 2011:33-34). These series of security meetings according to Monson and Arian 
(2011:33-35), amounted to nothing as criminal activities continued unabated, thus 
making some local residents in Diepsloot to conclude out of prejudice that they were 
carried out by black African immigrants.  
Hence out of prejudice and frustrations some local residents in Diepsloot allegedly 
concluded in a meeting that the most justifiable action towards dealing with the 
alleged criminality of black African immigrants was to loot their properties (Monson 
and Arian, 2011:35). Having allegedly passed a sentence on black African immigrants, 
some local residents in Diepsloot embarked on looting and violence against black 
African migrants as a logical means of containing the situation. Most of those 
displaced by the violence in Diepsloot later returned to their residences unassisted as 
they became aware that the mobs were merely interested in their properties. This 
development is not only a possible reflection of the alleged decisions at the 
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meeting(s), but it also reveals a criminal dimension to the violence, a state of anarchy 
resulting from poor policing in the affected areas (Monson and Arian, 2011:35-36).  
Consequently, this also implies that the violence may have originated out of envy and 
frustrations as the rampaging mobs were not interested in permanent eviction of black 
African immigrants but rather concentrated on looting their properties at the slightest 
given opportunity (Monson and Arian, 2011:35-36). Perhaps it was as a result of this 
same alleged agreement reached by some local residents in a meeting in Diepsloot that 
notice of eviction was forwarded to some black African migrants (residing in different 
neighbourhoods in some cases) demanding that they leave the neighbourhood, of 
which those that were present during the raiding were either asked to leave while their 
properties were seized or forcefully evicted or attacked (Ncana et al., 2008:4, Monson 
and Arian, 2011:34).  
Evidently a Mozambican resident was quoted as saying: ‗None of us was injured; they 
[the attackers] were just occupied with looting, drinking and eating. They seemed not 
to care about anything else besides looting, because I was in the tuck shop and they 
did nothing to me‘ (Monson and Arian, 2011:35). Another resident, a pregnant woman 
was reported as saying: ‗I was still sleeping when I heard people screaming outside, 
suddenly a group of locals banged on my door and told me to get out. I grabbed a few 
items and followed the other foreigners‘… (Ratsatsi, 2008:8). While a Malawian 
national resident in Marshal Town who perceives the violence to be perpetuated by 
criminals, claimed he was ordered out of his residence by a mob that instructed him to 
leave his door ajar and he was disallowed from taking any of his belongings (Mabuza, 
2008:5).  
Thus the situation was that some black African immigrants who were living in RDP 
houses/shacks were chased away and their homes were given by the mob to homeless 
South African citizens in an organised fashion (Monson and Arian, 2011:34). In 
support of this point of view, qualitative research carried out in Alexandria according 
to Monson (2011:181-182), reveals that the intention of the meeting in Alexandria was 
never to attack foreigners, but rather it was meant to discuss and plan how to root out 
alleged illegal immigrants, since the community had lost faith in the state to carry out 
appropriate actions against alleged immigrants.  
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According to some reports, the intention of black South Africans living in Alexandria 
was that if they managed to root out illegal black African migrants in their community 
who had no documentation, it would then pave way for easy identification and arrest 
of criminals amongst the legal residents (Monson and Arian, 2011:33-34, Monson, 
2011). These desperate measures might actually be indicative of the fact that some 
black African migrants might actually have been involved in criminal activities in the 
community, a development capable of provoking the anger of some black South 
Africans resident in Alexandria. However, because there are other horrific versions of 
experiences of xenophobic sentiments in Alexandria and elsewhere, it might be 
possible that this was the situation at the early stages of the raid until things got out of 
control due to complications (Monson and Arian, 2011:36-52). Conversely, Aidan 
(2010:648-647) insists that:  
The xenophobic violence represents a further instance of boundry 
making and constitutes a mechanism through which the politics of 
belonging is formulated. Despite the apparent spontaneity of the 
attacks, they were provoked by overtly political actions and by specific 
social groups. An ANC status report on the violence notes that the 
momentum for the attacks was generated at an Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) Annual General Meeting (AGM) held in Alexandra over the 
weekend of 10-11 May. At the meeting ‗a resolution was taken to drive 
foreign nationals out of Alexandria‘ and the attacks began 
‗immediately after the AGM‘. 
Since the attacks were in some cases preceded by meetings around hostels of which 
their proceedings are not properly accounted for, it can be argued that some black 
South Africans decided to take the law into their own hands (Monson and Arian, 
2011:34-35, Mhlana et al., 2008:10). Accordingly, Monson and Arian (2011:35) 
reveal that on 30
th
 April 2008 an attack that left Zimbabwean-owned shacks destroyed 
in Diepsloot was preceded by a community meeting. While Aidan (2010:249) 
contends that during a SANCO (South African Civics Organisation) summit held on 
29
th
 March 2008, it was also resolved to purge Alexandria of black African migrants.  
Evidently the attacks were premeditated as certain reports argue that in some areas in 
townships and informal settlements without legitimate leadership 
structures/government presence, ―parallel‖ leadership structures like CPF and SANCO 
assumed political leadership, organised and lead the attacks. It must be noted that most 
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of these organisations including AVCC (Alexandra Vukuzenzele Crisis Committee) 
and APF (Anti-Privatisation Forum) were reported to have emerged in an attempt to 
tackle poor government responses to the plight of poor black South Africans whom 
were reported to be tired of dwelling in dehumanising conditions in Alexandra and 
beyond (Sinwell, 2011:143-147).  
Unfortunately, in an attempt to prove their potency or superiority as more capable 
organisations against each other, black African foreigners became their level battle 
field of contest. Hence SANCO was reported to have in a build up to the ―afrophobic‖ 
violence of May 2008 made several threats to violently send black African migrants 
parking from RDP houses (Aidan, 2010:649). However, a most complicating fact in 
these reports is that at the end of the day, the number of those ejected from RDP 
houses by the rampaging mob in Alexandria were mostly South African citizens 
(Sinwell, 2011:137), a development which probably indicates as alleged by Sinwell 
(2011:146), that the early stages of the campaign was a peaceful attempt to purge 
Alexandra of corrupt practises injected into the RDP by some local government 
officials, black African foreigners and ordinary South African citizens. This also 
points to the fact that the mob might have embarked on a subjective definition of 
nationality/identity in their various communities. 
2.2.3.5 The Racist Dimension to Xenophobia and the Consequences of Classification  
Central to the discourse on black South African xenophobia against African 
immigrants is the question of racism. According to Bowser (1995:x), racism is  the 
belief in racial superiority, a situation whereby a particular racial group believes they 
are superior to  another and usually exercise power against the racial group considered 
inferior. It is therefore a socio-political/economic method of exclusion which involves 
the classification of people according to race so as to maintain dominance and 
exercise power beyond challenge. Cashmore and Jennings (2001:49) insist that racism 
was invented by capitalism and that it is a product of the economic matrix of the 
society. This notion is evident in the Human Rights Watch (1998:15) argument that:  
South Africa possesses a complicated racial classification system 
which divides the population into different racial groups, which 
includes African (of solely African Ancestry), Asian or Indian (largely 
descended from indentured servants brought from the Indian 
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subcontinent but also including more recent Asian immigrants), 
coloured (of mixed ancestry), and white (of European ancestry). 
 
 According to Human Rights Watch (1998), the different races in South Africa 
acquired different civil and political privileges based on the racial category they fall 
into, with ‗the most extensive privileges‘ allocated to the white race. Evidently, these 
social divisions have never been favourable to the indigenous black South Africans. It 
is in emulation of this racial classification system that some black South Africans 
though the same race with black African immigrants classify them in racial terms as 
darker (―amakwerekwere‖) than they are (Bloch and Heese, 2007:13, Muzumbukilwa, 
2007:4). These old apartheid racial classifications which restricted blacks from 
participating actively in the national economy are still in use despite living 
(ostensibly) in a non-racial democracy (Louw and Kendall, 1986:12-15). Such social 
stratification is bound to deepen frustrations among black South Africans, especially 
the poor black South Africans who are more negatively affected (than the black elites) 
by the prevailing social stratification method (Bearak and Dugger, 2008:15, Laing and 
Pather, 2008:1 and 4).  
 
In this light, Nkomo, Mkwanazi-Twala and Carrim (1995:275) describe 
deracialisation in South Africa as meaning when black and white South Africans are 
both found in a similar situation or condition void of discriminatory practises. They 
define desegregation as the ―removal of structural mechanisms of control that 
prevents blacks from enjoying the social provisions and privileges enjoyed by 
whites‖. Apparently, in order to acquire racial equality, peace and harmony in South 
Africa, ―deracialization‖ and ―desegregation‖ remains very essential. This is because 
they will help to ameliorate frustrations and eliminate its possible by-product, 
violence.  
 
Unfortunately more than 17 years after a new liberal democratic dispensation 
characterised by constitutional governance, racism has assumed new dimensions. This 
is in the form of intra-black racism or ―afrophobia‖ which manifests in violence by 
Black South Africans against black African immigrants who are profiled as 
―amakwerekwere‖.  Clearly, the whole notion of ―amakwerekwere‖ is a direct product 
of apartheid racial classification and profiling. In what seems to be ‗the politics of 
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exclusion‘ and racial superiority viewed and applied through the myopic lenses of 
languages and skin colours the Boers referred to the indigenous black communities of 
South Africa as ―Hottentots‖ which according to Nyamnjoh (2006:39) implies 
―stutterers‖. Tellingly, the black people of South Africa have taken a cue from the 
Boers and in turn classified the black African immigrants who they believe have 
darker skin colours than them, as ―amakwerekwere‖, insisting that ―all they claim to 
hear is gibberish; a barbaric form of stuttering‖ (Nyamnjoh, 2006, Dubow, 1995:20-
260). 
 
According to Nyamnjoh (2006:39-67), in South African society, there is the 
classification by some South Africans as ‗deserving citizens‘ and ―amakwerekwere‖ 
as ‗undeserving outsiders‘. The deep seated psychological frame of mind prevalent in 
some black South Africans is the crystallised belief that amakwerekwere are those 
from the ―uncivilised dark side of the African continent‖, who have nothing to offer 
but have come to take from a civilised South Africa, a state meant only for the 
―authentic‖ black South Africans. Thus, it becomes logical that their belongings 
(which are yielded from South Africa in the first place) are up for grabs for the 
deserving black poor of South Africa (Crush, 2008, Nyamnjoh, 2006:38-67, 
Flockemann et al., 2010:251-253). Besides the violent nature of the xenophobic 
attacks of 2008 and others before it, the extortion and abuse of black African 
immigrants by some South Africans in certain positions of authority such as the 
SAPS, Department of Home Affairs, the army, and the media (among others) point to 
the same fact (Neocosmos, 2008:588-589, Human Rights Watch, 1998:16-20). Hence, 
the possible implication is that black African immigrants have been designated by 
some black South Africans as their latest enemy in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Impliedly, many black South Africans seem to have shifted their attention from white 
South Africans, who were initially perceived as commonly shared enemies among 
black Africans during apartheid. Arguably, black African immigrants have been 
caught up in South Africa‘s seemingly enduring racial crossfire, which continues to 
be stoked by continuing social and economic challenges. 
 
Accordingly, Neocosmos (2006:95) reveals that in 1996 it was recorded that twenty 
six thousand people from Britain, Germany and the United States flouted immigration 
laws by overstaying their visits, but what happened at the end of the day was that only 
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fourty nine migrants from these countries were arrested and deported. Based on this 
Neocosmos (2006) insists that the impact of apartheid racial discriminatory laws on 
South African immigration are yet to be reversed as black African migrants are 
treated differently. Immigration has become criminalised only on the basis that all 
black African migrants are perceived to be illegal immigrants irrespective of the 
legality of their stay in South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006, Nyamnjoh, 2006:14-68). 
This xenophobic attitude of the state towards black African migrants is in tune with 
the defunct apartheid immigration discriminatory laws (Aliens Control Act of 1991 
expecially). The Aliens Control Act welcomes Europeans into South Africa while at 
the same time places immigration restrictions on black African migrants and 
ultimately restrains them from naturalising like their white counterparts (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:160-161). These apartheid similar attitudes are carried out under 
the guise of national interest which spells out as follows: ―poverty is high in South 
Africa and unemployment has been growing, we must look after our own first; it 
would be disastrous to ―open the flood gates‖ and allow the poverty of Africa to 
overwhelm our economy‖ (Neocosmos, 2006:95). Psychologically this implies that 
South Africa is allegedly open to the rich and shut against the poor. Thus immigration 
becomes completely viewed from an economic perspective that labels Africa as a 
symbol of poverty and an impending danger to the fortunes of South Africa.  
 
It is clear that government‘s policies on immigration which favours migrants outside 
Africa especially from the developed world and restricts migrants from Africa, 
actually perpetuates xenophobia. Xenophobic attitude does not just exist at the lower 
level but streams from the top. Based on this, some black South Africans view black 
African migrants as amakwerekwere (a threat to their economic wellbeing) while at 
the same time condoning the presence of white legal/illegal immigrants in South 
Africa as the harbinger of wealth and investments. White immigrants are perceived to 
be tourists and creators of wealth while black African migrants, no matter their legal 
status in South Africa are totally perceived by some black South Africans to be 
illegals (Nyamnjoh, 2006:14, Matsinhe, 2011:296). It is in this light that a clear 
difference ought to be made to completely distinguish these ―illegals‖ from 
―authentic‖ South Africans (Aidan, 2010:641-654). Thus black African immigrants 
became perceived as darker skinned than black South Africans. Inoculation marks, 
bodily features and languages becomes a determinant feature of legality/illegality in 
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South Africa as the SAPS adopted these unlawful ideas as criteria for making arrests 
and deportations of black African migrants (Human Rights Watch, 1998:2, 
Nyamnjoh, 2006:39-40, Matsinhe, 2011:298-301).  
 
Similarly, some black South Africans subject their victims to instant (Zulu) language 
tests as criteria to determine the veracity of their citizenship or legality/illegality in 
South Africa, a failure of this test attracts an immediate penalty of harassments, abuse, 
robbery and perhaps death, for the victims as convicts of ―jungle justice‖ (Ndlovu, 
2008a:, Worby et al., 2008:16, Tshabalala and Dibetle, 2008:4). Based on this, Everatt 
(2011:20) alleges that some black South Africans have become very racist in their 
manner of thinking and behaviour like it was with white South Africans. 
Unfortunately amongst the victims of these racist attitudes were also South Africans 
and South Africa unfortunately recorded the highest death toll by the end of the major 
xenophobic violence of 2008, which left no less than 62 people dead (Oloyede, 
2008:107-108, de Lange, 2008a:1, Coplan, 2008:126-129, La Grange, 2008a:4, 
Crush, 2008:59).  
 
Profiling and classifying people are forms of racism that comes with dire 
consequences. According to the Centre for Critical Research on Race and Identity 
(1998), ‗classification has consequences‘. Laband (2008:168) explained that 
following the initial stereotyping of blacks as forbidden savages during the 1820's by 
hunter traders at Port-Natal, different settlers in Natal including missionaries 
elaborated and crystallised the image of the Zulu Kingdom many years later as "a 
nation in arms, imbued with a fierce military ethos". This then served as a justification 
for the British invasion of Zululand in 1879 (Laband, 2008a:168). Also, according to 
Bauman (1989: 227-228), abstraction is a very powerful tool of the modern mind. 
When this is subjected to the case of human interaction or relations and attitudes, it 
implies removing the human face, and whatever is left of it become evidence of 
membership to a particular category and whatever action carried out on the owner of 
such face, is strictly reserved for the category of which the face is a member. 
 
Bauman (1989) further gives an example of how the armed gangs of Hutus and Tutsis 
of Rwanda, used passport information to isolate and determine who dies or stays 
alive, since their victims look very similar to them by all standards. This also applies 
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to the extermination of the Jews in Nazi-Germany under the leadership of Adolf 
Hitler where Jews were murdered for just being Jews and not for committing any 
crime (Bauman, 1989:228). The point here is that there is enormous danger in the 
strong negative publicity and irrationality associated with the classification of black 
African immigrants in South Africa as amakwerekwere. For example, Neocosmos 
(2008) argues that the xenophobic incidents witnessed in South Africa were the result 
of what he regards as the ‗politics of fear‘ which can result in ethnic cleansing of 
black African immigrants who are regarded as a danger to the future of ―authentic‖ 
black South Africans. Although xenophobia is a global issue and the rate of migration 
of Africans  all over the world is on the increase, South Africa is not the only country 
in the world with the problem of immigrants and xenophobia (Muzumbukilwa, 
2007:2-3, Roemer et al., 2007). But the case of South Africa remains unique in the 
sense that the violence is mostly targeted on black African immigrants in a 
heterogeneous society that is made up of  immigrants from different parts of the world 
(Hassim et al., 2008:213-219). Besides, more shocking is the fact that the victims of 
these ―afrophobic‖ violence were mostly the nationals of the same countries that 
provided South Africans with succour during the difficult days of the oppressive 
apartheid regime (Msomi and Meintjies, 2008:4). Thus in view of the above, it can be 
argued that post-apartheid violence witnessed in South Africa is not only a hangover 
from the experiences of apartheid inter-group relations and mentality but also the 
handwork of dirty politicking.   
 
Furthermore, the danger of ―afrophobia‖ in South Africa not only lies in the 
extermination of black African immigrants but also that it breeds the possibility of 
black South Africans turning on other groups (inter-racial violence) or each other 
(intra-group or inter-ethnic violence) in the absence of anyone else to vent on in the 
future. Accordingly, Ncana and Mkhize (2008:4) argue that some black South 
Africans might have seized the opportunity created by the ―afrophobic‖ violence of 
2008 to ―settle some old scores‖ (Ncana and Mkhize, 2008a:4). While some black 
South Africans erroneously or intentionally killed, robbed and raped fellow black 
South Africans during the ―afrophobic‖ violence(Meintjies and Msomi, 2008:1), some 
other black South Africans were reported to have lost their lives in the hands of their 
fellow countrymen for either refusing to participate in the violence or being 
sympathetic to the plight of the African immigrants (Molefe et al., 2008b:1 and 4). 
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Meanwhile, ethnic tensions were already in existence between some local African 
ethnic groups in South Africa before the xenophobic violence of 2008. There appears 
to be evidence that the ―afrophobic‖ violence may have exacerbated those pre-
existing ethnic tensions (Kalamane and SAPA, 2008a:3, Ncana and la Grange, 
2008:4).  
 
Indeed, there are concerns that the ―afrophobic‖ tensions and violence against non-
local Africans may be related to certain politically motivated violence experienced in 
post-apartheid South Africa, this includes assassinations of some political office 
holders amidst political protests and possibly, inciting xenophobic violence (Mboyisa, 
2008b:4, Memela, 2008:8, Ncana et al., 2008:4, Naki, 2008a:9). Neocosmos (2008) 
therefore suggests that to counter ‗the politics of fear,‘ the application of what he calls 
the ‗politics of peace‘ becomes inevitable. But one thing lacking in all these analyses 
is the practicability of fostering peaceful relations among the different African groups 
in South Africa. It is in this light therefore that this study will not only attempt to 
assess the deep-seated causes of ―afrophobia‖ but will also, ipso facto, focus on how 
to manage and prevent inter-group conflicts among black South Africans and 
immigrant Africans and, possibly, between South Africans of all races in the future.  
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
There are a number of theories that can be used to explain the phenomenon of 
afrophobia in South Africa, but this project is based on two vital theories that capture 
the very dynamic nature of the conflict, while a third theory prescribes solutions to the 
problem.  
2.3.1 Frustration Aggression Theory  
This theory initially coined as a hypothesis by a group of researchers in 1939, have 
continued to serve as a relevant theory in modern social research  (Soyombo, 2008:99, 
Van der Dennen, 2005, Lever, 1976:21, Berkowitz, 1989:59, Morlan, 1949:2, Dollard 
et al). This theory describes frustration as a cause of aggression, the proponents of this 
theory insists that when a group experiences frustration they are bound to display 
aggression. When a group experiences unemployment, poor service delivery, adverse 
poverty and inability to provide basic family needs, they are most likely to turn to 
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violence as a result of frustration. Hence in what appears to be an attempt to eliminate 
barriers to their goals, the group in question gets involved in certain degree of 
violence that is targeted at the cause of their frustration, but usually this violence is 
marred by all forms of scapegoating (Soyombo, 2008:99-100, Gower, 2009:3, Lever, 
1976:22). 
Accordingly, some black South Africans involved in the xenophobic violence insists 
that black African migrants were taking away their jobs and RDP houses while they 
(black South Africans) languish in poverty and total deprivation. However, the major 
criticism against this theory is that frustration does not necessarily lead to aggression 
as portrayed by the theory since people respond differently to frustrations. This leads 
to further amendments on the theory to accommodate different kinds of aggression, 
namely ‗direct‘ and ‗displaced aggression‘, with ‗direct aggression‘ levelled at the 
cause of frustration and ‗displaced aggression‘ argued to be orchestrated on a 
―scapegoat‖ (Girard, 1979, Lever, 1976:21-22, Berkowitz, 1989:60-61). Some 
researchers disagree with the theory insisting that a barrier to attainment of goals can 
only provoke violence if the barrier in question emerges unexpectedly, while some 
others refer to the theory as too simplistic to be realistic (Morlan, 1949:6, Berkowitz, 
1989:59). Meanwhile Berkowitz (1998:60) reveals that this theory has a very narrow 
definition of frustration as only a feeling that arises when an attempt made to achieve 
a much desired goal is forestalled. In essence the implication of this theory is that 
aggression can never come to be without frustration. Berkowitz (1998:60-61) 
therefore contends that the theory fails to capture the complexity of frustration to the 
point that even the feeling of deprivation which is triggered by poverty is by no means 
captured in the theory as a possible cause of frustration.  
2.3.2 Relative Deprivation Theory 
Dambrun et al (2006:1032) contend that relative deprivation theory explains group or 
individual contentment as:  
not related to their objective circumstances but, rather, to their 
condition relative to other persons or groups. This implies, for 
example, that objectively disadvantaged people may feel less deprived 
than objectively advantaged people because of the chosen target for 
their social comparison.   
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According to Dambrun et al (2006:1033), the direct opposite of relative deprivation is 
relative gratification, which is the result of feeling better off than others when an 
individual compares his condition with that of others. However contrary to the general 
belief that those experiencing relative deprivation exhibit greater prejudice than 
people enjoying relative gratification, an experiment conducted amongst psychology 
students in France reveals the contrary. The research which was conducted in 2002 
reveals that irrespective of the fact that those experiencing relative gratification were 
feeling better off they still exhibited prejudice against the out-group like those 
undergoing relative deprivation (Dambrun et al., 2006:1033). 
However Davis (1959:280-296) carries out a further explanation of relative 
deprivation theory using series of mathematical equations and diagrams to postulate 
the idea which suggests the existence of two different types of comparisons, namely: 
―in-group comparison‖ and ―out-group comparison‖, with in-group implying a 
comparison between people of similar category and out-group indicating comparisons 
taking place between people from different categories. An example of such 
categories/comparison can be found in the relationship between black South Africans 
and black African immigrants. Davies (1959:283) in his idea of in-group comparisons 
argues that the moment an individual who feels deprived compares himself with a 
non-deprived person the outcome of such comparison is referred to as ―relative 
deprivation‖. While a situation whereby a non-deprived person compares himself with 
a deprived person it results to a state of ―relative gratification‖. Davies (1959:283) 
therefore contends that whether the individual in question experiences relative 
deprivation or gratification the person perceives his level of deprivation to be different 
from that of his peers. Davies (1959:283) thus concludes that since this is an in-group 
comparison, it is totally referred to as ―fairness‖.  
Similarly in the case of out-group comparisons, a deprived in-group member 
comparing his situation with that of a non-deprived out-group member, the resulting 
attitude toward the out-group is referred to as ―relative subordination‖. Meanwhile if a 
non-deprived individual compares his/herself with a deprived out-group member, the 
outcome of the attitude displayed is referred to as ―relative superiority‖. Whether the 
resulting attitudes are either relative superiority or relative subordination the 
individual in question feels that his deprivation status is different from that of the 
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member of an out-group. The totality of this development is referred to as ―social 
distance‖ (Davies, 1959:283-284). 
Applying Davies‘ suggestions to the situation in South Africa one can clearly argue 
that some poor black South Africans compare their situations to that of black African 
immigrants (out-group) as well as with fellow black South Africans (in-group). Some 
black South Africans insist that black African migrants are achieving a lot in South 
Africa where they are foreigners, while they (black South Africans) are not coping 
with the economy (Davies, 1959:280-296, Sekgala, 2009:20, Orfanos, 2009:20, 
Everatt, 2011:22). In the same vein there are complaints about some black South 
African politicians who were once poor but suddenly turned  wealthy, ignoring the 
plight of their fellow citizens (Sekgala, 2009:20).  
Apparently this points to the fact that besides the cases of out-group comparison, there 
were indeed certain elements of in-group comparisons and squabbles behind the 
―afrophobic‖ violence. Judging by the number of casualties, it appears as if this was 
more of an in-group comparison which is suggestive of the fact that the mobs were 
actually targeting more fellow black South Africans than African immigrants. This 
development brings to question the validity in labelling the nature of the May 2008 
violence as entirely xenophobic. 
Finally, this theory just like any other theory has limitations. Despite the dynamic 
nature and approach of this theory in revealing the causes of afrophobic violence, it 
fails to properly address the choice of targets of the perpetrators of the violence in 
South Africa (Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti, 2011:56).  
2.3.3 Peace Education Theory 
The initiative of peace education follows the United Nations Organisation‘s (UNO) 
idea of sustainable peace for all nations of the world after the end of the Second 
World War in 1945 (http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/peace/frame2.htm, 2012). 
With its initial aim being to counter the threat of global extinction via possible nuclear 
war, the UN is of the view that ‗peace education brings together multiple traditions of 
pedagogy, theories of education, and international initiatives for the advancement of 
human development through learning‘ 
(http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/peace/frame2.htm, 2012). According to the 
95 
 
Canadian Centre for Teaching Peace, this theory is believed to have two different 
dimensions, namely the negative and positive peace education (Peace Education 
Conference Meeting, 1998). Negative peace education according to the centre strives 
to resolve conflicts while positive peace education prevents conflicts from arising in 
the first place. The theory, which the Centre maintains works differently in various 
global contexts, was summarily described in Japan as ―anti-atomic bomb‖. The centre 
further argues that peace educators or teachers serve as role models of peace who 
assist in altering certain violent behaviours acquired by young people from various 
homes through regular exposure to the culture of violence. This method has a long 
term positive effect and assists in preventing violence in the society (Peace Education 
Conference Meeting, 1998). 
Hence, the Canadian Centre for Teaching Peace insists that this theory be referred to 
in the school curriculum as ―peace education‖ and not ―violence prevention‖ or ―crisis 
and conflict resolution‖ which according to the centre are diversions (Peace Education 
Conference Meeting, 1998). The centre further contends that there exists a difference 
between peace education and peace studies. Peace studies looks at causes of war 
globally and proffer solutions on how to prevent violence, while peace education 
entails learning how to apply these solutions to teaching students peace education at 
different levels in their communities (Peace Education Conference Meeting, 1998). 
The centre therefore, argued that peace studies programme focus on global affairs that 
do not directly apply to different communities, while peace education applies the 
knowledge directly to the communities based on existing conditions, history and how 
it currently affects the society in question (Peace Education Conference Meeting, 
1998).  
In view of this, Harris (2004:6) further explains that there are five different types of 
peace education, namely: ―international education, human rights education, 
development education, environmental education and conflict resolution education‖. 
According to Harris (2004:6), this theory postulates the following approaches to peace 
education: to offer deep explanations to the root causes of violence, it is meant to 
provide various alternatives to violence, peace education is dynamic enough to 
accommodate different forms of violence, peace education varies according to cultural 
practices, peace education takes into cognisance the fact that peace is a dynamic 
process that varies depending on the context and finally the theory acknowledges the 
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fact that ‗conflict is omnipresent‘ (Harris 2004:6). This can be applied tactically at all 
levels of the society in South Africa to alter the culture of violence effectively. 
Therefore, this study deployed a peace education approach in terms of realising its 
objectives of proffering solutions to foster better relations between black South 
Africans and black African immigrants. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that this theory has certain limitations. Irrespective of the fact 
that studies geared towards conflict resolution, ‗environmental education‘ and ‗peer 
mediation programmes‘ are made available in the academic curriculum of some 
institutions, the major and most complex part of the education are not inclusive. And 
it is the ignorance of these intricacies involved in peace process that mostly causes 
violence in society (Harris, 2004:17). Besides, there are still uncertainties surrounding 
the connection/application of this theory to practise in situations like: were a nation is 
already at war or has just emerged from conflict, how can peace education be applied 
to communities that are not at war but are continuously experiencing high levels of 
crime? How exactly are peace processes interpreted in various cultures and how 
universal are the major concepts involved in applying peace education? (Peace 
Education Conference Meeting, 1998).   
Incidentally, since South Africa is not currently experiencing a total outbreak of 
conflict, this study bridges the weaknesses in putting this theory into practise by 
prescribing cultural and multi-racial integration in the forms of: carrying out cultural 
exhibitions or festivals, promotion of the learning of South African languages in 
South African schools and higher institutions, adoption of a compulsory but voluntary 
national youth service scheme that will comprise of both local and international 
students irrespective of race or colour and the deployment of peace educators from 
schools, and places of national service to the nearest points of conflicts. In doing this 
both non-citizens and locals become thoroughly exposed to the practical dynamics of 
culture and conflict in South Africa, while the goal of national integration and peace is 
achieved on the same platform.   
Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that these three theories are very vital to this study as 
they serve as the major framework of this project. This is in the sense that they 
(Frustration-Aggression Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory) speak to the 
language of aggression, frustration, inequalities, feeling of deprivation and conflict 
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which are clearly revealed all through this study. Meanwhile, the language of peace 
which is an antidote much required to put to rest a conflict situation is properly 
reflected in this project using peace education theory. These solutions as prescribed in 
this work are very applicable to the case of South Africa since she is not experiencing 
any full scale war.  
Relative deprivation theory takes a thorough look at the various levels of group 
relations and comparisons, thereby leading this study to the exposure of divergent 
feelings of deprivation in South Africa. Similarly, Frustration-Aggression Theory not 
only reveals deprivation, aggression and frustration but it also takes this project to an 
all new higher level by contributing immensely to the revelation of the deep seated 
reasons behind the xenophobic violence in South Africa and the patterns of aggression 
involved. Meanwhile, Peace Education Theory paves way for a clear cut strategy to 
achieve lasting peace in South Africa.  
2.4    Conclusion 
It is important to note that Xenophobia is a global phenomenon which is by no means 
limited to South Africa (Saideman and Ayres, 2008:155-160, Burnside, 2009, Roemer 
et al., 2007:237-247, Fetzer, 2000:30). But there are certain similarities in the nature 
of xenophobic violence in South Africa and what is reported of xenophobia in Africa 
and the rest of the world. Xenophobia appears to be a condition prevalent in 
developed/developing economies that are faced with economic challenges, social 
vices and immigration (Fetzer, 2000:30, Mikulich, 2009:4, Soyombo, 2008:94-95, 
Tshabalala and Dibetle, 2008:4, Human Rights Watch, 1998:125). The rate at which 
the world has become globalised has ended up creating another problem of human 
rights abuses such as xenophobic violence (Landau, 2011:11-15, Harrison, 2005:11-
13, Boutros-Ghali, 1996:87-89). But xenophobia in Africa if not properly handled can 
destabilize the continent as black Africans seems to have the tendency of bearing 
grudges and acting it out at the slightest opportunity.  
However there seems to be a very strong relationship between ―afrophobia‖ and 
racism in South Africa as racism have become internalised amongst black Africans 
resident in South Africa (Bloch and Heese, 2007:13, Muzumbukilwa, 2007:4). 
However these racist ideas which provided the nourishment for ―afrophobic‖ 
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sentiments and violence were evidently borrowed from the defunct apartheid regime 
in South Africa. This situation is suggestive of the fact that post-apartheid South 
Africa is still fairly connected to the ideas of their Ester-while colonial masters 
(Nkomo et al., 1995:263-264, Dodson, 2010:4). Beyond this it points to the fact that 
South Africa‘s modern democracy was still very young with very weak structures. 
Impliedly a total severance from the old apartheid mentality remains yet to be fully 
achieved (Dodson, 2010:4). Thus the novel migration of black African foreigners into 
South Africa was ill timed, a situation which exposed them as victims of various 
forms of aversions in a state in dire need of reconstruction (Sekgala, 2009:20, 
Orfanos, 2009:20, Olukoju, 2008:45, Steenkamp, 2009:442-443). 
 
Meanwhile, it must be clearly noted that apartheid discriminatory policies and racist 
ideas were the bane of social stability in South Africa. The idea of keeping black 
South Africans in isolation from the rest of the world as was practised by the defunct 
apartheid regime contributed to the level of distrust and fear black South Africans 
have for black African foreigners. It is partly as a result of this and ignorance that 
black African migrants were viewed to be different but similar and malicious (Nkomo 
et al., 1995, Dodson, 2010:8-9, Crush, 2008:31-32). This fear was compounded by 
various complications surrounding idegeneity in South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006:29-
31). Beyond this the degree of frustrations, violence, deprivation and poverty 
experienced by black South Africans who were just liberated from the claws of an 
oppressive apartheid regime, was enough to psychologically condition their minds for 
suspicions and possibly hatred for African immigrants (Steenkamp, 2009:442-443, 
Sonneborn, 2010:91-92,56,68-69). Unfortunately, the situation becomes more 
precarious with the perception of African foreigners as economic competitors and the 
subsequent involvement of some African migrants in certain criminal activities 
(Bearak and Dugger, 2008:15, Solomon, 2003:102-103 and 105, Everatt, 2011:22, 
Nyamnjoh, 2006:42). 
 
According to Heywood (2002:3-5), the art of politics involves different patterns of 
agreements and disagreements, It is the art of exercising control by implementing 
collective decisions in a state. Just like the nature of violence experienced during 
apartheid South Africa, the several cases of afrophobic violence experienced in South 
Africa from 1994-2008 were attempts to exercise control (Matsinhe, 2011:306-310, 
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Sonneborn, 2010:56-74, Du Toit, 2001:81-83, Neocosmos, 2008:587-593, Gqola, 
2008:213-221). To this end, it then follows that the origin of the May 2008 major 
xenophobic violence in South Africa can be traced to a meeting of hostel dwellers in 
Alexandria (located in Gauteng) some of whom are members of political parties, is 
indicative of an act of politics. More so, since the early phases of the violence was 
preceded by meetings in or around hostels occupied by political party members in 
different locations. For the initial May 2008 major xenophobic violence to erupt 
around hostels occupied by some political party members ahead of the 2009 general 
elections, speaks to the notion of campaign, strategy, organisation, co-ordination and 
an attempt to exercise control (Ndlovu, 2008b:5, Mhlana et al., 2008:10). 
Unfortunately, the arrival of some black African immigrants in South Africa was so ill 
timed that it left them easily exposed as a fertile political play ground to test run the 
already existing boiling emotions of some poor black South Africans (Crush, 
2008:44-51, Petros et al., 2006:67-77, Michela, 2008:23, Human Rights Watch, 
1998:4-5). However, the reality is that some black African immigrants (as at the 
period in question) were actually guilty of some of the crimes they were generally 
accused of, thus exasperating the already precarious situation (Solomon, 2003:105, 
Nyamnjoh, 2006:42). However, data available to this study clearly suggests that the 
percentage of black African migrants guilty of criminal activities in the country as 
accused, remains very minimal compared to South Africans (Nyamnjoh, 2006:46, 
Solomon, 2003:105, The Citizen, 2008:3, Neocosmos, 2008:590).  
Meanwhile, it is obvious that some of the organizers of the initial meeting(s) and 
community leaders in Alexandria where the violence originated meant no harm to 
black African migrants (Sinwell, 2011:134-138). However, since South Africa already 
has a culture of violence borrowed from the defunct apartheid regime, coupled with 
different irking socio-economic frustrations and an alarming rate of black illiteracy; 
meetings and protests became easily hijacked by certain negative political forces 
(Sinwell, 2011:137, Sonneborn, 2010:56,79-80 and 68-69, Du Toit, 2001:81-83, 
Aitchison and Harley, 2006:96, Danso and McDonald, 2001:118, Laing and Pather, 
2008:1 and 4, Monson and Arian, 2011:35-36, Vromans et al., 2011:90, Monson, 
2011:181-182). These four political forces have been identified in this project to 
mean: a. the forces of ancient apartheid politics b. elite politics c. „identity politics‘ d. 
politics of entitlement and e. ‗the politics of exclusion‘.  
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Beyond these, the violence was encouraged by certain existing weaknesses within the 
structures of government, the law and the inability of the judiciary to secure 
convictions against most alleged perpetrators of the xenophobic violence that left 62 
people dead in May 2008, including South Africans citizens (Monson and Arian, 
2011, Klaaren, 2011:135, Alcock, 2008:5, Mboyisa and AFP, 2008:3). Thus the 
violence soon became properly interpreted in certain quarters as an easy method of 
securing personal properties, wealth and the attention of South African government to 
the plight of poor black South Africans. Impliedly within a given space of time, well 
nurtured by the culture of impunity and violence, xenophobic violence in South 
Africa metamorphosed into a weapon of the poor against the seemingly uncaring 
elites and government of South Africa (Evans et al., 2009:1 and 4, Everatt, 2011:22, 
Joubert, 2008b:3, Rossouw, 2008:11, Sekgala, 2009:20, Orfanos, 2009:20, 
Rondganger, 2008b:13, Pillay, 2008:97-100, Johnston, 2008b:31). Thus conclusively, 
it can be argued that xenophobia/afrophobia in South Africa is a metamorphosis of the 
regular culture of violence and ‗politics of exclusion‘ experienced in the country over 
the years; a final by-product of the defunct apartheid regime (Matsinhe, 
2011:296,310, Du Toit, 2001:78,81-83, Udeh et al., 2013, Roemer et al., 2007:244). 
In this regard, the application of these three theories to this project helps to clearly 
unravel the complexity surrounding ―afrophobia‖ in South Africa as well as 
illuminate the inter-disciplinary nature of this project. This theoretical framework 
reveal that the xenophobic violence experienced in South Africa (1994-2008) goes 
beyond the microcosm of violence to embrace broader and complex issues that are 
woven around some psycho-social triggers involved in societal interactions. Although 
there might be similarities and relationship between theories, they are all distinct, 
hence in their different approaches help to explain, predict or present solutions to the 












Taking into account a record of certain xenophobic violence experienced in South 
Africa from the period 1994 to 2008, this chapter carried out an enquiry into the 
underlying causes, effects and development implications of xenophobia in South 
Africa. It not only analysed the different dimensions of xenophobia in South Africa 
but it also evaluated the implications of xenophobia for the reputation of South Africa 
in the international community as well as its national and international relations.   
3.2 National and Socio-Economic Effects of Xenophobic 
Violence in South Africa 
 In order to capture some of the socio-economic effects of xenophobic violence in 
South Africa, a critical but cursory look at a contemporary global economic system 
needs to be carried out. The Global economy as we know it today is woven around the 
concept of globalisation which involves various movements of people and South 
African capitalist economy is by no means insulated from this contemporary global 
economic system (Nyamnjoh, 2006:1-4 ,230-236, Human Rights Watch, 1998:2-30, 
McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998:165-195, Olowu, 2008:299, Nwonwu, 
2010:149-152). In order to explain this global development, an analyses/definition of 
globalisation becomes necessary. Thus globalisation can be defined as, the ‗melting 
down‘ of various national boarders to enhance global interconnection of transactions 
in goods and services, businesses and most importantly international relations, a 
situation which brings the world into a ‗global village‘ that is made up of borderless 
states and societies which are in one way or the other; more or less, interdependent on 
each other. Based on this fact that the world has become globalised, some national 
economies thrive on international relations (which incorporates 
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immigration/globalisation), but many African countries are yet to benefit positively 
from this development mostly due to poverty and underdevelopment (Nwankwo, 
2002:69-88, Nwankwo, 2003:33-67, Offiong, 2001:1-7, Boutros-Ghali, 1996:87-90, 
Nyamnjoh, 2006:230-236, Nwonwu, 2010:149-152). This precarious economic 
development that has spread through many African nations is mostly as a result of 
corruption, mismanagements, conflicts, neo-colonialism, globalisation and the actions 
of the apartheid government (in the case of some frontline states), a situation which 
ultimately resulted in mass migration of people in pursuit of greener pastures 
(Nwankwo, 2002:76-88, Boutros-Ghali, 1996:87-89, Offiong, 2001:3-16, 
Muzumbukilwa, 2007:3-4 and 24-25, Nyamnjoh, 2006:1-4 and 230-236, Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:22-30, Olowu, 2008:304, Trimikliniotis et al., 2008:1323). While 
many African countries are yet to benefit from globalisation, South Africa has more 
or less benefited from it mostly due to her economic strength and political stability. 
Based on these, South Africa became a destination for many skilled and unskilled 
black African economic and refugee migrants (Nyamnjoh, 2006:1-4, Human Rights 
Watch, 1998, Chossudovsky, 1997:397, McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998:165-
195, Muzumbukilwa, 2007:24-25). But despite the fact that globalisation has its 
advantages it also possesses some shortcomings which amongst others involves an 
increase in human right abuses all over the world (Harrison 2005:11-13; Boutros-
Ghali 1996:87-89). Unfortunately in the case of South Africa apart from human rights 
abuses like it is elsewhere, globalisation seems to have come under threat from ‗the 
politics of exclusion‘ (Nyamnjoh, 2006:3-5 and 230-236, Udeh et al., 2013, Roemer 
et al., 2007:244). 
 Apparently, the nuances of this latest global economic development remains yet to be 
captured by some black South Africans who have for years been kept in the dark by 
the defunct apartheid oppressive government (Nkomo et al., 1995:269-274, Nyati, 
2008:15). Due to illiteracy, poverty and ignorance mostly resulting from several years 
of isolation and deprivation, the realities of globalisation and African brotherhood 
appears to be beyond the realms of their comprehension. Hence based on apartheid 
experience and allegedly acquired anti-African orientation, the presence of black 
African immigrants meant yet another threat to the socio-economic wellbeing of some 
poor black South Africans (Nkomo et al., 1995:269-274, Danso and McDonald, 
2001:115-137, Aitchison and Harley, 2006:96, Steenkamp, 2009:443-444, Nyati, 
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2008:15). Based on this the much celebrated African brotherhood and ―African 
Renaissance‖ turned out to be naturally replaced with ―afrophobic‖ attitudes and 
statements towards other Africans (Neocosmos, 2006:12). Although a few black 
African immigrants may compete for jobs with some poor black South African, some 
of them were self-employed and very skilled to the point of providing employment for 
some poor black South Africans. Arguably, the ―afrophobic‖ attacks further created 
both lack of skilled workers in the country as well as unemployment for some poor 
black South Africans (Danso and McDonald, 2001:124-125, Cox, 2008:3). Since 
globalisation also entails the free flow of people, culture and ideas, the ―afrophobic‖ 
attacks nearly left the South African tourism business in ruins as some tourists, 
investors and prospective investors avoided South Africa (Adeleke et al., 2008:143-
144, Ferreira and Mtshali, 2008:16, Oloyede, 2008:116). Incidentally, some tourists 
out of fear for their safety cancelled out their trips to South Africa and the country 
continued to lose huge sums of money. South African private business owners were 
not spared as they continued to lose money due to the mass exodus of black African 
immigrants who were forced out of the country by some rabid mobs. These African 
immigrants constituted of tax payers, consumers and business associates, while 
among those that fled the country out of fear for their safety where many other foreign 
business owners  (Rondganger, 2008a, Ferreira and Mtshali, 2008:16, The Citizen 
Reporter and SAPA, 2008:3, Oloyede, 2008:116, Olukoju, 2008:4).  
Furthermore, in the contemporary globalised world, tourism not only boosts 
businesses but has also turned out to become one of the fastest growing businesses in 
the world. The nature of the businesses is such that it thrives mostly in a 
peaceful/serene environment and can be easily threatened by violence since tourists 
and investors are security conscious (Adeleke et al., 2008:143-144, The Citizen 
Reporter and SAPA, 2008:3). Over the years tourism has become one of the major 
sources of income, employment and foreign exchange earner for South Africa until it 
came under threat by the ―afrophobic‖ violence of 2008. Since ―afrophobia‖ affected 
tourism, businesses such as resorts, hotels, restaurants, airlines and cruise lines will 
not be spared, a situation which is unhealthy for national economy (Adeleke et al., 
2008:144).The ―afrophobic‖ violence not only jeopardised tourism but it also 
hindered the free flow of people, businesses, ideas and ‗cross-cultural fertilization‘ 
necessary for development in a country that benefits from and is part of contemporary 
104 
 
global economic system (Adeleke et al., 2008:143-144, Cox, 2008:3, Rondganger, 
2008b:13). 
 Conversely, the xenophobic violence reduced illegitimate business competition in 
some communities allowing some black South African businessmen and traders 
whose businesses might have come under strain from the business activities of black 
African migrants to improve on their transactions. Therefore the result of the violence 
was that some black South Africans became economically empowered as some of 
them having acquired some businesses skills from black African migrants, managed 
to take over some businesses initially dominated by black African foreigners (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:133, Rossouw and Kharsany, 2008:6, Olukoju, 2008:48). Since 
the violence lead to massive loss of human resources it can be argued that some local 
companies lost skilled workers as a result of the violence, since some of their workers 
who were black African foreigners were affected by the violence (Nyati, 2008:15, 
Olukoju, 2008:48). However, this crisis possibly created an opportunity for some poor 
black South Africans who may have been languishing in penury to be considered for 
employment by any of the affected companies.  
Consequently, the violent attacks and looting of businesses owned by black African 
migrants further created hardship and unemployment in the country as some of these 
businesses actually provided employment and services to some poor black South 
Africans in their respective communities (Cox, 2008:3, Danso and McDonald, 
2001:124-125, Monson, 2011:180-181). Accordingly, some South Africans 
irrespective of their race were very apologetic to black African foreigners affected by 
the violence and willingly offered massive humanitarian assistance in cash and kind 
(Smillie, 2008:1, Smillie and Radler, 2008:1 and 10, Rasool, 2008:13, Botes, 2008:8, 
Badat, 2008a:2, Badat, 2008b, Naki, 2008b:5, Serrao, 2008a:1, Serrao, 2008b:1). 
Meanwhile, in certain cases some South Africans assisted in reintegration of displaced 
people into their communities/neighbourhood, as this was the situation in places like 
Khayelitsha, Reiger Park and Masiphumelele (Rasool, 2008:13, Hartley, 2008:1, 
Botes, 2008:8, Sowetan, 2008a:14). Some South Africans, irrespective of their race or 
colour were ashamed of the actions of their fellow citizens and responded quickly 
with a protest march against the xenophobic violence (Dodson, 2010:3, Reuters, 
2008b:4). Similarly, some others were reported to have even assisted community 
leaders and the police in retrieving some stolen items belonging to non-local black 
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Africans  (Hartley, 2008:1, Monson, 2011:180-181). Monson (2011:180-181) is of the 
view that some black South Africans living in Madelakufa II strongly opposed the 
―afrophobic‖ violence and even went ahead to draw the attention of police to the 
violence in their area. A set of respondents in this community were of the following 
view that: 
 When foreigners were chased, there was a big problem (sic). 
We were hungry. There was no food. […] I am glad they are 
back, and thanks to the police, who responded swiftly. These 
people make it possible for us live; without them we are 
nothing (sic). […] take it from us—we remove foreigners in 
our area; we went days without food when their spaza shops 
closed (sic). We nearly died of hunger. Foreigners will never 
[again] be touched in this area (Monson, 2011:180).  
     
South Africa under the influence of globalisation has successfully increased her 
economic presence in Africa as well as allowed increase in inward free flow of goods, 
services and people irrespective of attempts by government to forestall these. The 
movement of people, goods and services in Johannesburg remains a typical example, 
despite the fact that all these have recently come under threat by xenophobia 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006: 232-233). Meanwhile, before now some black African migrants 
freely mingled with and taught some black South Africans some business tricks and 
the art of self-employment. It is possible that this out-brake of violence might have 
endangered these businesses and brotherly relations. This is possible since some black 
African migrants now view black South Africans with grave suspicion/distrust and 
vice versa (Hosken, 2008:7, SAPA, 2012b:2, Dube, 2008:3, Molefe et al., 2008b:1 
and 4, Ncana and la Grange, 2008:4, Steenkamp, 2009:445-446). Development such 
as this is quite unhealthy for nation building as such sentiments and suspicion might 
find its way across the borders of South Africa to endanger South African—African 
relations. During the oppressive apartheid regime Africans were perceived as 
comrades during the anti-apartheid movements, only to become labelled as miscreants 
at the fall of the apartheid regime due to ―afrophobic‖ sentiments (Steenkamp, 
2009:442, Matsinhe 2011). There are some black Africans who are South African 
citizens by birth, marriage or naturalisation, some of whom were on the target list of 
the rampaging mobs because of their country of origin, skin pigmentation, accent or 
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bodily features. This situation formerly created intra-racism and further deepened 
social distrust and divisions among black African communities in South Africa 
(Johnston, 2008c:13, Steenkamp, 2009:445-449, Badat, 2008d:1, Makhafola, 
2008b:5). Government‘s poor response to the crisis further generated distrust for the 
South African government amongst some black African migrants. Some Somali, 
Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees were reported to have preferred to die of starvation 
than receive humanitarian assistance from South African government whom they 
perceived as untrustworthy. While some Somalis attempted suicide by jumping into 
the cold icy waters around the Cape of Good Hope (Hosken, 2008:7, Steenkamp, 
2009:445, Kapp, 2008:1987, Masombuka, 2008:4). Some South African families were 
not spared by the effects of the violence as there were some black South Africans 
married to black African migrants some of whom the violence succeeded in 
threatening their marriages, matrimonial homes, family peace and unity (Badat, 
2008d:1, Makhafola, 2008b:5). Thus the violence not only further deepened identity 
conflict in the country but it also strengthened inter-group consciousness, ethnic 
sentiments and intra-racism in South Africa (Steenkamp, 2009:445, Molosankwe, 
2008:3, Ndaba, 2008:6, Kalamane and SAPA, 2008a:3). 
 Unfortunately, one of the greatest problems generated by the xenophobic violence in 
South Africa was an unexpected outbreak of humanitarian crisis, as black African 
foreigners fleeing from the violence took refuge in police stations and churches.  This 
development turned out to become an embarrassment to the government as the 
magnitude of the violence against other African nationals was allegedly unexpected 
(Msomi et al., 2008a, SAPA-AFP, 2008b:10, Oloyede, 2008:107-108, Carter, 2008:6, 
Msomi et al., 2008c:1, Meintjies and Msomi, 2008:1, Rondganger et al., 2008:1). 
Most irritating and embarrassing was the fact that the violence not only effected 
refugees in South Africa but rather it also made refugees out of some black South 
Africans in their own country (Gifford, 2008:3, Ndaba, 2008:6, Posthumus, 2008:7, 
Johnston, 2008c:13). It was reported that some refugees who were re-traumatised by 
the violence they experienced in the country attempted suicide since the ―afrophobic‖ 
violence only proved to be another nightmare for those of them fleeing violence for 
safety in South Africa (Hart and Yung, 2008:1, Joubert, 2008b:3). Some of these 
black African migrants who actually fled their countries to seek protection and safety 
in South Africa either lost their lives or loved ones and properties to the ―afrophobic‖ 
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violence. Thus the violence turned out to become a ‗double tragedy‘ for some of them 
who had already lost their loved ones and properties to conflicts in their home 
countries (Joubert, 2008a:10, Sennett et al., 2008:22, Joubert, 2008b:3). 
The xenophobic violence exposed certain weaknesses in South Africa‘s new 
democratic structures as the government was found to be sluggish in responding to the 
violence (Msomi, 2008:1). To make matters worse, it was alleged that there was 
certain re-structuring that took place within the structure of the SAPS in 2006 before 
the major violence of 2008, which almost wrecked the ability of the police to control 
the violence. The restructuring was reported to have affected the specialist crime 
combatting units of the police, reducing the number of active police officers in the 
unit to almost minimal. This restructuring was reported to have grossly incapacitated 
the effort of the police to contain the violence, and this is more in the sense that the 
special unit was said to be responsible for combating riots, public disturbances and 
crimes. When eventually the violence went beyond the control of the over stretched 
South African Police (SAPS), South African government was forced to deploy the 
military (South African National Defence Force) as a backup to quell the conflict 
(Flanagan, 2008:3, Vos, 2008:3, Msomi et al., 2008a:1). This development created a 
sense of a breakdown of law and order in the country which might have sent a 
dangerous signal to would be investors and business owners in South Africa. This also 
suggests that South African government might have also been forced to spend more 
money on emergencies and national security beyond her anticipation, a development 
which might have negative effects on national economy in the not so distant future.  
Within 14 days the ―afrophobic‖ violence had spread round seven provinces and soon 
afterwards it was found spreading all over the nine different provinces of South Africa 
(Oloyede, 2008:107-108, Olowu, 2008:297, Mail and Guardian, 2008:1). With South 
Africa recording the highest number of casualties (21 lives) out of the violence that 
raged mostly for two weeks claiming not less than 62 lives, most of which were 
African nationals, it becomes obvious that xenophobic violence undermines South 
African national security (Oloyede, 2008:107-108, de Lange, 2008a:1). But beyond 
this, the violence placed a question mark on South Africa‘s freedom charter which 




3.3 Impact of Xenophobic Violence on South Africa‟s Foreign 
Relations, Diplomacy and Global Image   
 The major explosion of xenophobic violence of 2008 had not less than citizens of nine 
different African countries affected by the violence, of which included: Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Sixty two people lost their lives to the violence of which 21 
of them were confirmed to be South African citizens (Oloyede, 2008:108, de Lange, 
2008a:1, Olukoju, 2008:45). Unfortunately those affected where mostly citizens of the 
same countries that assisted South Africans during the anti-apartheid movements. 
This situation can be very embarrassing for the affected African countries, especially 
for those whose citizens lost their lives during the major xenophobic violence of May 
2008 which erupted while the continent was gearing up for Africa‘s Day celebration 
(Bell, 2008:2, SAPA-AFP, 2008a:3, Meintjies and Msomi, 2008:1). Most 
embarrassing was the fact that some of the citizens of these same African countries 
also lost their lives in their home countries while aiding South Africans during their 
liberation struggle (Leshilo, 2008:10).  
Although the government of these countries mostly continued to display maturity in 
their relations with South African government, some of their citizens were reported to 
have been filled with distrust and disgust for both South African government and its 
citizens (Seale, 2008:3, SAPA-AFP, 2008b:10, Rondganger, 2008a:6, Rondganger, 
2008b:13, Fauvet, 2008:3, The Star, 2008b:13, Mashaba et al., 2008:5, Fuphe, 
2008b:5, SAPA, 2008b:5). This development undermines the security of black South 
Africans travelling or living abroad, especially to other African countries, as the 
violence in South Africa had the potential of provoking retaliation in other African 
countries (de Lange, 2008b:10, The Star, 2008c). This situation is very worrisome 
since it can pose a threat to future South African foreign relations. 
With the 2008 major ―afrophobic‖ violence in South Africa assuming an 
unprecedented level in the history of xenophobic violence in Africa, the beautiful 
rainbow nation‘s image becomes wrongfully projected to the international community 
as a nation of mob, rogues, criminals, racists and xenophobes (Oloyede, 2008:107-
108, Olukoju, 2008:39 and 44, SAPA-AFP, 2008b:10, Onah, 2011:267 and 274, 
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Ntyintyane, 2008:32). The result of this is that in the course of negotiations and 
bargaining with other nations of the world, South Africa might always end up under 
the severe pressure of protecting her image, thus placing the nation in a regular 
defensive position. This situation, rather than strengthening South Africa‘s foreign 
policy weakens it, and thus her bargaining power becomes compromised. This 
development poses a grave danger to South Africa‘s strength of diplomacy and 
foreign relations. For instance, the recent Nigeria-South African diplomatic row 
which had the Nigerian government accusing South African government of being 
xenophobic is an indication of the damage the violence had done to the good image of 
the country in Africa (AFP, 2012, Patel, 2012, Govender, 2012, SAPA, 2012a). It was 
reported that following the label of ―a xenophobic nation‖ from the Nigerian 
government after South African government allegedly, hastily deported some 
Nigerians in March 2012 for allegedly possessing fake yellow fever cards. South 
African government among other speculated reasons was reported to have been 
placed in such an uncomfortable position that she was compelled to tender an 
unconditional apology to the Nigerian government. This is irrespective of the fact that 
it was reported that Nigerian government was also alleged to be at fault for not putting 
a stop to the so called fraudulent Nigerian yellow fever cards that reportedly found 
their way across South African boarders (AFP, 2012, Patel, 2012, Govender, 2012, 
SAPA, 2012a).    
 Meanwhile, before now South Africa has always prided herself as a leader in Africa 
with her national anthem extoling African virtues. South Africa was revered all over 
Africa and the world as a protector of human rights; her newly found democracy was 
widely celebrated all over the world as worthy of emulation in Africa. Unfortunately, 
the xenophobic violence seems to have withered this euphoria and almost damaged 
this pride (Joubert, 2008a:10, Olukoju, 2008:48, Sonneborn, 2010:52,92-101, SAPA-
AFP, 2008a:3, Nell, 2008:229-230, Hastings, 2008:13). More so, with South Africa 
being at the forefront of the campaign for New partnership for Africa‘s Development 
(NEPAD), one of the founding members of the African Union (AU), member of the 
Southern African Development Commission (SADC) and a signatory to various 
human rights-related treaties like the refugee protection treaty adopted during the 
OAU (Organisation for African Unity) summit in 1969; the damage done to her image 
by the ―afrophobic‖ violence can be said to be colossal (Olowu, 2008:304-305, 
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Nwankwo, 2002:87-120, Olukoju, 2008:48). The violence smeared the image of 
South Africa‘s foremost nationalists and freedom fighters like Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu and Nelson Mandela who are both widely respected all over the world as Noble 
Laureate and legendry human rights activists. While Nelson Mandela, besides being 
South Africa‘s first democratically elected  president is also respected all over Africa 
and the world as a symbol of freedom and hope in Africa (Tau, 2008:3, Hastings, 
2008:13, Onah, 2011:267, Nell, 2008:229). ―afrophobic‖ violence in South Africa not 
only means an impediment to globalisation but a violation of international law on 
human rights, a situation which might have compelled certain African states like 
Nigeria to view South Africa with suspicion. This is more in the sense that the 
―afrophobic‖ violence was a betrayal of the spirit of African brotherhood (Ubuntu) 
and Pan-Africanism that marked the relations between South Africa and other African 
states (Olowu, 2008:296-318, SAPA-AFP, 2008b:10, The Star, 2008c:9, AFP, 2012, 
Patel, 2012, Govender, 2012, SAPA, 2012a).  
Accordingly, South African government embarrassed by the violence apologised to 
some affected African States while vowing to get to the root of the matter (Asagba, 
2011:152, Oloyede, 2008:108, Sowetan, 2008c:5). The implication of this is not only 
that ―afrophobic‖ violence in South Africa threatens her relations with other African 
states. But rather the danger also lies with the fact that this violence may have also 
succeeded in placing South Africa in such an ugly situation that she has to always 
struggle with protecting her image amongst the committee of nations. However, the 
―afrophobic‖ violence of 2008 remains a wakeup call for other African governments 
to develop their countries and provide for their citizens in other to relieve South 
Africa of the pressure of immigration (Olukoju, 2008:49, SAPA-AFP, 2008b:10, 
Seale, 2008:3, Mashaba et al., 2008:5, SAPA-AP, 2008).  
Fortunately, the acquisition of AU (African Union) chairperson by South Africa 
through Madam Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is an indication that South Africa is 
making progress in advancing her foreign policy in Africa, irrespective of the fact that 
this development is still not without its challenges. It is also possible that one of the 
reasons why South Africa went ahead to vie for this extolled position in Africa is to 
enable her further improve on her image in Africa as a leader, as she forges her 
foreign policies and interest in African development (Mail and Guardian, 2012, 
SABC, 2012, Nwankwo, 2002:87-120, Solomon, 2003:153). 
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3.4  Conclusion 
 It is without doubt that the ―afrophobic‖ violence of May 2008 tainted the good 
image of South Africa before the international community and brought so much 
embarrassment to the government (Olukoju, 2008:48, Olowu, 2008:304-305, 
Meintjies and Msomi, 2008, SAPA, 2008b:5). But one other thing that remains 
obvious is that the national outbursts of emotions and massive humanitarian 
assistance received by black African immigrants from sympathetic South Africans (of 
all races), implies that some South Africans are shocked and ashamed of the actions 
of some of their countrymen (Rasool, 2008:13, Botes, 2008:8, Badat, 2008a:2, Naki, 
2008b:5, Crush, 2008:9, Serrao, 2008b:1, Serrao, 2008a:1, Smillie and Radler, 2008:1 
and 10, Smillie, 2008:1). This is an indication that the ―afrophobic‖ violence against 
black African immigrants does not necessarily mean that black South Africans dislike 
black African immigrants. For instance, Mangosuthu Buthelezi the former minister of 
the department of home affairs and the leader of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) who has 
acquired notoriety for his infamous inflammatory statements that criminalised black 
African migrants, was later found to be shedding tears for the victims of 2008 
afrophobic violence (Neocosmos, 2008:588, Danso and McDonald, 2001:132).  
Therefore all these might as well be indicative of the fact that the total outcome of the 
campaign was least expected by the alleged initiators. However the major violence of 
2008 carried out mostly against black African immigrants cannot be completely 
referred to as xenophobia. This is in view of the fact that the major targets of the mob 
were black African migrants, as people of other races who were also migrants were 
not targeted. Moreover violence in which South Africa recorded the highest number 
of victims and the number of people ejected from RDP houses by mobs in Alexandra 
were mostly South Africans still does not prove the violence of May 2008 to be 
xenophobic. However, this could be indicative of the fact that the mobs may have 
actually, as reported, found it difficult to distinguish between citizens and non-
citizens. If this then is a fact, such a development might have aided the aversion of an 
impending possible genocide (Molefe et al., 2008b:4, Oloyede, 2008:108, Worby et 





BUILDING PEACEFUL (INTRA-RACIAL) GROUP 
RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction  
A thorough assessment has been carried out on this chapter of various attempts made 
so far by the civil society and government towards enhancing peaceful group relations 
in South Africa. Since finding lasting solutions to intra-group violence remains 
absolutely vital to this project, this chapter paved way for this objective by also 
carrying out an evaluation of the outcome of these previous attempts towards conflict 
prevention and management of intra-group relations in South Africa. This was done in 
other to assess their possible impacts on the society and to proffer better solutions that 
will assist conflict resolution, prevention and management of intra-group relations in 
South Africa. 
4.2 Tactical Approaches Adopted by both the State and Civil 
Society to Manage and Prevent “Afrophobic” Violence in 
South Africa 
 Most government and civil society responses and strategies against ―afrophobic‖ 
violence were short term measures and do not provide for long term prevention of 
further ―afrophobic‖ violence (Sinwell, 2011:147, Amisi et al., 2011:79 and 82). 
However unlike the government, civic organisations carried out a more thorough 
analysis and assessment of the situation to determine the root causes of ―afrophobic‖ 
violence, which they among others identified as : poverty, inequalities, crime, unfair 
business competition, governments inability to fulfil its promise of delivering RDP 
houses to all poor citizens, political propaganda, corruption (especially at local 
government level), capitalism and a high level of unemployment. Incidentally, the 
most persistent factors identified to be responsible for the violence were poverty and 
unemployment. These assessments were made possible mostly through interviews, 
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research and community engagements on the part of civil society and researchers 
(Amisi et al., 2011:62,65,74,75,79-81, Sinwell, 2011:132-146). 
4.2.1 Sustaining Peaceful Intra-group Relations in South Africa, the South African 
Civil Society Perspective 
 In Alexandra during the major ―afrophobic‖ violence of May 2008, community 
leaders were said to have protected foreigners by negotiations with the rampaging 
armed mob, warding off ―afrophobic‖ attacks, and even went as far as recovering 
some of their stolen properties (Sinwell, 2011:134-135). In some cases, security 
meetings were organised by community leaders to protect black African migrants 
from being consumed in the conflict. Some black South Africans volunteered to work 
with security guards to provide safety for some poor black African foreigners 
dwelling in their midst. While in Marlboro, community leaders advised black African 
foreigners to take refuge in police stations having anticipated the violence would soon 
get out of control (Sinwell, 2011:135-136).  
Meanwhile, the moment the situation seemed to have calmed down, various leaders in 
the Alexandra community called for a general meeting to dissuade residents from 
continuing with the violence, but to no avail. Hence community leaders decided to 
decentralise meetings in order to communicate more effectively to residents in smaller 
groups. Other strategies adopted were to organise meetings in the community with 
community leaders, religious leaders, sports leaders and councillors in attendance. 
This strategy worked more effectively as the organisers earned the respect and 
attention of community residents (Sinwell, 2011:137-138). Beyond this, the further 
involvement of political leaders, civic organisations and community police forum 
(CPF) offered no breeding space for sabotage and malice, as informants duly notified 
the police of any strange gathering (Sinwell, 2011:139). Meanwhile, religious leaders 
took up the challenge of preaching against violence in their various churches and 
communities and effectively engaged in spreading their anti-xenophobic campaigns 
through various Christian forums and ministries (Sinwell, 2011:138). 
Furthermore, since the outcome of peace meetings conducted by leaders in Alexandra 
and civil society organisations revealed that government‘s poor service delivery was a 
serious issue faced by the community, political leaders of both The IFP and ANC in 
Alexandra having put aside their differences, both worked in harmony on the 
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complaints of poor service delivery in Alexandra urging residents to embrace peace. 
Civic organisations and political leaders, having identified the root causes of the 
violence, enlightened residents on how to alternatively go about reaching the 
government regarding their various frustrations in the community void of violence 
(Sinwell, 2011:138-139 and 141-143). While other non-governmental organisations 
such as Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training (ADAPT) and Lifeline 
engaged in counselling both the victims of violence and HIV patients in the 
communities (Sinwell, 2011:140). Civil society also assisted with the reintegration of 
displaced black African migrants into their various communities.The reintegration 
process in Durban for instance was reported to have been hampered in some cases by 
poor coordination and lack of coherence in the process. In some cases, failure with the 
reintegration processes were as a result of poor communication and enlightenment of 
host communities regarding the processes and plight of black African migrants and 
refugees in their communities. To make matters worse, some of the challenges faced 
and reported by some local community residents, some of which were the reasons 
behind the violence, still remained unresolved even as reintegration processes were 
going on.  
However, despite these challenges, some successes were recorded in the reintegration 
processes in Durban and elsewhere in the country at the end of the violence (Amisi et 
al., 2011:80, Rasool, 2008:13, Hartley, 2008:1, Botes, 2008:8, Sowetan, 2008a:14). 
While many NGOs and sympathetic South Africans offered massive humanitarian 
services in the forms of gifts, money and unreserved apologies to the displaced for 
their harrowing experiences. All these went a long way to assist the displaced and 
brought calm to the situation while paving way for a possible reintegration of these 
displaced people with their various communities (Smillie, 2008:1, Rasool, 2008:13, 
Botes, 2008:8, Badat, 2008a:2, Naki, 2008b:5, Serrao, 2008b:1, Serrao, 2008a:1).  
Incidentally, one of the most effective long term measures adopted to forestall further 
xenophobic violence in the country was the attempt by African Diaspora Forum to 
enhance ―cross cultural fertilization‖ between black South Africans and black African 
immigrants. This was made possible by attempting to cement relations between South 
Africans and black African immigrants, engaging in African cultural exchanges, 
encouraging development of relationships and mutual understanding amongst 
Africans, discouraging public xenophobic utterances/policies and fostering integration 
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of various African communities through cultural exhibitions. Beyond these, the 
organisation attracted about eighteen representatives of various African countries to 
help facilitate the programme, while it at all levels engaged various South African 
institutions on promoting African relations. This attempt on cultural integration 
remains very vital as black African immigrants and black South Africans can actually 
better understand each other when both parties understand and learn to respect each 
other‘s culture and traditions. In the same vein, the youth branch of the organisation 
took the campaign against xenophobia to the media by initiating television and radio 
discussions. But unfortunately the organisation later became dysfunctional following 
the death of a key initiator and member of the CPF (Sinwell, 2011:140-141).  
Another strategy with a long term effect on prevention of further xenophobic violence 
in the country is that which was adopted by the APF (Anti-Privatisation Forum). The 
members of this organisation having identified capitalism and the ANC‘s so-called 
neo-liberal policies as responsible for sustaining high rate of poverty and inequalities 
in South Africa, embarked on a mission to forestall policies aimed at promoting 
capitalism in the country. But the objectives of this organisation did not see the light 
of day as members of this organisation failed to come up with policies aimed at 
tackling the nefarious activities of capitalism or providing better alternatives to ARP 
(Alexandra Renewal Project) (Sinwell, 2011:131 and 147).  
However, the APF, churches and labour unions like some other civic organisations, 
succeeded in conducting an anti-xenophobia march and awareness campaign to 
discourage people from participating in xenophobic violence. Less than two weeks 
into the major xenophobic violence, thousands of people turned out in the streets of 
Johannesburg bringing traffic to a halt carrying different placards and marching 
across the streets condemning xenophobic violence. Beyond this the APF also issued 
a press statement against xenophobia in South Africa. But the problem with this 
organisation is that it lacks leadership coherence as members of this organisation 
outside Alexandra pursue different agenda from those of members resident in 
Alexandra (Amisi et al., 2011:67, Sinwell, 2011:146-147, Reuters, 2008b:4). The 
issue of leadership coherence seems to be a general problem that plagued the 
activities of NGOs in managing the humanitarian crisis that was triggered in the event 
of the major 2008 xenophobic violence. This is so in the sense that some NGOs were 
faced with misunderstandings and disagreements between and among themselves, a 
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development which ended up further complicating matters (Schwarer and Mwelase, 
2010:35). However, the WPF (Women for Peace) moved beyond providing food for 
victims of xenophobic violence in Alexandra to creating employment opportunities, 
specifically to empower black South Africans. This, some members of the 
organisation argue, will help distract some black South Africans from becoming 
envious of successful black African migrants thus helping many black South Africans 
to imbibe self-confidence by acquiring more skills (Sinwell, 2011:139-140). But the 
problem remains that this organisation cannot do much in creating employment 
without the assistance of government with general job creation in the country.   
Another dimension to tactical approaches against ―afrophobic‖ violence is that which 
is found in StreetNet, an organisation that brings together both local and foreign street 
vendors. Their approach is such that they simply discourage their members from 
partaking in any xenophobic violence or attitude. Members report cases that are 
earlier dealt with before they get to crisis point (Amisi et al., 2011:78). This is 
indicative of the fact that an anti-xenophobic campaign can be successfully carried 
into trade unions where anti-foreigner sentiments might be rife due to trade 
competition. But the question remains, how far has this campaign been carried out to 
other trade unions, as this might be a very isolated case of anti-xenophobic campaign 
in trade unions in the country.  
However, most encouraging is the fact that Lawyers for Human Rights and the 
KwaZulu-Natal Refugee Council (KZNRC) promote legal and human rights of black 
African migrants. While KZNRC goes further to enlighten refugees about their 
obligations/responsibilities to their host communities and South Africa at large (Amisi 
et al 2011:77-78). Such an attempt, if consistent, remains a step in the right direction 
as it will help enlighten refugees on how to properly behave in South Africa, their 
host country. Schwarer and Mwelase (2010:10) reveals that many black African 
migrants (particularly refugees) have no clue regarding the content of the South 
African constitution and as such do not know their rights in the country. Therefore 
any attempt by a legal organisation to protect their rights will go a long way to assist 
them to understand how to survive in the country. 
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4.2.2 Attempts by South African Government on Prevention of “Afrophobic” Violence 
and Maintenance of Peaceful Intra-group Relations in South Africa 
There are mixed feelings regarding government‘s intervention in the xenophobic 
violence as the police was poorly structured to handle the violence, while military 
deployment to assist the police prevented further spread of the violence and was 
rather too late as the violence had already gathered enough momentum (Flanagan, 
2008:3, Vos, 2008:3, Msomi et al., 2008a:1). In Durban, Schwarer and Mwelase 
(2010:9-10) reported that some Metro Police officers manhandled some refugees who 
ended up taking refuge in the city hall by whisking them away from the building; a 
development which certain analysts viewed as rather encouraging to xenophobic 
violence in South Africa.  
However, some other reports clearly indicated that South African government latter 
carried on with what seems to be the African Diaspora Forum initiative of promoting 
cultural integration and intra-racial harmony amongst black African communities in 
South Africa. The government did this by setting aside every 24 September to 
nationally celebrate Heritage day, 25
 
May to celebrate Africa‘s day and 21 March for 
Human Rights day national celebration. These days are either nationally celebrated as 
public holidays or meant for cultural displays (Religious Leaders Training on Conflict 
Resolution, 2013). But the problem with this initiative is that some black African 
foreigners (like the Congolese) are not comfortable with the idea of culturally 
integrating with South Africans (Schwarer and Mwelase, 2010:33).  
However, this approach requires some good publicity to continue to be very effective 
and attain higher credibility as the South African public may not in actuality, 
comprehend the deep meanings of such ceremonies beyond the rhetoric. Thus beyond 
the rhetoric of nationally celebrating some of these days as public holidays, a lot of 
practicalities and publicity are required to make these days, informative, educational 
and worthwhile. This is where government needs to come and assist by thoroughly 
involving the media. Unfortunately, Schwarer and Mwelase (2010:16-28) contend 
that government failed to liaise with NGOs to map out anti-xenophobic programmes 
with long term effects and as such, certain efforts made by NGOs became exercises in 
futility. Another major hindrance to the efforts of some NGOs is the problem of 
communication. This development arose out of the fact that most employees of NGOs 
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dealing with refugees were mostly South Africans and this created some 
complications especially for planning on programmes with long term effects 
(Schwarer and Mwelase, 2010:20). Incidentally this is where government and the civil 
society should have liaised to recruit some black African migrants to assist these 
NGOs with interpretation and communication.  
4.3 Conclusion 
Currently there seems to be no concrete efforts made by the government to properly 
establish anti-afrophobic programmes with long term effects as the efforts made by 
government so far were mostly to manage, on a short term basis the major afrophobic 
violence of 2008. Although there are efforts made by the civil society to manage 
afrophobic violence in South Africa and prevent its future re-occurrences, failure on 
the part of government to properly liaise with them in their anti-afrophobic 
programmes, mostly rendered civil society efforts into only philanthropic and short 
term crisis management campaigns. This is basically in the sense that little 
achievements were recorded in the areas of planning, execution and sustenance of 
anti-afrophobic programmes with long term effects capable of preventing further re-
occurrences (Sinwell, 2011:147, Amisi et al., 2011:79 and 82, Schwarer and 
Mwelase, 2010:15-18, 28-32 and 35). 
However, no matter the different approaches adopted by civil society to handle 
afrophobic violence in South Africa, without support from government on tactical 
long term measures like the provision of housing, tackling unemployment in the 
country and engaging in poverty alleviation; efforts by civil society will not go far 
enough to prevent further re-occurrences of afrophobic violence in South Africa 










SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Summary  
Having carried out a thorough analysis of available data, this concluding end of the 
study brought together the outcome of these analyses in order to extract the main 
findings of this research. Consequently, this lead to certain policy recommendations 
that not only provided practical solutions to ―afrophobic‖ violence in South Africa but 
paved way to promoting and cementing good relationship between non-local black 
Africans, black South Africans and South Africans in general.   
5.2 Conclusions 
It is indeed without doubt that at the very centre of the causes of xenophobic violence 
in South Africa lies RDP houses and jobs (Radler, 2008:3, Nyamnjoh, 2006:31). 
However, most aggravating is the fact that some South African politicians indulge in 
making unfulfilled promises to poor black South Africans while recklessly blaming 
black African migrants for their failures (Johnson, 2008:4, Mackenzie, 2008:13). 
Most unfortunately is the fact that South Africa‘s racial hierarchy of social benefits 
adds more frustrations to the lives of black South Africans who continue to find 
themselves at the very bottom of South African social stratification ladder (Laing and 
Pather, 2008:1 and 4, Nkomo et al., 1995:263-282). 
Compounding the entire situation is the complexities surrounding nationality and 
identity in South Africa, a situation which ultimately lead some black South Africans 
into perceiving black African migrants as a threat to their identity, future and interests 
(Neocosmos, 2006:22-31). The total outcome of all this is that xenophobic violence 
becomes perceived by some black South Africans as a struggle for survival (Orfanos, 
2009:20). Surrounded with these frustrations, the violence appear to have become the 
final resort of the common man to draw the attention of government to the highly 
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deplorable living conditions of the poor, in a racially charged society (Sinwell, 
2011:141-144, Nkomo et al., 1995:261-280, Solomon, 2003:102-103, Oloyede, 
2008:108-109, Orfanos, 2009:20, Sekgala, 2009:20, Human Rights Watch, 1998, 
Matsinhe, 2011:309). Irrespective of these, xenophobic violence remains illegitimate 
in the sense that whatever might be the situation, there is certainly no justification for 
any form of violence/crime against black African foreigners in South Africa 
(Johnston, 2008a:4, Mancotywa, 2008:12).  
Unfortunately, the new democratic government of South Africa cannot be entirely 
blamed for the violence in the country as her structures of governance are still very 
young to entirely resolve the legacy created by over 300 years of apartheid rule 
(Luthuli, 2008:9, Sonneborn, 2010, Amisi et al., 2011, Nkomo et al., 1995:261-282, 
Dubow, 1995, Mnisi, 2008:11). Incidentally, the continuous existence of apartheid 
structures in South Africa continues to complicate the relations between black South 
Africans and black African migrants. The problem appears to have started when some 
black South Africans who have patiently waited for the actualization of some 
ambiguous promises made to them by some of their elusive elites to no avail, 
witnessed first-hand, the success of black African migrants. Some of these black 
African immigrants, on arrival in South Africa succeeded in economically challenging 
the status quo with their informal business acumen, trading prowess and professional 
skills. This newly found successes probably exposed some black African migrants to 
the anger and envy of some South Africans who on comparing their conditions with 
theirs (black African migrants) held their government responsible for their plight. 
Based on this, some black South Africans alternatively sort the attention of South 
African government by laying siege on black African migrants (Nyamnjoh, 2006:68-
231,  Everatt, 2011:22, Sekgala, 2009:20).  
Incidentally, the humanity of the black race in South Africa has over centuries been 
shattered and relegated to the background in different ways such as using very 
negative connotations, labelling, racial classification and dehumanising treatments, all 
of which might have succeeded in inflaming the possible dissention of the success of 
black African migrants in South Africa. Unfortunately, this novel relationship 
between some black South Africans and black African migrants proves that some of 
these age long apartheid ideas and practises have actually ended up being  
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consciously/unconsciously lifted into post-apartheid South Africa by some black 
South Africans (Matsinhe, 2011). These complications in black African relations in 
South Africa was also exacerbated by high level of black illiteracy and poverty as 
some black South Africans neither understood the implication nor the plight of 
refugees in South Africa (Danso and McDonald, 2001:118, Aitchison and Harley, 
2006:96, Everatt, 2011:21, Everatt, 2008-2009:3, Mnisi, 2008:11, Crush, 2008:33-
35). Meanwhile, a thorough analysis of the history of violence against black African 
foreigners reveals that the so called xenophobic violence in South Africa is by no 
means a spontaneous reaction since there has been different cases of xenophobic 
violence from 1994-2008 (Crush, 2008:44-54, Matsinhe, 2011:307-308). This is an 
indication that frustrations and grudges have actually built up over the years only to 
be let loose at the slightest given opportunity, a situation which clearly explains the 
magnitude of the violence of the 2008 xenophobic violence. 
However, xenophobic violence cannot be said to be peculiar to South Africa as it is 
rather a global phenomenon that has been well promoted by the advent of 
globalisation, a development which appears to threaten African regional stability 
(Nwankwo, 2002:69-88, Nwankwo, 2003, Offiong, 2001:1-7, Boutros-Ghali, 
1996:87-90, Harrison, 2005:11-13, Campbell, 2003:74, Soyombo, 2008:94-95, 
Pedahzur and Yishai, 1999:101-102, Matsinhe, 2011:302, Crush and Ramachandran, 
2010:214-217, Bauman, 1989:227-228, AFP, 2012, Patel, 2012, Govender, 2012, 
SAPA, 2012a, Nyamnjoh, 2006:230-236). Nonetheless, a situation whereby the 
number of people ejected from RDP houses by the rampaging mob in Alexandra from 
where the major violence erupted in May 2008 were mostly South African citizens  
and South Africa recorded the highest number of casualties in the major violence of 
2008, all points to the fact that the labelling of the violence as entirely xenophobic 
remains questionable (Oloyede, 2008:108, Sinwell, 2011:137). Moreover, since the 
violence has in its target, mostly black African migrants in a heterogeneous nation 
like South Africa, it becomes impossible to conclude that the nature of the violence 
was indeed entirely xenophobic (Sichone, 2001, Landau, 2004, La Grange, 2008b:1, 
Hassim et al., 2008:213-219). 
In view of these, there are different dimensions to afrophobic violence in South 
Africa. These include: the criminal element, ethnic dimension to the violence, intra-
racism, political gambits, the culture of violence and apartheid legacies in South 
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Africa  (Du Toit, 2001:170-173, Nkomo et al., 1995:261-280, Worby et al., 2008, 
Landau, 2011:12, Steenkamp, 2009:443-444, Saunders and Southey, 2001:195, 
Matsinhe, 2011:301-304, Rossouw, 2008:11, Gevisser, 2008:16-17, Phaahla and 
Darley, 2008:22, Tshabalala and Dibetle, 2008:4).  
However, taking into cognisance the fact that the whole episode of xenophobic 
violence that took place in the year 2008 initially started as peaceful gatherings and 
protests for poor government service delivery, it then becomes obvious that the 
intentions of some of the organisers of the first set of protest(s) were hijacked by 
some negative forces. These forces may have capitalised on the above mentioned 
weaknesses of the poor unenlightened masses to unleash violence in Alexandra and 
beyond (Sinwell, 2011:137 and 141, Landau, 2011:12, Mhlana et al., 2008:10, Crush, 
2008:44-54, Ndlovu, 2008b:5, Bearak and Dugger, 2008:15, Krog, 2008:1, Tromp, 
2008:1). Overtime and nurtured by an atmosphere of impunity and weaknesses in the 
judicial system, the violence gained momentum and spread all over the country 
concentrating mostly on informal settlements (Mhlana et al., 2008:10, Johnston, 
2008b:31, Klaaren, 2011:135, Evans et al., 2009:1 and 4). For the same reason of not 
bringing to justice most of the perpetrators of the violence, the xenophobic violence 
soon becomes interpreted as an easy means to illegally acquire wealth and curry 
government‘s attention (Klaaren, 2011:135, Evans et al., 2009:1 and 4, Everatt, 
2011:22, Joubert, 2008b:3, Rossouw, 2008:11, Sekgala, 2009:20, Orfanos, 2009:20, 
Rondganger, 2008b:13, Pillay, 2008:97-100, Johnston, 2008b:31).  
However, what remains unclear is the reason why the violence was resisted by local 
black South African residents in some areas but yet became easily rooted in some 
other places. Different reasons have been advanced for this by researchers, of which 
the most popularly accepted is that the violence was easily rooted were there were 
poor existence of government structures such as law enforcement agencies (Sinwell, 
2011:143-147). But one thing that remains very clear is that the violence took place 
mostly in areas were black South African residents were experiencing high level of 
poverty and deprivation (Sinwell, 2011:143-147, Mhlana et al., 2008:10). One 
obvious fact is that there is a possibility of a ―third force‖ involvement in triggering 
the violence as alleged by government, as some South Africans ended up being very 
ashamed of the actions of their fellow countrymen (Okolo, 2008:3, Memela, 2008:8, 
Naki, 2008a:9, Stewart et al., 2008a:1 and 4, Mhlana et al., 2008:10, Mashaba, 
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2008b:4, Sowetan, 2008c:5, Everatt, 2011:26, Sinwell, 2011:140, Tau, 2008:3, 
Msomi and Meintjies, 2008:1 and 4, Msomi et al., 2008c: 1 and 4, Mogale, 2008:15, 
Crush, 2008:9). Perhaps this is more in the sense that the ANC and IFP have in the 
past recorded a history of violence in Alexandra from where the major violence of 
2008 initially erupted (Sinwell, 2011:138).  
Beyond this, the atmosphere of xenophobia and fear was encouraged by some 
politicians, political demagogues and certain media ‗sensational publications‘ which 
either encouraged or triggered the violence in different parts of the country (Crush 
and Ramachandran, 2010:218, Smith, 2008-2009:26, Human Rights Watch, 1998:20-
21 and 123-125, Neocosmos, 2008). This is despite different warnings from some 
politicians, religious leaders, nationalists and well-meaning South Africans like 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the then premier of Mpumalanga, Matthews Phosa 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998:126-127, Kunda, 2009). 
However, contrary to regular practises in some other countries in Africa and around 
the world, the permission granted by South African government and some citizens to 
allow the integration of refugees and asylum seekers into various local communities 
(both before and after the xenophobic violence), and the massive amount of 
humanitarian assistance received by black African foreigners from many South 
Africans, all speak volumes about the true nature and humanity of most South 
Africans (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2010, Monson and Arian, 2011:179-181, 
Crush, 2008:9, Religious Leaders Training on Conflict Resolution, 2013, Amisi et al., 
2011:77 and 80). Beyond the permission, the fact that hundreds of thousands of black 
African immigrants are working, studying and living successfully in South Africa, 
some since 1994 is a positive indicator of acceptance of foreigners such that allows 
them to be integrated when they are law abiding. This should perhaps be a worthwhile 
prospect for future studies. The strategy of integration of black African migrants into 
various communities in the country remains very important for proper ‗cross cultural 
fertilization‘ and enhanced interaction to take place between the two groups. In 
actuality, this is an indication that if the needs and basic concerns of black South 
Africans are properly taken care of by the government, black South Africans can 
actually live in harmony with black African migrants (Amisi et al., 2011:81). This is 
very vital in the sense that further damage to black South African relations with black 
African immigrants not only possesses a grave danger to South African national 
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security, development, racial integration and foreign policy, but rather there is a 
possibility that it can jeopardise regional peace and stability.  
5.3 Policy Recommendation 
In view of these, it is advisable for South Africa to embark on more pro-active 
measures to prevent further damages to her reputation by embarking on policies that 
will enforce racial, inter/intra group integration and peace in the country. To help 
protect her image and prevent further xenophobic violence, South Africa needs to 
embark on a very dynamic foreign policy that will not only help her neighbours 
sustain political and economic stability, but will help her expand her business 
frontiers. This will not only help reduce the attraction of migration to South Africa, 
but will also assist job creation for both South Africans and citizens of other African 
countries within and beyond the shores of South Africa (Mboyisa, 2008c:3, The Star, 
2008c:9). Thus with the aid of globalisation, the much desired goal of maintaining 
regional stability and establishing good ‗cross cultural fertilization‘ will be acquired.  
The best place to start enforcing policies of national and racial integration is with the 
schools and tertiary institutions where both citizens and foreigner will be 
compulsorily required to go through peace education, learning of local languages of 
choice or community service before graduation. Students in tertiary institutions, both 
South Africans and foreign nationals (but most importantly black African migrants), 
must for the sake of national and regional integration be compelled by the law to 
embark on at least eight months of compulsory but voluntary national service before 
or immediately after graduation  (http://www.nysc.gov.ng/about/objectives.php,2013, 
http://www.nysc.gov.ng/about/about.php,2013, http://www.nysc.gov.ng/,2013, 
http://anambracorpers.pishondesigns.org/history.html, 2010). These voluntary but 
compulsory nationwide services in schools, companies and government departments 
must be carried out in such a manner that people are not posted to serve in areas 
where they are racially compatible as doing so will be counter-productive.   
Therefore to enhance racial/cultural integration and to reduce stereotypes to a 
minimum, government must come up with a national strategy of posting 
students/graduates with different racial backgrounds to work in areas with higher 
concentration of citizens with opposite racial backgrounds. However, this must be 
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carried out under government sponsorship with adequate provision of security 
services already making sure students/graduates have acquired proper peace education 
as their services might be required in dealing with matters of conflict in their areas of 
voluntary service. Beyond the essence of national integration, these compulsory but 
voluntary services will help provide black South Africans the opportunity of acquiring 
some working experience to better their opportunities of gaining employment after 
graduation. 
Most importantly, government needs to adopt more practical measures to on a larger 
scale encourage education of black South Africans, making sure they also 
compulsorily learn and practise peace education within and outside schools applying 
the above stated strategy. A good approach towards actualising this will be to make 
education compulsory for all South Africans, while at the same time encouraging high 
income earning South Africans to financially assist with provisions of scholarships. 
Beyond this, government needs to source for foreign partnership in scholarship 
education of poor black South Africans. Farmers in the country can be encouraged to 
provide free food stuffs monthly to some local community dwellers or farmworkers 
while government provides subsidised food market stores around certain local 
communities or cities. Government needs to partner with NGOs to establish skill 
acquisition centres, security and sporting events in informal settlements and 
local/rural communities around the country in order to keep more local residents busy, 
empowered and secured (Sinwell, 2011:136,138-140). 
Besides the provision of jobs and housing for South African citizens, which is very 
vital, government needs to partner with NGOs to ensure that adverts for scholarship 
admissions are taken into both communities and informal settlements. Providing 
education, jobs and housing for as many South Africans as possible will help to deal 
with inequalities in the society; however it remains very necessary that government 
totally dismantles all apartheid structures that are based on racial hierarchy of social 
benefits. A situation whereby people of different races earn different levels of income 
or social benefits based on the colour of their skin can actually encourage racism in 
the society to a very alarming rate. This is more in the sense that it will make South 
Africans to become unusually racially conscious (Nkomo et al., 1995:263-266). 
Dismantling these racial hierarchies will deal a terrible blow to racism in South 
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Africa. It will help promote/advance equality, diffuse tensions and suspicions 
(especially among black community) in the society thereby generally promoting peace 
and unity in the country (Nkomo et al., 1995:275). 
Furthermore, these initiatives need to be continuously supplemented with what 
Neocosmos (2008:587) describes as ‗the politics of peace‘. This according to 
Neocosmos (2008:587,592-593) implies that all the political propaganda which has 
instilled fear among some South Africans such as alleging an impending invasion by 
aliens and a declaration of war on those who are perceived to be different, needs to be 
abandoned and replaced with a ‗politics of inclusion‘. Among others, this includes: 
regular television and radio discussions on how to deal with xenophobia, an anti-
xenophobia march and awareness campaigns in the streets of major cities, and  getting 
rid of discrimination and treating everybody resident in the country equally as stated 
in the freedom charter (Neocosmos, 2008:593, Sinwell, 2011:140, Nyamnjoh, 2006:3-
4). Politicians need to be legally discouraged from heating up the polity with reckless 
and inflammatory statements that will endanger black African migrants. A sure way 
to get this done is to improve and encourage research in the study of political science 
in various universities in the country. 
A very tactical way of getting this ‗politics of peace‘ to the main root of the society is 
to encourage monthly/regular community and neighbourhood meetings of which each 
neighbourhood/community at the end of every year organises an end of year party. 
This will help bring people together and enhance peaceful coexistence, but for this to 
be more effective, it is important for government to by any means legally necessary, 
discourage the idea of people living separately according to racial categories. This is 
in the sense that this idea, which was the fulcrum of the divide and rule strategy of the 
defunct apartheid regime, became the bane of racial equality and social justice in 
South Africa. People of different races living and holding monthly meetings together 
in neighbourhoods with the support of religious leaders will help promote inter-
racial/intra-racial marriages, peace, unity, equality, security and reduce to a minimum 
the existence of racism, intra-racism, out-groups and negative perceptions of out-
groups. This policy will rather than divide and differentiate people according to racial 
groups, will rather bring closer together people of different races and encourage better 
understanding and interaction of different racial groups. 
127 
 
On the other side, government, police, the legislature and the judiciary needs to be 
properly strengthened and equipped to deal with matters relating to xenophobia/hate 
crimes. The use of inflammatory and obnoxious words that depicts racism or racial 
classifications such as ―amakwerekwere‖, if not so, ought to be abolished. Similarly, 
political and media propaganda that criminalises African immigrants needs to be 
discouraged with a national ‗politics of inclusion‘ (Nyamnjoh, 2006:3-4). Beyond 
making hate crimes punishable by law, the government needs to fully support NGOs 
in campaigns for the protection of human rights in South Africa, in extension the 
rights of immigrants (Amisi et al., 2011:77, Crush, 2008:41). This is very compulsory 
if xenophobic violence in South Africa is to be put into check since it will act as a 
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